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Summary of conclusions 
 
The Report concludes that the establishment of a secure national identity system has the 
potential to create significant, though limited, benefits for society.  However, the 
proposals currently being considered by Parliament are neither safe nor appropriate.  
There was an overwhelming view expressed by stakeholders involved in this Report that 
the proposals are too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a 
foundation of public trust and confidence.  The current proposals miss key opportunities 
to establish a secure, trusted and cost-effective identity system and the Report therefore 
considers alternative models for an identity card scheme that may achieve the goals of 
the legislation more effectively. The concept of a national identity system is 
supportable, but the current proposals are not feasible. 
 
Many of the public interest objectives of the Bill would be more effectively achieved by 
other means.  For example, preventing identity theft may be better addressed by giving 
individuals greater control over the disclosure of their own personal information, while 
prevention of terrorism may be more effectively managed through strengthened border 
patrols and increased presence at borders, or allocating adequate resources for 
conventional police intelligence work. 
 
The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. 
No scheme on this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world. Smaller and less 
ambitious systems have encountered substantial technological and operational problems 
that are likely to be amplified in a large-scale, national system.  The use of biometrics 
gives rise to particular concern because this technology has never been used at such a 
scale. 
 
Any system that supports critical security functions must be robust and resilient to 
malicious attacks. Because of its size and complexity, the identity system would require 
security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and 
operational costs than has been estimated. The proposed use of the system for a variety 
of purposes, and access to it from a large number of private and public sector 
organisations will require unprecedented attention to security. 
 
All identity systems carry consequential dangers as well as potential benefits. 
Depending on the model used, identity systems may create a range of new and 
unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, 
increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens. The success of a 
national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and cooperative approach 
involving all key stakeholder groups including an independent and rolling risk 
assessment and a regular review of management practices. We are not confident that 
these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the Identity Cards Bill. The 
risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the 
scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal 
rights of individuals. 
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Introduction 
 
The introduction of a national identity system will herald a significant shift in Britain’s 
social and economic environment. Many fundamental concepts such as privacy, 
anonymity and the individual’s accountability to government will be repositioned. The 
potential for merging, matching and sharing of personal information across the private 
and public sector will be made possible. For better or worse, the relationship between 
the individual and the State will change. 
 
Surprisingly little research has been undertaken with specific reference to the identity 
card legislation currently being considered by Parliament. The aim of this study is to 
provide a comprehensive review of the Bill, assess the costs and implications arising 
from its provisions, and to suggest areas for improvement. 
 
As this Report observes, support in principle for a national identity card is substantial. 
Opinion polls conducted both by organisations supporting the proposals and by groups 
opposing them have uniformly highlighted a headline support figure of between sixty 
and eighty percent of the population. This principled support should, however, be 
separated from issues of practicality and cost arising from the proposals. It is these latter 
aspects that will form the focus of this project. 
 
There appear to be some significant potential benefits to the UK in adopting a 
harmonised system of identification. However, the risks and the financial implications 
for business and for individuals may be substantial. In producing this report we have 
kept foremost in mind the potential to create an identity system with limited cost and 
risk, but one that brings the maximum benefit to individuals and society. 
 
This report is based on research of available evidence. It does not deal with principle or 
speculation.  
 
There is a surprising degree of agreement between the findings of this report and the 
conclusions of the Home Affairs Committee on the draft Identity Cards Bill. This report 
agrees in whole or part with 79 of the 85 relevant recommendations in the HAC report. 
This concurrence is a crucial test of the strength and validity of both reports. 
 
This Interim Report is not exhaustive, but we believe it does provide a comprehensive 
foundation for further debate about many key aspects of the government's proposals. 
Over the coming weeks we will continue to build on these interim findings to produce a 
final report that will assess a wider range of issues relating to the impact and 
implications of an identity scheme for the UK. 
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Conclusions in detail 
Overview 
This Report assesses the implications, costs, opportunities and consequences arising 
from current legislative proposals to introduce a national identity card scheme.  The 
Report does not challenge or debate the principles that underpin the proposals. The 
goals of combating terrorism, reducing crime and illegal working, reducing fraud and 
strengthening national security are accepted a priori as legitimate responsibilities of 
government. 
 
The Report concludes that the establishment of a secure national identity system has the 
potential to create significant, though limited, benefits for society.  However, the 
proposals currently being considered by Parliament are neither safe nor appropriate.  
There was an overwhelming view expressed by stakeholders involved in this Report that 
the proposals are too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a 
foundation of public trust and confidence.  The current proposals miss key opportunities 
to establish a secure, trusted and cost-effective identity system and the Report therefore 
considers alternative models for an identity card scheme that may achieve the goals of 
the legislation more effectively. The concept of a national identity system is 
supportable, but the current proposals are not feasible. 
 
An appropriate identity system for the United Kingdom would be one based on a 
foundation of public trust and user demand rather than one based on enforcement 
through criminal and civil penalties.  The goal of public trust would be made possible, 
in part, through the use of reliable and secure technologies. 
 
The remainder of this summary outlines the key areas of concern with the proposals as 
they stand.  Each point is discussed in more detail in the main report. 
Purposes of the system 
The current proposals seek to address multiple, divergent goals, yet the evidence from 
other national schemes indicates that identity systems perform best when established for 
clear and focused purposes. The goal of “prevention or detention of crime”, for 
example, involves a potentially huge number of applications and functions that may not 
be appropriate for an identity system that also seeks to achieve a goal of public services 
delivery. 
 
Equally, many of the public interest objectives of the Bill would be more effectively 
achieved by other means.  For example, preventing identity theft may be better 
addressed by giving individuals greater control over the disclosure of their own personal 
information, while prevention of terrorism may be more effectively managed through 
strengthened border patrols and increased presence at borders, or allocating adequate 
resources for conventional police intelligence work. 
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The technological environment 
The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. 
No scheme on this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world. Smaller and less 
ambitious systems have encountered substantial technological and operational problems 
that are likely to be amplified in a large-scale, national system.  The use of biometrics 
gives rise to particular concern because this technology has never been used at such a 
scale. 
 
The proposed system unnecessarily introduces, at a national level, a new tier of 
technological and organisational infrastructure that will carry associated risks of failure. 
A fully integrated national system of this complexity and importance will be 
technologically precarious and could itself become a target for attacks by terrorists or 
others.   
Cost 
Any system that supports critical security functions must be robust and resilient to 
malicious attacks. Because of its size and complexity, the identity system would require 
security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and 
operational costs than has been estimated. The proposed use of the system for a variety 
of purposes, and access to it from a large number of private and public sector 
organisations will require unprecedented attention to security. 
 
Private sector costs relating to the verification of individuals may account for a sum 
equal to or greater than the headline cost figure suggested by the government. Staff 
must be trained to use biometric systems, and in larger organisations must be on hand at 
all times to verify customers and new employees. New facilities may have to be built to 
accommodate applicants who feel sensitive about having their biometrics taken in 
public areas. 
 
The government has substantially underestimated the cost of biometric readers. Because 
of physical irregularity or mental impairment, a significant number of people are unable 
to provide a stable biometric unless expensive equipment is used. 
 
The cost of registration of applicants appears to have been underestimated. The Bill 
makes provision for the disclosure and processing of more than fifty sources of 
identification. This element, coupled with the capture of biometrics and the 
investigation of the biographical history of applicants, may result in registration alone 
costing more than the projected overall cost of the identity system. 
 
The direct cost to people applying to be registered on the system is also likely to be 
higher than anticipated.  Biometric registration may have to be repeated every five years 
for much of the population.  As people age, their biometrics change and become less 
reliable.  As a consequence, these people are more likely to face problems with the use 
of the identity card system and may require more frequent updates of their biometric 
information stored on the system.  Approximately 17 per cent of the population are aged 
over 65 and will fall into this growing class, as will such people as the visually 
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handicapped and those with mental impairment.  The implications for reliability, cost 
and trust in the proposed identity system are significant. 
 
One possible solution to these problems is the endemic use of multiple biometrics. 
However, this would add significantly to the cost of the system. 
The legal environment 
In its current form, the Identity Cards Bill appears to be unsafe in law. A number of 
elements potentially compromise Article 8 (privacy) and Article 14 (discrimination) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Because of the difficulty that some individuals may face in registering or verifying their 
biometrics there is a potential conflict with national laws such as the Disability 
Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act. 
 
The proposals appear to be in direct conflict with the Data Protection Act. Many of 
these conflicts arise from the creation of a national identity register, which will contain 
a substantial amount of personal data, some of which would be highly sensitive. The 
amount of information contained in the register, the purposes for which it can be used, 
the breadth of organisations that will have access to the Register and the oversight 
arrangements proposed are contentious aspects. 
 
The Bill also creates a possible conflict with the right of freedom of movement 
throughout the EU for EU citizens. It is arguable that the Identity Cards Bill may 
discourage non-UK EU workers from coming to the UK to work and so may infringe 
EU principles on the freedom of movement of workers.  Furthermore, EU Directive 
68/360 governing the rights and conditions of entry and residence for workers may 
make it unlawful for the government to require non-UK EU citizens to obtain a UK 
identity card as a condition of residence.  
 
Liability and responsibility for maintaining accuracy of data on the Register, conducting 
identity checks and ensuring the integrity of the overall operation of the scheme has not 
been resolved. The legislation places requirements on individuals and organisations that 
are substantial and wide-ranging, and yet no indication has been given relating to how 
liability would be established, who would assess that liability, or who would police it.  
Oversight 
The oversight arrangements set out in the Bill appear to be inadequate in several key 
respects. An Identity Cards Commissioner as envisioned by the legislation may be an 
insufficient mechanism to adequately promote public trust. The Commissioner will not 
be able to act on individual complaints and cannot assess the practical aspects of the 
scheme. The Commissioner is excluded from assessing the use of criminal and civil 
penalties related to the scheme, information being provided to security agencies and is 
not empowered to review his own functions or powers. Moreover, the Commissioner 
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will report to the Home Secretary, rather than Parliament, and thus may lose the 
appearance of full independence from government.1 
 
The current population of oversight bodies in the UK is complex, inefficient and 
frequently in conflict. Commissioners responsible for various aspects of privacy and 
surveillance, for example, rarely cooperate with each other. Reform of the oversight 
process rather than the addition of more oversight agencies might be the most effective 
way forward.  
International obligations 
The Government has consistently asserted that that biometrics proposals, both in the 
new UK passport format and in the identity cards legislation, is a harmonising measure 
required by international obligations, and is thus no different to the plans and intentions 
of the UK’s international partners. There is no evidence to support this assertion. 
 
We conclude that the Government is unnecessarily binding the identity card scheme to 
internationally recognised requirements on passport documents.  By doing so, the 
Government has failed to correctly interpret international standards, generating 
unnecessary costs, using untested technologies and going well beyond the measures 
adopted in any other country that seeks to meet international obligations.  
Alternative scenarios 
One alternative to the proposed scheme would be to permit a wider range of practical 
applications for day-to-day dealings with businesses. This scenario would make use of 
purpose-specific identity technologies that would give consumers a more secure and 
simple means of accessing commercial organisations in an electronic environment such 
as the Internet. By offering direct consumer benefits as well as government services, 
such systems could assist in securing public support for the scheme. 
 
In considering performance of more limited identity schemes in other countries, and the 
possible applications and limitations of technologies available now or in the near future, 
it is likely that the benefits to individuals and business from the UK scheme are 
extremely limited.  
 
This report concludes that the proposals currently being considered by Parliament do 
not represent the most appropriate, secure, cost effective or practical identity system for 
the United Kingdom. The system outlined by the legislation appears unlikely therefore 
to achieve its stated objectives. 
 
All identity systems carry consequential dangers as well as potential benefits. 
Depending on the model used, identity systems may create a range of new and 
unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, 
increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens. The success of a 
national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and cooperative approach 
                                                 
1 Liberty briefing on the Identity Cards Bill, http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/privacy/id-card-bill-key-
points.pdf.  
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involving all key stakeholder groups including an independent and rolling risk 
assessment and a regular review of management practices. We are not confident that 
these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the Identity Cards Bill. The 
risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the 
scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal 
rights of individuals. 
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Overview of the legislative proposals 
 
The Identity Cards Bill outlines an identity system that has eight components: the 
National Identification Register, a national identity registration number, the collection 
of a range of Biometrics such as fingerprints, the national identity card, provision for 
administrative convergence in the private and public sectors, establishment of legal 
obligations to disclose personal data, cross notification requirements, and the creation 
of new crimes and penalties to enforce compliance with the legislation. 
 
The Bill sets out criteria for the establishment of the system based on “Public Interest”. 
Clause 1(4) of the Bill defines public interest as being “in the interests of national 
security”, “for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime”,  “for the purposes 
of the enforcement of immigration controls”,  “for the purposes of the enforcement of 
prohibitions on unauthorised working or employment” and “for the purpose of securing 
the efficient and effective provision of public services.” 
 
The proposals entail substantial collection and accumulation of personal information. 
Clause 1 and Schedule 1 of the Bill sets out more than fifty categories of information 
required for the register (subject to change by regulation). Along with the standard 
identifiers such as name, birth coordinates, current and previous addresses and 
residential status, the register is also mandated to contain such data as biometric details, 
full chronology of residential location in the UK and overseas, a record of all dealings 
between the individual and the Register and a full audit trail of activity on the Register. 
 
The government has estimated that the cost of the scheme over ten years will be £5.5 
billion, although there is some confusion over the relationship between this figure and 
the cost of providing enhanced biometrics on passports and over the likely arrangements 
for dealing with passport application and enrolment costs.  The current proposal is that 
cost of the scheme will be covered through direct contribution from ID card applicants.  
An “enhanced” biometric passport, which includes entry on the national register, will, 
according to current official projections, cost about £85. Identity registration without a 
passport will on current estimates cost between £35 and £40, with an additional charge 
for the card itself. There will be a charge for the renewal or replacement of cards. 
 
Clause 15 (3) of the Bill specifically prohibits any provision (within the Identity Cards 
Bill) requiring people to carry the card at all times. This clause also rules out 
compulsion to submit a card to receive a benefit or any public service. However, 
following approval of an order, c. 6 (1) empowers the Secretary of State to order 
anybody or everybody to register for a card. Although the government has speculated 
that this clause may not be brought into force for some years, there is no time period 
established in the Bill. Parliament could approve the order to do so at any time it wishes. 
 
The card system will be buttressed by a substantial array of new state powers and 
criminal penalties. The Bill creates a score of new offences including refusal to obey an 
order from the Secretary of State (6(4)), failure to notify authorities about a lost, stolen, 
damaged or defective card (13(1)), failure to renew a card (9(2)), failure to submit to 
fingerprinting (9(4)(b)), failure to provide information demanded by the government 
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(9(4)(d)), failure to attend an interview at a specified place and time (9(4)(a)) and failure 
to notify the Secretary of State of any change in personal circumstances (including 
change of address) (12(1)). Failure to obey an order to register or providing false 
information will also constitute an offence. Penalties range from £1,000 fine to two 
years imprisonment. A penalty of up to £2,500 can be levied for failure to attend an 
appointment for a biometric scan. This fine can be repeated for every subsequent failure 
to attend.  
 
The government proposes to eliminate this risk of forgery and multiple identities by 
establishing a “clean” database of identities. Entry onto the database will require 
multiple biometric capture, biographical footprint checking and a range of primary 
documentation. The Home Office believes that the database will contain no multiple 
identities because a “one to many” check will be used before a person is enrolled.  
 
Biometrics would be taken upon application for a card and for entry on the National 
Identification Register, and would be verified thereafter for major "events" such as 
obtaining a driving license, passport, bank account, benefits or employment.  
Background and chronology 
On November 29th 2004, following a two and a half year gestation, the Government 
introduced and published its Identity Cards Bill.2 This legislation was debated (in 
Second Reading) in the Commons on 20th December, and was then considered in 
Committee in mid January. The legislation reached Third Reading on 10th February 
2005 when it passed by 224 votes to 64. The Second Reading debate in the House of 
Lords is scheduled for 21st March. The Bill is similar in many respects to the Draft 
Identity Cards Bill3 that the Government published in April 2004 following the public 
consultation4 and the Home Affairs Committee hearings.5 
Overview of the scheme 
The Identity Cards Bill is something of a misnomer in that the card element is only one 
part of a much larger integrated scheme. The proposal is multi-faceted and far-reaching, 
and in its current form will involve substantial use of personal information within a 
complex legal and technological environment. 
 
The Bill outlines an identity system that has eight components. 
 
The National Identification Register. This element is the information hub of the 
system. Clause 1 of the Bill imposes an obligation on the Secretary of State to establish 
a central population register containing a wide range of details of every UK citizen and 
resident aged from 16 years and 3 months. 
 
                                                 
2 Identity Cards Bill (as amended by Standing Committee B), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/identitycards/. 
3 Draft Identity Cards Bill, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/identitycards/publications.html. 
4 Legislation on identity Cards: a consultation. Home Office, April 2004, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/identitycards/publications.html. 
5 Home Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/130/13002.htm. 
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The code. Clause 2 (6) requires that every individual must be given a unique number, to 
be known as the National Identity Registration Number (NIRN). This number will 
become the “key” for government and private sector organisations to access information 
on the register and, in certain circumstances, to share that information. 
 
Biometrics. Clause 5 (5) requires individuals to submit to fingerprinting and “other” 
means of physical identification. This is likely to include electronic facial recognition, 
signature and iris recognition. 
 
The card. Clause 8 establishes the actual identity card, generated from and containing 
part of the information in the Register. 
 
Legal obligations. Clause 15 establishes a requirement to produce the card in order to 
obtain public services. 
 
Administrative convergence. The number and the card register will be used by a 
variety of agencies and organisations both for access and disclosures, and in the future 
as a possible administrative base. 1 (5) permits the bringing together of all registration 
numbers (National Insurance, NHS number etc) used by a person. 
 
Cross notification. Agencies will be required to notify each other of changes to a 
person's details. Clause 19 authorises the Secretary of State to disclose details from the 
register to other agencies without the consent of the individual. 
 
New crimes and penalties. The Bill establishes a large number of new crimes and 
offences to ensure that people comply with the ID requirements. 
 
These elements are set out clearly in clause 5 of the Regulatory Impact Assessment6 for 
the Bill. 
 
                                                 
6 Identity Cards Bill, Regulatory Impact Assessment, Home Office. November 2004, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/ria_251104.pdf. 
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Overview of the scheme’s objectives 
The Bill sets out a number of purposes for the Card and the Register. Some are more 
open-ended than others. For example, the scheme is described as “a convenient method 
for such individuals to prove registrable facts about themselves to others”. The Bill also 
establishes that the card scheme will allow “the provision of a secure and reliable 
method for registrable facts about such individuals to be ascertained or verified 
wherever that is necessary in the public interest.” 
 
“Public Interest” encompasses a number of dimensions. Clause 1(4) of the Bill defines it 
as being “in the interests of national security”, “for the purposes of the prevention or 
detection of crime”, “for the purposes of the enforcement of immigration controls”, “for 
the purposes of the enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised working or 
employment” and “for the purpose of securing the efficient and effective provision of 
public services.” 
 
On the face of it, this definition would imply that the card and the register would be 
necessary to seek employment,7 to gain access to health,8 benefits and other services, 
and that it would be used by police, security and immigration officers in the execution 
of their functions. However the words “for the purposes of the prevention or detection 
of crime” could possibly be connected to financial control and money laundering 
regulations to provide a means by which the ID system can be used for a much wider 
range of purposes. The could include operating a bank account, using professional 
                                                 
7 ‘Need a job? Get a card - arresting ID pitch to business’, John Lettice, The Register, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/03/business_immigrant_checks/. 
8 ‘U.K. to Put Biometric Readers in all Hospitals, Blears Says’, Bloomberg. September 28, 2004, 
http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000102&sid=adIU._FV1Wnw&refer=ukU.K. 
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services9 such as a solicitor or accountant, applying for a permit or license, internal 
travel, buying property, stocks or shares, applying for credit or using large amounts of 
cash. 
 
It has been proposed that the card and register may ultimately be used to verify 
entitlement to most if not all public services10 while the Bill and the Regulatory Impact 
Assessment paves the way for widespread use by the private sector. The Assessment 
states that the government will “work closely with private sector organisations to ensure 
that the [ID card] scheme develops along lines which will meet their business 
requirements”. This could mean that links and transactions within private sector records 
are likely to appear alongside the government-held registrable facts associated with an 
individual. 
 
The Home Office recently stated: “We are proposing to make online checks against the 
register the norm, except in those low risk/low value cases where a visual check is 
judged to be sufficient.”11 Responding to a question of whether libraries and video 
rental shops might require the card the Home Secretary told the Home Affairs 
Committee: “Wherever someone is required to prove their identity and those operating 
that particular service have registered so they can use a (biometric) reader then that 
would be fine.”12 
Personal information contained in the Register and on the Card 
The Government has asserted that the creation of the ID system will result in the 
collection of less, not more, personal information than currently exists. In April, for 
example, the Home Secretary told BBC1's Breakfast programme: "There will be no 
more information, in fact a lot less, and much less accessibility than there are for 
shopping cards at the moment”. The Home Secretary repeated this claim during a 
speech13 in November, resulting in a robust response14 from the retail sector. 
 
The government’s claim is contentious in that it appears to confuse data on the identity 
card (i.e. a chip embedded in a piece of plastic) with the national Registry, which is 
where almost all the personal information will be held. (The Bill, however, does not 
specify what information should be contained in or on the card itself, and leaves this to 
regulation). 
 
However, clause 1 and Schedule 1 of the Bill sets out more than fifty categories of 
information that may be required for the register (subject to change by regulation). 
Along with the standard identifiers such as name, birth coordinates, current and 
                                                 
9 ‘New client? ID card please’, Accountancy Age, December 2, 2004, 
http://www.accountancyage.com/news/1138822. 
10 ‘ID card database to support a public service delivery agenda’, Out-law.com, December 6, 2004,  http://www.out-
law.com/php/page.php?page_id=idcarddatabaseto1102340874&area=news. 
11 ‘Talks consider use of ID cards for business’, James Watson, Computing, December 1, 2004, 
http://www.vnunet.com/news/1159786. 
12 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Minutes of evidence, May 4, 2004, http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/uc130-vii/uc13002.htm. 
13 Rt. Hon David Blunkett, Speech to the IPPR, November 17, 2004, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/identitycards_041118speech.htm. 
14 ‘Blunkett concern on loyalty cards’, BBC News online, November 17, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4018939.stm. 
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previous addresses and residential status, the register is also mandated to contain such 
data as biometric details, full chronology of residential location in the UK and overseas, 
a record of all dealings between the individual and the Register and a full audit trail of 
access and disclosure activity on the Register. 
Access to the information on the national register 
Clause 19 of the Bill permits the disclosure of information from the register without the 
individual’s consent to (among other agencies) police organisations, the security 
services, Inland Revenue, the Department for Work & Pensions, the Serious Organised 
Crime Agency and Customs & Excise. 
 
Under clause 19 (3) of the Bill information from the register can be handed to or 
accessed by police for purposes of prevention or detection of crime. This provides 
substantial scope to use the information. Police may, for example, apply to link 
fingerprint information on the register to “crime scene” evidence. They must however 
establish that they have taken reasonable steps to seek the information from other 
sources. 
 
19 (4) provides for the creation of access and disclosure for “other purposes” specified 
by Order. 
Overall cost of the scheme 
The government estimated in 2002 that the scheme would cost somewhere in the order 
of £3.1 billion. When in 2004 the Home Affairs Committee asked the Home Secretary 
to clarify the exact amount he refused, citing commercial secrecy. By the time the final 
Bill was published in November 2004 the government acknowledged that the cost15 of 
the scheme over ten years would be £5.5 billion, though the specific breakdown of this 
figure is somewhat unclear. Industry specialists have warned16 that the complexity and 
uncertainty of the scheme’s architecture and technology could create a higher cost. 
 
Clause 37 also allows the Secretary of State (with the permission of the Treasury) to 
pass regulations to apply additional charges for a range of circumstances such as 
disclosure of information and modification of information on the register. 
Recovery of cost 
The current proposal is that the scheme will be paid for through direct contribution by 
ID card applicants.  An “enhanced” biometric passport, which includes entry on the 
national register, will cost around £85. An ID card without a passport will on current 
estimates cost17 between £35 and £40. There will be a charge for the renewal or 
replacement of cards. 
                                                 
15 ‘Home Office admits cost of ID cards will be double estimate’, Jean Eaglesham and Maija Pesola, Financial Times, 
November 30, 2004, http://news.ft.com/cms/s/fbc6527a-4276-11d9-8e3c-00000e2511c8.html  
16 ‘ID card costs soar as supplier slams technology’, Nick Huber, Computer Weekly, November 4, 2004, 
http://www.computerweekly.com/Article134763.htm. 
17 ‘ID card scheme unveiled by Queen’, BBC News Online, November 23, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4034699.stm. 
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Voluntary and compulsory elements of the scheme 
The Home Office has been clear that its intention has always been to create a 
compulsory regime, but until recently this crucial point has suffered some confusion. 
Government ministers have almost unanimously ruled out the option for legal 
compulsion to carry a card, and indeed clause 15 (3) of the Bill specifically prohibits 
any provision (within the Identity Cards Bill) requiring people to carry the card at all 
times. This clause also rules out compulsion to submit a card to receive a benefit or any 
public service. However, this clause does not provide protection to anyone who has 
been ordered to register for a card under the “compulsion” clause of the Bill. Following 
approval of an order, 6 (1) empowers the Secretary of State to order anybody or 
everybody to register for a card. This might include benefits recipients, new employees, 
people wanting to open a bank account, people of a particular ethnicity, people who 
have been in contact with law enforcement or, indeed, the entire population. Although 
the government has speculated that this clause may not be brought into force for some 
years, there is no time period established in the Bill. Parliament could approve the order 
to do so at any time it wishes. 
 
At the commencement of the first consultation phase the government's stated definition 
of "compulsory" was expressed as: "not required to be carried by each individual at all 
times". Now the official position is that the card will eventually become universal and 
compulsory. That is, it will become compulsory to be entered onto the National 
Identification Register. Clause 2 (4) of the Bill allows the Secretary of State to enter a 
person onto the National Identity Register without that person’s consent. Clause 5 
allows the Secretary of State to propose “designated documents” that will require entry 
onto the Register. This power may apply, for example, when a person applies for or 
renews a passport or when a foreign national seeks a residence permit. Passport holders 
will automatically be entered onto the identification register. For those people who do 
not have a passport 6 (1) will allow the government to require people to be registered. 
 
The proposal for a compulsory stage has met a mixed response. In its final report18 on 
the Draft Identity Cards Bill the Home Affairs Committee warned: “The move to 
compulsion is a step of such importance that it should only be taken after the scrutiny 
afforded by primary legislation: the proposed "super-affirmative procedure" is not 
adequate.” The Committee urged the government to consider compulsion only through 
the introduction of fresh legislation. This recommendation was rejected by the 
government. In fact, the Home Secretary pre-empted even the limited mandate of 
Parliament by issuing a statement in which he announced: “I will now bring forward 
legislation to bring in a compulsory, national ID card scheme.”19 
                                                 
18 Home Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/130/13002.htm. 
19 ‘Home Secretary Sets Out next Steps on ID Cards’, Home Office press release, Reference: 331/2004 -: October 24, 
2004, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/n_story.asp?item_id=1124. 
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Age restrictions within the legislation 
The government has addressed the matter of issue of cards for children from the age of 
5. In its consultation20 paper it identified 36 possible uses of cards in such circumstances 
as entry to “12 Certificate” films and ownership of a pet. 
 
The Bill establishes the minimum age for card registration at 16 years and three months. 
However, 2(7) of the Bill permits the Secretary of State by Order to lower the minimum 
age. This option may be pursued. The government’s consultation paper states: “For an 
entitlement card scheme to be an effective proof of age card, it would need to be 
available to young people over the full range of age restrictions that apply to various 
goods and services”. 
 
Children’s rights groups have expressed concern21 that provisions in the Identity Cards 
Bill may allow a link with data held in the forthcoming national children’s database 
permitted by the Children’s Act. The Children’s Act has been criticised22 by the 
Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights23 over its potential breach of the right 
to privacy. 
Penalties for non-compliance with the legislation 
It is probable that registration for a card will be required for anyone who wishes to 
work, use the banking or health system, travel internationally or receive benefits. As Mr 
Blunkett advised Parliament:24  
“The issuing of a card does not force anyone to use it, although in 
terms of drivers or passport users, or if services - whether public or 
private - required some proof of identity before expenditure was laid 
out, without proof of identity and therefore entitlement to do it I doubt 
whether non-use of it would last very long.” 
It is important to keep in mind that the card will be buttressed by a substantial array of 
new state powers and criminal penalties. The Bill creates a score of new offences 
including refusal to obey an order from the Secretary of State (6(4)), failure to notify 
authorities about a lost, stolen, damaged or defective card (13(1)), failure to renew a 
card (9(2)), failure to submit to fingerprinting (9(4)(b)), failure to provide information 
demanded by the government (9(4)(d)), failure to attend an interview at a specified 
place and time (9(4)(a)) and failure to notify the Secretary of State of any change in 
personal circumstances (including change of address) (12(1)). Failure to obey an order 
to register or providing false information will also constitute an offence. Penalties range 
from £1,000 fine to two years imprisonment. A penalty of up to £2,500 can be levied for 
                                                 
20 Legislation on identity cards: a consultation, Home Office, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/comrace/identitycards/publications.html. 
21 Action on Childrens Rights,  http://www.arch-ed.org/chldrnbill.htm. 
22 ‘Children Bill repeats ID Card database problems’, Out-law.com, September 28 2004, 
http://www.out-law.com/php/page.php?page_id=childrenbillrepeat1096381311&area=news 
23 Joint Committee On Human Rights - Nineteenth Report, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/161/16102.htm. 
24 House of Commons, Hansard, July 3, 2002, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020703/debtext/20703-07.htm 
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failure to attend an appointment for a scan of fingerprints and iris. This fine can be 
repeated for every subsequent failure to attend.  
Enforcement of the penalties 
Many of the offences set out in the Bill are civil penalties. Defendants can object to the 
penalty by writing to the Home Office, but the Secretary of State has the right to 
increase the penalty if they choose to do so (34(3)). People charged in this way can also 
appeal to the courts (35(1)). 
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International environment and obligations 
To date, the discussion on the relationship between the proposed Identity System and 
Britain’s international obligations have been confusing.  On the one hand, the 
Government is calling for the creation of a 'gold standard' for identity using techniques 
and technologies that are unprecedented. On the other hand the Government asserts that 
the legislation is merely a harmonising measure, meeting international obligations, and 
is thus no different to the plans and intentions of the UK’s international partners. 
 
In this section we will look at the nature of the international requirements for 
standardised identity documents.  We will also address developments in other countries. 
 
We conclude that the Government is unnecessarily binding the identity card scheme to 
the internationally agreed requirements on passport documents.  By doing so, the 
Government has failed to correctly interpret international standards, generating 
unnecessary costs, using untested technologies and going well beyond the measures 
adopted in any other country that seeks to meet international obligations.  The 
Government is making unnecessary choices on important international issues in order to 
meet domestic policies.  There are more effective and less complex ways to meet 
international standards and obligations. 
Background to the international context 
It is indeed true that many countries are moving towards enhanced identity 
infrastructures, and much of this activity is attributed to rising concerns regarding 
terrorism.  Countries that have repeatedly held national debates on ID cards and rejected 
the principle are now reconsidering earlier stances.  But a direct response to terrorism is 
rarely a primary driver in these debates. 
 
Many Governments are attempting to create a sense in the public mind that biometric 
identity documents are inevitable.  They argue that the world is moving in this direction, 
that the technology is available and ready, and that states are compelled by international 
obligations to adopt the technology.  Few of these initiatives have been proposed in 
response to terrorism, but are instead initiatives that have been long-standing and 
previously achieved little momentum.  Political and financial momentum was 
subsequently generated after terrorism became a predominant concern. 
 
This situation is best seen in the United Kingdom through the explanations for why an 
Identity Scheme is both desirable and financially viable.  In public statements, the 
Government has focused on changes to the technical standards of travel documents, 
notably passports.  These international travel documents are increasingly burdened with 
additional functionality so they can fuse with the role of identity cards. According to 
Home Office Minister Beverley Hughes,  
"I welcome the publication of the UK Passport Service's Corporate 
and Business plans today. The work carried out over the next five 
years by the UKPS, in partnership with other Government 
departments and agencies, will be crucial to the fight against identity 
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fraud, as we build the base for the compulsory national Identity Card 
scheme. 
 
"Identity crime is a growing threat both here and abroad, and 
facilitates illegal immigration, benefit fraud, illegal working, and 
terrorist activity. It is only by thinking ahead and starting this work 
now that we will tackle this menace, and ensure that the UK is in a 
position to face up to the technological and law-enforcement 
challenges of the future."25 
On the introduction of the draft Bill in April 2004, the Home Secretary announced that 
because passports were necessarily going to be biometrics-enhanced, ID cards were 
inevitable. 
"UK passports are going to be introducing biometrics whether people 
like it or not, because that's the way the world is going. ... Within three 
years we will be in a position to start everyone having a biometric 
passport issued and along with it a biometric card. People will not be 
able to have multiple identities."26 
At the Labour conference in the fall of 2004, the Home Secretary presented how, once 
the Government could link the passport to an extended set of social protections, the 
costs of the passport would help pay for the ID card. 
“[W]e will legislate this winter to upgrade our secure passport system, 
to create a new, clean database on which we will understand and know 
who is in or country, who is entitled to work, to services, to the 
something for something society which we value. As people renew 
their passports, they will receive their new identity card. The cost of 
biometrics and the card will be added to the total of passports.”27 
When the Identity Cards bill was announced in the Queen’s Speech, the Home Secretary 
linked the ID card to the new passport, and extended the cost argument, drawing links to 
U.S. and EU policies. 
“And why the necessity of doing it at all now? Well fairly obviously 
on a very personal level what is it good for in terms for us? If we are 
going to have to pay $100 a throw to get a biometric visa for clearance 
to travel to and from the US and there are 4 of us in the family, it’s a 
lot easier to use a biometric ID card, linked to our new biometric 
passport then it is to have to pay over and over again in order to be 
cleared to be able to get to the US, and that will certainly become the 
case in other parts of the world as well. It’s helpful for us, in terms of 
being able to establish common travel arrangements in Europe. Not 
necessary inside but certainly coterminous with the Schengen travel 
area, in order to be able to do that, alongside our colleagues in France, 
                                                 
25 ‘UK Passport Service 2004-2009 business plan highlights biometric IDs’, March 31, 2004, PublicTechnology.net 
http://www.publictechnology.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=820. 
26 ‘Blunkett pushes for ID card law 'in 18 months'’, Andrew Sparrow, Daily Telegraph, April 26, 2004. 
27 ‘UK ID cards to be issued with first biometric passports’, John Lettice, The Register, October 11, 2004. 
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Germany and Spain who are now developing the issue of biometrics 
for travel inside and outside the European Union.”28 
This line of reasoning was summarised by the Prime Minister, responding to a question 
from the leader of the Liberal Democrats on the practical costs and challenges to the 
proposed scheme. 
“The point that I would make is that what has changed my mind on 
identity cards is that we now have the technology and, indeed, will 
effectively be obliged to use it for passports, which represents the bulk 
of the cost—£70 out of the £85 is for the passport, which we will have 
to introduce in any event. It makes sense in my judgment, when we 
have this biometric technology and when it really can make a 
difference on some of these issues—this is a common consensus 
certainly among the police and enforcement services—that we make it 
clear that ID cards will be introduced.”29 
Following the introduction of the Identity Cards legislation, the Home Secretary 
asserted, in an article for the Times, that 
“This drive towards secure identity is, of course, happening all over 
the world. Under current plans, for example, from next autumn British 
tourists who need a new passport will have to get a biometric one to 
visit the US or get a biometric visa. We will - rightly - have to bear the 
costs of introducing the new technology to enhance our passports 
anyway. We should take the opportunity of that investment to secure 
wider benefits such as those I set out here.”30 
This line of reasoning concludes that biometric ID cards are inevitable. The 
Government has linked the Identity Card to international standards and obligations on 
the passport, whilst extending the mandate of the passport into a much larger 
programme including the management of domestic policy.   
 
With this as the background to the international context, the remainder of this section 
will explain the nature of these international obligations, other international initiatives 
on identity, and how other countries are dealing with these same pressures, initiatives, 
and technologies. 
Passport Standards:  ICAO, the EU, and the U.S. 
Background 
For a number of years the international community has co-operated on increasing the 
security standards on passports.  The UN-level agency responsible for these standards is 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).  In the late 1990s the ICAO 
undertook research on the potential uses of biometrics and other forms of digitisation of 
                                                 
28 Home Secretary ‘Identity Cards Speech’ to the Institute for Public Policy Research, November 17, 2004, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/identitycards_041118speech.htm.  
29 House of Commons, Hansard, December 15, 2004, Column 1664. 
30 ‘ID cards defend the ultimate civil liberty’, Charles Clarke, The Times, December 20, 2004. 
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passport information, but in the years that followed not much progress had been made in 
this quest.   
 
The U.S. Government enlivened this process with the USA-PATRIOT Act.  The USA-
PATRIOT Act, passed by the U.S. Congress following the events of September 2001 
included the requirement that the President certify within two years a biometric 
technology standard for use in identifying aliens seeking admission into the U.S. The 
schedule for its implementation was accelerated by another piece of legislation, the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 2002.  Section 303 and 307 of 
this second law included seeking international co-operation with this standard.  
“By October 26, 2004, in order for a country to remain eligible for 
participation in the visa waiver program its government must certify 
that it has a program to issue to its nationals machine-readable 
passports that are tamper-resistant and which incorporate biometric 
and authentication identifiers that satisfy the standards of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).”31 
This Act created pressure on the Visa Waiver Countries32 to institute new passports that 
include biometrics, and also generated momentum for the activities of the ICAO to 
come up with the standard. 
ICAO Requirements 
Moving the issue of biometric passports to the ICAO pushed the biometrics policy well 
beyond the Visa Waiver Program countries. The ICAO is the international standard-
setter for passports, and since 1995, had been researching biometric passports. Since 
then, the performance of some biometric technologies had improved sufficiently to 
make facial recognition, fingerprints and iris scans contenders for implementation in 
passports standards.  
 
The technical working group assessing these technologies includes representation from 
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. The 
primary purposes of biometric use, according to the ICAO, is to allow for verification 
("confirming identity by comparing identity details of the person claiming to be a 
specific living individual against details previously recorded about that individual") and 
identification ("determining likely identity by comparing identity details of the 
presenting person against details previously recorded on a number of living 
individuals"). Additional potential benefits include advanced passenger information to 
ports of entry and electronic tracking of passport use.  
 
In their review of biometric technologies, the ICAO assessed compatibility according to 
seven criteria, including  
                                                 
31 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 - ALDAC No. 1, Telegram from the Secretary of 
State to all Diplomatic and Consular Posts, on Executive Order 12958, March 14, 2003, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/laws/telegrams/telegrams_1403.html.  
32 Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, 
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
 The LSE Identity Project Interim Report:  March 2005 23 
 
  
- compatibility with enrollment requirements  
- compatibility with MRTD33 renewal requirements  
- compatibility with MRTD machine-assisted identity 
verification requirements  
- redundancy  
- global public perception  
- storage requirements  
- performance  
The ICAO then assessed the available technologies and separated them into three 
groups, based on their overall ability to meet the comprehensive set of requirements, 
and found that 
Group 1: Face achieves the highest compatibility rating (greater than 
85%);  
Group 2: Finger(s) and eye(s) emerge with a second-level 
compatibility rating (near 65%); and  
Group 3: Signature, hand and voice emerge with a third-level 
compatibility rating (less than 50%).  
By 2003, facial recognition emerged as the primary candidate.34 Intellectual Property 
issues prevented iris scans from being accepted; and it was felt that facial recognition is 
more socially acceptable.  The ICAO felt that a single standard biometric technology 
used by all nations would ensure interoperability. This biometric implementation would 
only require the inclusion of a digital photograph embedded on a chip within the 
passport. 
 
Surprisingly, shortly afterward, the ICAO mildly shifted its position.  At a meeting in 
early 2003, its working group stated that 
“ICAO TAG-MRTD/NTWG35 recognises that Member States 
currently and will continue to utilise the facial image as the primary 
identifier for MRTDs and as such endorses the use of standardised 
digitally-stored facial images as the globally interoperable biometric 
to support facial recognition technologies for machine assisted identity 
verification with machine readable travel documents. 
 
ICAO TAG-MRTD/NTWG further recognises that in addition to the 
use of a digitally stored facial image, Member States can use 
standardized digitally-stored fingerprint and/or iris images as 
additional globally interoperable biometrics in support of machine 
assisted verification and/or identification.”36 
                                                 
33 Machine readable travel documents. 
34 International Civil Aviation Organization, Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents ICAO 
TAG MRTD/NTWG Technical Report: Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric 
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation Using Machine Readable Travel Documents, Montreal, ICAO, 
2003.  
35 Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents and New Technology Working Group. 
36 ICAO, Report of the Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents, Fourteenth Meeting, 
Montreal, 6-9 May 2003. 
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The ICAO was recognising that “some States may conclude it desirable to deploy two 
biometrics on the same document.”37 In attempting to accommodate flexibility for the 
varying demands of the member states of the ICAO working groups, the ICAO had 
subverted its primary goal of interoperability. The inclusion by a country of additional 
biometrics on its passport does not aid the travel of citizens from this country because 
only their home country will be able to make use of that biometric.  For example, the 
inclusion of iris data in UK passports will not aid travel to the United States, because 
the U.S. does not record or verify iris scans.  The inclusion of any additional biometrics 
is unnecessary for added international travel security, as the additional biometric can 
only be of use to the British Government for possible domestic uses. 
 
The ICAO’s new position has given rise to two conditions.  First, despite its goal of 
interoperability, the current international standard is flexible in the use of biometrics 
provided that all passports include the mandatory digital photograph.  Second, the ICAO 
standards are mute on the point of whether there needs to be a back-end database that 
stores all biometrics of citizens’ passports, and whether countries may collect these 
biometrics from visitors.  If Britain includes iris scans in its passports, which is not in 
any way required for travel to the U.S., there is nothing that would prevent the U.S., or 
any other country, from collecting and storing the totality of information on British 
tourists.   
 
The ICAO does not require the development of databases of biometric information for 
the issuance of national passports and verification of foreign passports.  In fact, the 
ICAO is aware that there are contentious legal issues involved with the infrastructure 
for these passports, including potential conflict between the goals of centralising 
citizens' biometrics and protecting privacy laws, and collision with 'cultural practices'.  
According to ICAO documents,  
“At States own borders, for passports issued to their own citizens, 
whether to extract the biometric from the traveller’s passport, or from 
a database containing the biometric template assigned to that traveller 
when their passport was issued (note some States are legislatively 
inhibited from storing biometric templates and in this case have no 
choice other than to use the image or template stored in the travel 
document).” 
The ICAO thus states that, 
“ideally, the biometric template or templates should be stored on the 
travel document along with the image, so that travellers’ identities can 
be verified in locations where access to the central database is 
unavailable or for jurisdictions where permanent centralized storage of 
biometric data is unacceptable.”38  
The ICAO goes on to confirm that while central databases can facilitate additional 
security confirmation checks, they are not necessary.  In response, the European 
                                                 
37 ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents:  Introduction, http://www.icao.int/mrtd/biometrics/intro.cfm.  
38 ICAO, Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents:  Technical Report, ICAO TAG 
MRTD/NTWG, May 21, 2004. 
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Commission admitted that this issue required further attention and research to “examine 
the impact of the establishment of such a European Register on the fundamental rights 
of European citizens, and in particular their right to data protection.”39 
 
In response to the ICAO’s statement, an open letter issued to the ICAO by civil society 
organisations from the around the world observed, 
“It may be interesting to see if national governments recall this option, 
or if they rather change their national laws to allow for centralized 
storage, as allowed in other ICAO documents. Creative compliance 
may be a tool of both the state and non-state actors.”40 
The call by Governments for national biometric databases, the creation of databases on 
foreign travellers, and the development of biometrics beyond a digital photograph, are 
not in accordance with international obligations.   
EU Specifications 
The UK Government is by no means alone in its attempts to create biometric databases.  
The European Union has also taken steps in this direction with proposals that will 
involve the collection of fingerprints of all UK residents when they travel within the 
EU. 
 
Despite earlier statements by the European Commission on the need for research on the 
relationship between a biometric database and data protection rules, the Council of the 
European Union has established a policy requiring all 400 million EU biometric 
passports to include fingerprints, each to be stored in an EU register. 
 
The Council of the European Union decided in autumn 2004 to standardise all EU 
passports through the drafting of regulation.  The European Parliament began 
consideration of a standardised biometric passport shortly afterwards.  In October 2004, 
in a closed meeting, the Justice and Home Affairs Council decided to include mandatory 
fingerprinting for all EU citizens in the draft regulation. The Council then pressed the 
European Parliament into hastening the policy through the Parliament in December 
2004, without considering in any detail the decisions made by the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council.  The Parliament was informed by the Council that refusal to accept the 
demands would result in the Council calling for an ‘Urgency Procedure’ that would 
ensure the passage of the regulation. Additionally, if the Parliament had refused, the 
Council threatened to delay the introduction of the co-decision procedure for 
immigration and asylum issues to April 1 instead of the scheduled date of January 1.41 
 
The legality of this course of action is open to question.  However, throughout the entire 
process, the Council had argued that it was compelled to include biometrics into the 
                                                 
39 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Regulation on Standards for Security Features 
and Biometrics in EE Citizens' Passports, Brussels, The European Commission, 2004, 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st06/st06406-re01.en04.pdf.  
40 Privacy International and others, An Open Letter to the ICAO, March 30, 2004, 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-43421.  
41 Privacy International and others, An Open Letter to the European Parliament on Biometric Registration of All EU 
Citizens and Residents, November 30, 2004, http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-
85336.  
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passports because of U.S. requirements.  Again the central argument continues to apply:  
the inclusion of fingerprints in the EU passport system will not assist the U.S. 
authorities, nor is it a requirement from the U.S. authorities. Rather this policy serves a 
EU-domestic policy to generate a registry of fingerprints of all EU citizens and 
residents. 
 
It is important to note that the United Kingdom is not bound by the EU specifications. 
U.S. border regulations 
At this juncture it is useful to review the U.S. requirements once again.  The USA-
PATRIOT Act only requires that the President, within two years, must certify a 
biometric technology standard for use in identifying aliens seeking admission into the 
U.S. The policy was modified by the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act 2002, requiring that all visa-waiver program countries implement, by October 2004, 
biometric passport programmes that satisfy the ICAO standards. 
 
If countries did not comply with the deadline they would be excluded from the Visa-
waiver program, with a costly consequence.  As the deadline approached, however, it 
was becoming clear that no countries in the program were ready to issue biometric 
passports.  The Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security 
recognised that this could create a potential hazard as hundreds of thousands of visitors 
to the U.S. would have to apply for a visa, creating chaos at U.S. consulates and 
embassies.  The Secretaries of State and Homeland Security appealed to the U.S. 
Congress for a two-year delay to the deadline, citing ‘privacy issues’ and the 
technological challenges encountered by these other countries.  The Secretaries warned 
that potential visitors to the U.S. would ‘vote with their feet’ and go elsewhere.42   
 
Congress responded unfavourably to this request, and only granted a one-year 
extension.  Countries now have until October 2005 to implement new passport regimes 
that include a biometric.  Further postponement will be difficult to achieve.  It seems 
unlikely that many countries will be ready for this deadline, particularly if these 
Governments insist on including additional biometrics that involve more complicated 
registration processes and additional technologies and costs. 
 
In order to comply with the ICAO standard, the U.S. is implementing a biometric 
passport of its own.43  The U.S., however, in compliance with the ICAO standard is 
only requiring a digital photograph on a chip in the passport and does not appear to be 
moving towards a database solution. 
 
Meanwhile, the U.S. is photographing and fingerprinting all visitors under the US-
VISIT program.  All personal details that are recorded are kept for 75 years and used by 
various departments in the Federal, State, and tribal governments.  It is important to 
note, unlike in the EU and the UK, the U.S. has decided against fingerprinting and iris-
scanning its own citizens. 
                                                 
42 Letter to the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and the Secretary of State, March 17, 2004. 
43 U.S. Department of State, Abstract of Concept of Operations for the Integration of Contactless Chip in the U.S. 
Passport, April 2004. 
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Identity Systems in other countries 
A number of countries are moving towards including biometrics in identity cards, 
passports, and government databases. 
 
Malaysia,44 Singapore and Thailand are establishing similar card systems. China45 is 
moving rapidly in this direction with the development of a compulsory ID database and 
card system but abandoned the biometric element after it concluded that the technology 
was unworkable with large populations.46 The U.S. military in Iraq is developing a 
similar card and biometric system to control47 access to Fallujah, while the UNHCR48 
has deployed an iris biometric system to control refugee traffic across the Pakistan-
Afghan border. The UAE49 also uses an iris system for border control. No European 
country has such a comprehensive card system as that proposed for the UK. 
 
The Home Affairs Committee observed: 
“Most members of the European Union have voluntary or compulsory 
identity cards. Apart from the United Kingdom the only members 
without any form of identity card scheme are Ireland, Denmark, 
Latvia and Lithuania. Most EU countries have a national register, or 
issue citizens at birth a personal number for use in a wide range of 
circumstances, such as paying tax, opening a bank account or claiming 
benefits. Many cards have a biometric, in the sense that they 
incorporate a fingerprint, and some are compulsory to carry and 
produce on request. No country yet has a biometric system of the sort 
proposed for the United Kingdom, but a number are introducing 
smart-cards and considering options for more sophisticated 
biometrics.”50 
However, with the exception of Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Cyprus, no 
Common law country in the world has ever accepted the idea of a peacetime ID card. 
The Australian51 and New Zealand52 public have rejected similar proposals outright. 
Following widespread criticism,53 Canada abandoned its proposed biometric ID card 
                                                 
44 Vericardsys Website information, http://www.vericardsys.com/MyKad.htm. 
45 ‘China starts to launch second-generation ID cards’, People’s Daily, March 30, 2004, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/30/eng20040330_138863.shtml. 
46 ‘Fingerprints Missing From Chinese National ID Card’, Card Technology, September 11, 2003,   
 http://www.cardtechnology.com/cgi-bin/readstory.pl?story=20030911CTDN261.xml. 
47 ‘Marine Corps deploys Fallujah biometric ID scheme’, John Lettice, The Register, December 9, 2004 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/09/fallujah_biometric_id/. 
48 ‘UNHCR passes 200,000 mark in returnee iris testing’, UNHCR press release, October 10, 2003,  
http://www.un.org.pk/unhcr/press/Oct_10_03.htm. 
49 ‘Iridian Launches Expellees Tracking and Border Control System in UAE’, Biometric Tech News, March 19, 
2003, http://www.biometritech.com/enews/031903d.htm. 
50 Home Affairs Committee, Fourth Report, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/130/13002.htm. 
51 Roger Clarke, Just Another Piece of Plastic for your Wallet: The 'Australia Card' Scheme, 1987,  
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/OzCard.html. 
52 Smart Cards as National Identification Cards, School of Computing & IT, University of Wolverhampton, 1998, 
http://www.scit.wlv.ac.uk/~c9479633/cp3349/smrtid.html. 
53 ‘ID card plan to top $7 billion’, Louise Elliott, Canadian Press, October 6, 2003, 
http://www.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2003/10/06/218966-cp.html. 
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system in early 2004, opting to focus its efforts on enhanced border security.  National 
ID card proposals have consistently been rejected by the United States Congress.   
 
The situation regarding biometric passports is becoming more complicated.  Denmark 
has implemented biometric passports, but the biometric information is kept on the chip 
in the passport and not in a central register. The biometric is limited to a digital 
photograph.  The Swiss have acted similarly.  The Greek Data Protection Authority 
prevented the Government from implementing biometric checks at the borders, forcing 
the Government to abandon its plans for a biometric border system for the Olympics.54   
 
On the other hand, a number of countries are mimicking the UK.  Recently the French 
Government announced its intentions to include further biometrics on its ID card, due to 
“international obligations” from the ICAO to include fingerprints, and in reference to 
the new acceptance of ID cards in the UK since the ‘law’ of December 2004.55  The 
Philippines and Thai Governments are modelling their proposed ID cards on the UK 
scheme, with centralised databases of multiple biometrics tracking a wide range of uses.  
Germany, on the other hand, is considering a similar approach, but was recently warned 
against it on technological grounds.  The German Government had considered the 
inclusion of additional digital biometrics, but the Federal Parliament’s Office of 
Technology Assessment advised against complex systems involving centralised 
databases, warning of “a gigantic laboratory test”, and varying costs depending on the 
scheme selected.  Depending on different scenarios and document features, the report 
says, the cost could range from EUR 22 million to EUR 700 million for implementation 
and from EUR 4.5 million to EUR 600 million for annual maintenance for passports and 
ID cards.56   
United States and Drivers Licenses 
In February 2005 the U.S. House of Representatives approved H.R. 418, the REAL ID 
Act.  It has not been approved by the Senate at the time of writing this report, nor is its 
passage likely to be easy.  The legislation has encountered significant opposition from 
politicians and groups at all points in the political spectrum. 
 
One of the bill’s relevant aims is to establish and rapidly implement regulations both for 
State drivers’ license and for identification document security standards.  The bill first 
requires states to deny drivers’ licenses to undocumented immigrants. This step is seen 
as moving the driver's license into the realm of a national ID card. 
 
The first step in laying the foundations requires that federal agencies refuse any drivers' 
license that does not meet minimum document requirements and issuance standards, 
including verification of immigration status. As a result, temporary residents in the U.S. 
will only get a driver's license that is valid until their authorised period of stay expires. 
For all other non-citizens, licenses will be valid for only one year.  
 
According to the American Immigration Lawyers Association,  
                                                 
54 ‘Biometric checks illegal in Greece, says Data Protection Authority’, eGovernment News, November 11, 2003, 
http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/1775/337.  
55 Ministere de l’Interieure de la Securite Interieure et des Libertes Locales, Le Programme INES, January 31, 2005. 
56 ‘Introduction of biometric ID cards and passports to cost up to EUR 700m in Germany’, eGovernment News, 
November 18, 2004, http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3495/336.  
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“Preventing immigrants from obtaining driver's licenses undermines 
national security by pushing people into the shadows and fueling the 
black market for fraudulent identification documents. Moreover, it 
undermines the law enforcement utility of Department of Motor 
Vehicle databases by limiting rather than expanding the data on 
individuals residing in a particular state. Perhaps more to the point, it 
is clear from the 9/11 and Terrorist Travel staff report that the 
proposed restrictions would not have prevented a single hijacker from 
obtaining a driver's license or boarding a plane. (...) The terrorists did 
not need U.S.-issued driver's licenses to board the planes on 
September 11; they had foreign passports that allowed them to board 
airplanes. Use of foreign passports to board airplanes would still be 
permitted under this provision.”57 
The Act also requires that States sign up to the interstate compact for sharing licensing 
information. 
 
The database that is generated under this regime will also be shared with Mexico and 
Canada. The bill specifies information to be held in the database; including name, date 
of birth, gender, digital photograph, signature, and address. 
 
The law also repeals current law and allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
"prescribe one or more design formats" for the licenses. The White House announced its 
support for the bill, as it will “strengthen the ability of the United States to protect 
against terrorist entry into and activities within the United States.”58 
 
The bill now goes to the Senate for review, where many predict a difficult path ahead.  
The policies in this bill were previously rejected by the Senate when they were included 
within the Intelligence Reform Act 2004, in response to the recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission. 
 
Even at its worst, however, this bill would only give the Federal Government the same 
powers that the Government here already has over the information held in the DVLA.  
The general response to the REAL ID bill in the U.S. is one of widespread concern, and 
there are already a number of pressing court cases on the matter.  Americans generally 
are opposed to ID cards and have rejected all proposals to implement such a system. 
 
The Common Travel Area & the Ireland dimension 
In the event that the UK identity card proposals pass into law, there is a perception that 
the existence of the Common Travel Area of the UK & Ireland will necessitate the 
establishment of an Irish identity card, otherwise the Common Travel Area would 
present a fundamental security loophole in the ID card proposals. This view is not 
supported by evidence. 
 
                                                 
57 American Immigration Lawyers Association, The REAL ID Act of 2005:  Summary and Selected Analysis of 
Provisions, January 27, 2005, http://www.aila.org/contentViewer.aspx?bc=10,911,5516,8191.  
58 Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy:  HR 418 – REAL ID Act of 2005, Office of 
Management and Budget, February 9, 2005. 
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Under the conditions of the Common Travel Area, citizens of each country may travel 
freely within the Area to seek employment or for any other reason without being 
subjected to immigration controls Border authorities may, however, require the 
presentation of passports or some other form of identification. 
 
These rights (within the UK) are enshrined in the 1949 Ireland Act, which stipulates that 
Irish citizens living in Britain can enjoy full freedom of movement between the two 
countries, and should enjoy the same benefits as British citizens. The legislation ensures 
that they are not to be treated as foreign nationals. The government has not signalled 
any intention to repeal these provisions. 
 
Speaking in the House of Commons, Ulster Unionist Party Leader, David Trimble, 
asserted: 
“If the proposal reaches its final stage of being a compulsory identity 
card system, it will be necessary to have persuaded the Irish Republic 
to introduce an almost identical system. A common or shared database 
will probably be needed for it to operate.”59 
In a holding answer to a related question put by David Lidington MP, Citizenship & 
Immigration Minister Des Browne stated: 
“The principle of the Common Travel Area will be unchanged by the 
introduction of identity cards. All third country nationals who have 
permission to stay in the UK for more than three months, irrespective 
of their point of entry, will be required to enrol on the register at the 
three-month point.”60  
This position was confirmed by Home Minister Beverly Hughes, who in answer to a 
question from Sarah Teather MP said “The Government's proposals for identity cards 
do not compromise the principle of the Common Travel Area”.61 
 
The principle of the Common Travel Area may well be unaffected by the identity card 
proposals, but a number of practical issues are likely to emerge if the Common Travel 
Area is to be maintained with Irish membership. The human rights and law reform 
group JUSTICE has observed: 
“The Government needs to address whether the Common Travel Area 
can continue as a viable concept under the ID card proposals. The 
problems are technological as well as legal and ideological; reliance 
on the use of new equipment, who is responsible for this and whether 
they wish to be responsible are all questions that need to be considered 
to make the transition a smooth one.” 
                                                 
59 House of Commons, Hansard, December 20, 2004 : Column 1992, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/cm041220/debtext/41220-31.htm.  
60 Hansard, Written answers, January 10, 2005, Column 305W, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/cm050110/text/50110w83.htm.  
61 Hansard, Written answers, January 26, 2004, Column 214W, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040126/text/40126w51.htm.   
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JUSTICE raised a number of important questions about the practicality of travel under 
the current arrangements if a UK identity system was to commence. These are: 
 
(a) To what extent would the Republic be able to continue to be part of a joint 
immigration area with the UK if that country relied on passport cards that 
contained electronic information that can only be read by specially installed 
machines?  
 
(b) Would the UK government want to install these machines in Irish ports and 
airports, and would the Irish want them?  
 
(c) Would the British people be content with the fact that details on their cards 
could be read outside the UK, above and beyond the biometrics currently 
envisaged by the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAA) and endorsed 
by the EU?  
 
The Irish Department of Justice has also expressed concern about the fate of the 
Common Travel Area, postulating that an identity card system may need to be 
established for Ireland.  
 
Provided that the appropriate technology is in place throughout the Area, we see no 
reason why this step should be taken. Alternative documentation can still be used within 
the Area, as it is now, and those Irish nationals residing in the UK for more than three 
months will be able to apply for a UK identity card, as would the nationals of any other 
country. 
 
32 The LSE Identity Project Interim Report:  March 2005 
 
 
Key objectives of the UK Scheme  
National security, organised crime and terrorism  
This objective has been subject to claim and counter-claim. On July 3rd 2002, in 
response62 to a question by Chris Mullin MP, David Blunkett said “I accept that it is 
important that we do not pretend that an entitlement card would be an overwhelming 
factor in combating international terrorism”. Later, in answer to a question from Sir 
Teddy Taylor MP, he said he would not rule out the possibility of “their substantial 
contribution to countering terrorism”. 
 
The Government’s considered position is that an ID card will help in the fight against 
terrorism. However the essential facts are disputed. David Blunkett has told parliament 
that the security services have advised him that 35 per cent of terrorists use false 
identification, However Interpol general secretary Ron Noble told63 the House of Lords 
Home Affairs Committee that all terrorist incidents involve a false passport. He was 
unable to present evidence to support this claim. 
 
The published evidence tends to refute the more extreme claims. In 2004 Privacy 
International published the findings64 of the only research ever conducted on the 
relationship between identity cards and terrorism. It found that there was no evidence to 
support the claim that identity cards can combat terrorist threats.  
 
The report stated:  
“The presence of an identity card is not recognised by analysts as a 
meaningful or significant component in anti-terrorism strategies. 
 
The detailed analysis of information in the public domain in this study 
has produced no evidence to establish a connection between identity 
cards and successful anti-terrorism measures. Terrorists have 
traditionally moved across borders using tourist visas (such as those 
who were involved in the US terrorist attacks), or they are domicile 
and are equipped with legitimate identification cards (such as those 
who carried out the Madrid bombings). 
 
Of the 25 countries that have been most adversely affected by 
terrorism since 1986, eighty per cent have national identity cards, one 
third of which incorporate biometrics. This research was unable to 
uncover any instance where the presence of an identity card system in 
those countries was seen as a significant deterrent to terrorist activity. 
 
                                                 
62 House of Commons, Hansard debates, July 3, 2002, Column 231,  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-
bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl&URL=/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020703/debtext/20703-05.htm. 
63 ‘All terror attacks use false passports, claims Interpol chief’, John Lettice, The Register, December 2, 2004,  
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/02/noble_wows_lords/. 
64 Privacy International, Mistaken Identity: exploring the relationship between national identity cards and the 
prevention of terrorism, April 2004, http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/uk/id-terrorism.pdf. 
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At a theoretical level, a national identity card as outlined by the UK 
government could only assist anti-terrorism efforts if it was used by a 
terrorist who was eligible and willing to register for one, if the person 
was using their true identity, and if intelligence data could be 
connected to that identity. Only a small fraction of the ninety million 
crossings into the UK each year are supported by comprehensive 
security and identity checks.” 
Crucially, the Bill also contains a fundamental condition that nullifies most of its efforts 
to support counter-terrorism. David Blunkett has told the Home Affairs Committee that 
in order to prevent the creation of “ID card martyrs”65 the government would not make 
it a criminal offence to refuse to be registered for a card. Instead, refuseniks would be 
liable for a civil penalty. In view of some entrenched hostility to the scheme, perhaps 
this approach makes tactical – and politically essential - common sense. However, some 
critics have pointed out that wealthy people66 or those backed by criminal organisations 
can avoid an ID card or registration simply by paying the recurring £2,500 fine. This 
fine could effectively become a tax on criminals and terrorists operating in the UK. 
 
Of equal significance is the admission by the Home Office that visitors to the UK who 
are entitled to a stay of three months or less will not be required to apply for a card. 
 
The government appears to be incrementally backing away from its original assertion 
that the card system would be a tool to directly prevent terrorism. In a recent press 
briefing, Home Office minister Des Browne said67 "It (the ID system) does not stop it 
but it helps you police it and interdict it". 
Identity fraud 
The government has heavily promoted the need to combat the problem of identity theft, 
consistently citing its estimate68 of £1.3 billion per year lost because of the activity of 
identity fraudsters.  
 
While identity theft is indeed a crime that can have a devastating impact on the victim, 
this estimate has been called into question. A 2004 conference69 organised by the Law 
Society heard that the figure was derived from a “best guess”. When the data is more 
closely analysed, the conclusions are less certain. Summarising the presentation by 
Roger Smith, Director of JUSTICE, the Law Society wrote: 
“It (the Cabinet Office report) asserts that £1.3 billion is lost due to 
identity fraud.  However, when you analyse the data closely, it 
dissolves.  Customs is worth £250 million loss on the basis of total 
                                                 
65 Home Affairs Committee, May 4, 2004, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/130/4050405.htm. 
66 ‘There's only one way ID cards won't be abused’, Sam Leith, Daily Telegraph, December 3, 2004, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2004/12/03/do0303.xml. 
67 ‘ID cards: this is not a big brother database’, Andy McCue, Silicon.com, December 1, 2004, 
http://management.silicon.com/government/0,39024677,39126226,00.htm. 
68 Cabinet office, Identity Fraud: a study, July 2002, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/id_fraud-report.pdf. 
69 Law Society conference “Identity Cards: benefit or burden”, London, March 22, 2004. 
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/influencinglaw/policyinresponse/view=article.law?DOCUMENTID=166478.  
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MTIC fraud between £1.7million - £2.6 billion with a midpoint of 
£2.15 billion, we can assume that identity fraud is 10% of this figure.” 
Additionally, credit card fraud is frequently confused with identity theft, and estimates 
of the two activities frequently intersect. 
 
Still, at first sight it appears logical to argue that a national identity system will help 
combat identity theft. There is, however, a substantial body of evidence to show that the 
establishment of centralised identity can increase the incidence of identity theft. 
 
The clearest example of this relationship exists in the United States, where the Social 
Security Number70 has become an identity hub and a central reference point to index 
and link identity. Obtaining a person’s SSN provides a single interface with that 
person’s dealings with a vast number of private and public bodies. Hence the level of 
identity theft in the U.S. is extremely high. 
 
This situation applies equally in Australia,71 where the introduction of an extensive Tax 
File Number has also increased the incidence of identity theft beyond the levels 
experienced in the UK. 
 
The key factor behind identity theft is the widespread availability of a central number, 
linked to a range of personal information. Consumer groups in the U.S. have recently 
criticised the Senate Banking Committee for failing to take action to reverse this trend. 
The Consumers Union argues72 that identity theft will continue to rise until the 
relationship between the SSN and the publication of personal details in the finance 
sector can be reduced. 
 
In the United States, Blue Cross and Blue Shield recently decided to discard the 
inclusion of Social Security numbers to help prevent identity theft. Between April 1 and 
the end of the year, all of the insurance company's members will be given new ID 
numbers and new ID cards containing those numbers.73 
Prevention and detection of crime 
Although Law and Order is a key motivation for the establishment of ID cards in 
numerous countries, their usefulness to police has been marginal.  
 
Assertions that identity cards would be a useful too for policing have received little 
support or substantive backing by academic or law enforcement bodies. During debates 
in the mid-1990’s over the proposed introduction of an identity card the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) said that while it is in favour of a voluntary system, its 
members would be reluctant to administer a compulsory card that might erode relations 
with the public. 
                                                 
70 ‘Proposed California Bill Bans Distribution of Social Security Numbers’, Information Week, December 6, 2004, 
http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=54800697. 
71 Speech by Karen Curtis, Federal Privacy Commissioner, to the 2nd International Policing Conference, Adelaide, 
3rd November, 2004 http://www.privacy.gov.au/news/speeches/sp5_04p.html.  
72 Consumers Union statement, September 23, 2003, 
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core_financial_services/000407.html. 
73 ‘Blue Cross to drop Social Security numbers from ID cards’, The Business Journal, March 8, 2005. 
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According to police in most economically developed countries, the major problem in 
combating crime is not lack of identification procedures, but difficulties in the gathering 
of evidence and the pursuit of a prosecution. Indeed, few police or criminologists have 
been able to advance any evidence whatever that the existence of a card would actually 
reduce the incidence of crime, or the success of prosecution. In a 1993 report, ACPO 
suggested that street crime, burglaries and crimes by bogus officials could be 
diminished through the use of an ID card, though this was in conflict with its position 
that the card should be voluntary. 
 
Support along these lines for the introduction of cards is also predicated on the 
assumption that they will establish a means of improving public order by making people 
aware that they are being in some way observed. Sometimes, cards are proposed as a 
means of reducing the opportunity of crime. In 1989, the UK government moved to 
introduce machine readable ID cards to combat problems of violence and hooliganism 
at football grounds. The general idea was that cards would authorise the bearer to enter 
certain grounds and certain locations, but not others. They could also be cancelled if the 
bearer was involved in any trouble at a ground or related area. The idea was scrapped 
after a report by the Lord Chief Justice claimed that such a scheme could increase the 
danger of disorder and loss of life in the event of a catastrophe at a ground. 
 
One unintended repercussion of ID card systems is that they can entrench wide-scale 
criminal false identity. By providing a one stop form of identity, criminals can easily 
use cards in several identities. Even the highest integrity bank cards are available as 
blanks in such countries as Singapore for several pounds. Within two months of the new 
Commonwealth Bank high security hologram cards being issued in Australia, near 
perfect forgeries were already in circulation. 
 
This conundrum has been debated in Australia, the UK and the Netherlands. It relies on 
the simple logic that the higher an ID cards value, the more it will be used. The more an 
ID card is used, the greater the value placed on it, and consequently, the higher is its 
value to criminal elements. 
 
There appears to be a powerful retributive thread running along the law and order 
argument. Some people are frustrated by what they see as the failure of the justice 
system to deal with offenders, and the ID card is seen, at the very least, as having an 
irritant value. 
 
It is impossible to provide a comparative assessment that would link the existence of a 
national identity card with the overall level of crime in each country. It is, however, 
possible to establish certain inferences by assessing crime trends across Europe. 
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Table 1: Crime Recorded by Police in EU Countries,   1995 - 199974 
Country Recorded Crime Drug -
Trafficking 
Homicides Terrorist 
Incidents75  
 ID Cards 
 % change % change Avg 97-99, 
/100,000 
1968-2005 NC: not 
compulsory 
C: compulsory 
Eire - 21 +139 1.35 26 No  Cards 
England76 - 10 - 6 1.45 165 uk77 No  Cards 
Scotland - 8 + 9 2.10        uk No  Cards 
Denmark - 8 - 56 1.20 28 No  Cards 
Luxembourg - 5 + 23 0.83 5 ID   NC 
Germany - 5 +  33 1.22 458 ID   C 
France - 3 + 29 1.63 1027 ID   NC 
Finland - 2 + 29 2.55 1 ID   NC 
Spain + 1 - 12 2.60 1218 ID   C 
Austria + 1 + 40 0.84 64 ID   NC 
Sweden + 2 - 32 1.94 40 ID   NC 
Netherlands + 2 + 119 1.66 77 ID   NC 
Italy + 5 + 18 1.56 405 ID   NC 
Portugal +11 - 9 1.39 51 ID   NC 
Greece +14 + 128 1.69 593 ID   C 
Belgium +18 + 45 1.75 119 ID   C 
 
These figures do not establish a relationship between cards and levels of crime, but they 
do indicate that there is no safe way to assess whether a card system will influence 
crime trends. It is certainly the case, according to these figures, that crime trends in 
countries without a national ID card tend to be in the downward direction. 
Benefit fraud 
The proposals will in all likelihood have a substantial impact on the use of false 
identities by benefits claimants. This element of benefit fraud, however, represents only 
a small percentage of the overall fraud problem. David Blunkett advised Parliament78 
"benefit fraud is only a tiny part of the problem in the benefit system". The majority of 
fraud on the benefits system is through under-reporting of income, or non-reporting of 
financial and family circumstances. Benefits agencies worldwide agree that false 
                                                 
74 International comparisons of criminal justice; 1999 spreadsheet RDS website issue 6/01 Gordon Barclay et al., 
May 2001, source:  www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/.  
75 Incidents from MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, source: www.tkb.org/Home.jsp.  
76 England and Wales. 
77 N. Ireland had 618 incidents. 
78 House of Commons, Hansard debates, July 3, 2002, Column 230, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-
bin/ukparl_hl?DB=ukparl&URL=/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020703/debtext/20703-05.htm. 
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identity is not a key issue. The Australian Department for Social Security estimated79 
that benefit overpayment by way of false identity accounts for 0.6 per cent of 
overpayments, whereas non-reporting of income variation accounts for 61 per cent.  
 
In evidence80 to the Home Affairs Committee, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the 
Department of Work and Pensions, Chris Pond MP, confirmed that false identity 
represented a tiny fraction of the benefit fraud problem. He said his Department advised 
that of the estimated £2 billion total annual benefit fraud, £50 million came from people 
not being who they said they were when making a claim. There is a possible deterrent 
effect established by an ID system, though this has not been quantified. 
 
It is possible that the cost to government of establishing a new ID infrastructure for 
benefits would amount to more than the annual loss through false identity. 
 
                                                 
79 Privacy International, Identity Cards: frequently asked questions, 1996, 
http://www.privacy.org/pi/activities/idcard/idcard_faq.html. 
80 House of Commons, Minutes of evidence, Home Affairs Committee, April 27, 2004. http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/uc130-vi/uc13002.htm. 
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The legal environment 
The Identity Cards Bill raises a number of issues and potential conflicts relating to a 
variety of existing laws. The most important of these are: 
 
- A number of elements of the Bill potentially compromise Article 8 (privacy) and 
Article 14 (discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
- The Bill also creates a possible conflict with the right of freedom of movement 
throughout the EU for EU citizens. It is arguable that the Identity Cards Bill may 
discourage non-UK EU workers from coming to the UK to work and so may 
infringe EU principles on the freedom of movement of workers.  Furthermore, 
EU Directive 68/360 governing the rights and conditions of entry and residence 
for workers may make it unlawful for the government to require non-UK EU 
citizens to obtain a UK identity card as a condition of residence.  
 
- Because of the difficulty that some individuals may face in registering or 
verifying their biometrics there is a potential conflict with UK laws such as the 
Disability Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act. 
 
- The proposals appear to be in direct conflict with the Data Protection Act. Many 
of these conflicts arise from the creation of a national identity register, which 
will contain a substantial amount of personal data, some of which would be 
highly sensitive. The amount of information contained in the register, the 
purposes for which it can be used, the breadth of organisations that will have 
access to the Register and the oversight arrangements proposed are contentious 
aspects. 
 
- Liability and responsibility for maintaining accuracy of data on the Register, 
conducting identity checks and ensuring the integrity of the overall operation of 
the scheme has not been resolved. The legislation places requirements on 
individuals and organisations that are substantial and wide-ranging, and yet no 
indication has been given relating to how liability would be established, who 
would assess that liability, or who would police it.  
The European Convention on Human Rights 
The fifth report81 of the Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights set out “serious 
concerns” relating to more than a dozen key areas of the ID legislation.  These include: 
 
- The extent of the personal information which will be included within the 
“registrable facts” held on the Register, and whether all of the information held 
serves a legitimate aim, and is proportionate to that aim, as required by Article 8 
(paragraphs 10 –15); 
 
                                                 
81 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Identity Cards Bill, Fifth Report of session 2004-2005, House of Commons & 
House of Lords, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/35/3502.htm. 
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- The potential for personal information to be recorded on the Register without the 
knowledge or consent of the individual concerned, under clause 2(4),which 
allows the inclusion on the Register of information “otherwise available ” to the 
Home Office (paragraph 17); 
 
- The potential for the system of “designated documents ” to render registration 
and ID cards effectively compulsory for certain groups of people who hold these 
documents, and the resultant potential for arbitrary or disproportionate 
interference with Article 8,and for discrimination in breach of Article 14 
(paragraphs 18 –21); 
 
- The potential for a “phased in ” system of compulsory registration and ID cards 
to lead to interference with Article 8 rights which is not justified by any 
legitimate aim, and may discriminate against those groups subject to 
compulsion, contrary to Article 14 (paragraphs 22 –25); 
 
- Under a compulsory scheme, the extent of personal information which may be 
disclosed from the Register to a service provider as a condition of access to 
public services under clause 17,potentially in breach of Article 8,and the lack of 
safeguards against unnecessary disclosure to service providers under clause 17 
- (paragraphs 26 –29); 
 
- The potential, under a compulsory scheme, for both public and private persons 
to make contracts or services conditional on production of an ID card, or access 
to information on the Register, without sufficient safeguards under clause 18,and 
the risk of breach of Article 8 (paragraphs 30 –33); 
 
- Provision for extensive data sharing from both the public and private sectors in 
order to confirm information on the Register, or information which the Home 
Office wishes to enter on the Register, under clause 11 (paragraphs 34 –36); 
 
- Provision for extensive disclosure of personal information on the Register to 
public bodies for a wide range of purposes under clauses 19 –21, and for 
unlimited extension of these powers of disclosure by way of regulations under 
clause 22, without sufficient safeguards, risking breach of the Article 8.2 
requirements that an interference with private life be in accordance with law, 
that it pursues a legitimate aim, and is proportionate to that aim (paragraphs 37 –
43). 
 
This report does not assess or amplify these concerns, but does endorse the need for 
further investigation of the issues raised by the Joint Committee. 
EU Free Movement Principles and Directive 2004/38/EC 
The Government’s Identity Card Bill would appear to require the mandatory registration 
on the National Identity Register of all EU citizens resident in the UK for more than 
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three months.82  This requirement arguably conflicts with EU freedom of movement 
principles and, in particular, with the recently enacted EU Directive on the Free 
Movement of Persons, Directive 2004/38/EC (the Directive).  The Directive’s 
provisions suggest that EU citizens should not and cannot be compelled to register with 
the National Identity Register and obtain an identity card, at least not on the conditions 
set forth in the proposed Bill. 
 
The free movement of persons within the EU remains one of the four pillars of the EU’s 
Internal Market.  Under the free movement principle, EU citizens retain a fundamental 
right to freedom of movement and residence within the EU, as conferred directly by 
Article 39 of the EC Treaty, subordinate legislation and related case law.  The precise 
rights of entry and residence now are governed by a complex body of EU legislation.  
Under legislation that preceded the new Directive, EU citizens could enter another 
Member State “on production of a valid identity card or passport” and stay in that 
Member State for up to three months without the need to comply with any formalities, 
such as obtaining a residence card.  Workers, self-employed persons and their families 
were entitled to a five-year residence permit that could be renewed automatically. 
 
Then, in 2001, the European Commission issued proposals that ultimately resulted in 
the enactment of Directive 2004/38/EC.  The Directive’s principal aim is “to simplify 
and strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens” by 
codifying existing directives into a single legislative act.  The Directive creates a new 
right of permanent residence and sets forth the limits that can be placed on these rights 
by Member States on public policy, public security or public health grounds. 
 
The UK Government has until 30 April 2006 to implement the Directive and, prior to 
implementing the Directive, is precluded from enacting conflicting legislation.  As 
noted by the European Court of Justice in Case C-129/96 Inter-Environment Wallonie 
ASBL v Région Wallonie, “it is during the transposition period that the Member States 
must take the measures necessary to ensure that the result prescribed by [a] directive is 
achieved at the end of that period” and to refrain “from adopting measures liable 
seriously to compromise the results prescribed”.  
 
The Proposed Identity Cards Scheme is Arguably Incompatible with Directive 
2004/28/EC. The Directive requires Member States to allow EU citizens “to enter their 
territory with a valid identity card or passport” (Article 5) and to reside there for up to 
three months “without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to 
hold a valid identity card or passport” (Article 6).  EU citizens, therefore, have the 
express right to stay in the UK for up to three months without any conditions or 
formalities.  Requiring them to acquire a UK identity card during that period of time 
would qualify as a condition or formality.  The Government appears to have accepted 
this and has stated that for “legal reasons, it is not feasible to require EU nationals to 
register until they have been in the UK for three months and intend to stay longer.”83 
                                                 
82 “Registration certificates and residence permits for foreign nationals would be issued, taking account of EU 
standards, but to the same level of security as the UK identity cards and as part of a single overall system of recording 
and verifying the identity of all legal residents”. Cm 6359, Identity Cards:  The Government Reply to the Fourth 
Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session 2003-04 HC 130, p 4. 
83 Cm 6359, Identity Cards:  The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session 
2003-04 HC 130, p 10. 
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Article 7, in turn, confers on all EU citizens the right to reside in another EU Member 
State for more than three months, if the citizen falls into one of the following categories 
of persons:  workers and self-employed persons, students and those with sufficient 
resources to support themselves without becoming a burden on the relevant Member 
State’s social welfare system.84  Article 8 describes the administrative formalities that a 
Member State may apply to such EU citizens -- namely, the host Member State may 
require the EU citizen to “register with the relevant authorities” (Article 8(1)).  Article 
8(2) goes on to clarify that a “registration certificate shall be issued immediately [by the 
Member State], stating the name and address of the person registering and the date of 
registration.”  The “registration certificate” is, however, all that the Directive requires. 
 
A more comprehensive assessment is set out in Appendix 3 of this report. 
Potential conflict with other UK laws 
The Disability Discrimination Act 
In the section on biometrics, this report identified potential problems for blind and 
visually impaired users of iris recognition systems. While this disadvantage will most 
likely extend to a broader range of disabilities, we will concentrate here on issues 
relating to potential discrimination affecting visually handicapped people. 
 
This research raises concerns about consequences of the Bill, particularly: 
 
- The recording on the national Identity Register of biometric data, as set out in 1 
(5)(d) of the Bill; 
 
- The collection from an individual of biometric data, as set out in 5 (5)(b); 
 
- The conditions set out in Section 6 and in 12 (4)(b) requiring an individual to 
submit to biometric identification; 
 
- The powers set out in s.6 requiring the surrender of biometrics to gain access to 
benefits and services; 
 
- The penalties specified in 6 (4) and 12 (1) for failure to obey a directive of the 
Secretary of State and to notify the government of change of personal 
circumstances. The latter on the face of the legislation may encompass changes 
to biometric conditions; 
 
- The Offences specified in Section 30 relating to provision of false information. 
 
The Bill does not contain detailed information regarding the collection or maintenance 
of biometric data.  We understand that details of the proposed system for collection of 
biometric data will be established in Regulations. 
                                                 
84 Family members (whether or not EU citizens) have a corresponding right of residence if they are accompanying or 
joining the EU citizen. 
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Against the backdrop provided by the evidence above, the report raises a number of 
concerns about specific provisions in the Bill. 
 
Eligibility to enroll in the National Identity Register. Section 5 of the Bill requires 
the production by the applicant of “prescribed information”, as determined by the 
Secretary of State. The Secretary of State will have the power to require unspecified and 
unlimited additional data. This may impose significant additional requirements on blind 
and visually impaired people who are unable to successfully register their iris. It may be 
necessary to explore whether the extent of such personal data and identifying 
information should be specified and limits placed on what may be required. 
 
Compulsion.  S.6(1) gives the Secretary of State the power to compel people to register 
and to attend appointments at a designated place and time. S.6(4) and s.6(6) provide for 
severe penalties for failing to attend or for defying such an order (up to £2,500 for each 
breach). There is a concern that blind or visually impaired people may be ordered to 
attend meetings more often than fully sighted people in order to verify their identity. 
Many of these people need to make special arrangements for travel. Others may have 
difficulty negotiating unfamiliar geographic areas to attend a designated location. 
Safeguards and limitations should be in place to protect blind and visually impaired 
people from ongoing impositions and requirements placed on them by a Document 
Authority.  
 
Collection of biometric data. The collection from an individual of biometric data is set 
out in 5(5)(b). The Bill provides no detailed information on the manner of this 
collection, nor does it set out the minimum standards for the technology used. It is 
possible that blind and visually impaired people are more likely to encounter difficulty 
in using the biometric technology, and thus a requirement should be in place on the face 
of the Bill to ensure the protection of their privacy and dignity. 
 
Inability to register an iris. The Bill sets out requirements for the surrender of 
biometrics on the order of the Secretary of State, and establishes penalties for defying 
such an order. This provision raises a number of questions of practicality. How does a 
blind or visually impaired person establish to the satisfaction of a Document Authority 
that he or she is physically incapable of being registered, rather than being obstructive? 
What evidence or documentation should be required to establish the relevant 
circumstances? What arrangements are to be put in place to deal with such situations? It 
can be argued that these conditions should be set out in the Bill rather than being left to 
the Regulations. 
 
Notification of change of personal circumstances. Penalties are specified in 6 (4) and 
12 (1) for failure to obey a directive of the Secretary of State and to notify the 
government of change of personal circumstances. The latter - on the face of the Bill - 
may encompass changes to personal biometric conditions. It would appear, for example, 
that the 200,000 or more people per year who undergo cataract procedures would be 
required to notify the government and (possibly) then be required to re-enrol. Many 
blind or visually impaired people who undergo medical treatment would be unsure of a 
change to their iris biometric. Others with deteriorating eye conditions may feel they 
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should notify the government routinely to avoid a £1,000 penalty. This would, perhaps 
in law, be viewed as an unfair and unacceptable burden. 
 
Provision of services. S.15 of the Bill sets out a requirement for the production of 
identity cards and other “registrable facts” (including biometric data) for the provision 
of benefits and services. The Bill makes no provision, nor sets out any safeguard or 
limitation, for people who are unable to provide a usable biometric. It is important to 
recognise, on the basis of the data set out earlier in this report, that significant numbers 
of blind and visually impaired people may not be able to be verified against their 
enrolled iris. 
 
Provision of false information. The Offences created in Section 30 relating to 
provision of false information give rise to concern. The Bill states that imprisonment 
may result from providing such information when a person (a) knows or believes the 
information to be false; or (b) is reckless as to whether or not it is false. A person with a 
changing or deteriorating eye condition, or a person who is preparing for medical 
treatment, might be accused of fulfilling these conditions. This risk becomes 
particularly substantial at the point of re-enrolment or verification, when an iris may not 
match the biometric recorded on the National Identity Register. The Bill, in the view of 
blind and visually impaired people we have consulted, should be explicit on these points 
and provide appropriate safeguards. 
Potential for indirect racial discrimination 
The potential for indirect racial discrimination under the identity cards regime has also 
been flagged as a potential issue of concern. The Government has acknowledged that 
the “draft legislation and the administration of the scheme is bound by the Race 
Relations Act 1976, as amended by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000”.85  
Section 1A of the Race Relations Act 1976 describes indirect discrimination as a 
measure which is of equal application regardless of race or ethnic or national origins but 
puts or would put persons of the same race or ethnic or national origins “at a particular 
disadvantage when compared with other persons.”  Indirect discrimination is 
permissible but only if it is “a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim”. 
 
The Government argues that the “identity cards scheme itself is non-discriminatory as it 
is intended to cover everyone in the United Kingdom for longer than a specified 
period”.86  However, this statement fails to address adequately the period before identity 
cards become compulsory for all citizens.  The Government will need to ensure that any 
phased rollout of the identity card scheme, such as requiring an asylum seeker to obtain 
an identity card before an existing UK citizen, complies with the principle of 
proportionality. 
The Data Protection Act 
The Data Protection Act (DPA) provides a range of safeguards over the use of personal 
data and would be relevant to the creation of a national identity system. The Information 
                                                 
85 Identity Cards Bill:  Race Equality Impact Assessment, para.13. 
86 Ibid. 
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Commissioner has expressed concerns that the scheme, as set out in the Bill, could 
jeopardise some elements of data protection. 
 
The Act contains eight Data Protection Principles (DPP’s) that establish rights and 
safeguards relating to the collection, processing, access, disclosure, storage and security 
of personal information. These are all central to the design and operation of an identity 
card system.  
 
The Identity Cards Bill raises many questions about compatibility with existing Data 
Protection legislation.  The remaining lack of clarity of purpose and the wide-ranging 
scope for the Secretary of State to amend the various elements of the legislation by 
Order, mean that the elements of transparency and certainty sought by the First Data 
Protection Principle may not be provided.  The lack of clarity has a knock on effect for 
satisfying the rest of the principles – if the purpose is not clear it is difficult to assess 
whether information is relevant or excessive.  The Bill also proposes turning the 
principle that it is the data controller’s duty to ensure the accuracy of their data on its 
head by laying this onus on the individuals themselves.  Furthermore, though not clearly 
stated, it is implicit that the information fed into the National Identity Register will be 
kept indefinitely. 
 
The Bill in many ways seeks to obviate the requirements of the DPA, taking the whole 
ID card outside the data protection regime: ‘The Government’s commitment to make 
the scheme consistent with the data protection legislation can be summarized as outline 
proposals to exempt the scheme from five of the eight data protection principles through 
the use of statutory powers’87 
 
There are three main elements to the First Data Protection Principle: processing must be 
legitimate, fair and lawful. The very enactment of the enabling legislation will ensure 
that any processing will be legitimate. There may be questions however, surrounding 
the other two elements of fairness to individuals and lawfulness.  Although the Bill does 
list more clearly the purposes for which the ID card and Register will be used than in 
earlier proposals, the provisions within the Bill for wide ranging powers of the Secretary 
of State to make amendments to the legislation by Order without sufficient 
consideration by Parliament or public debate mean that the existing purposes and 
consequent disclosures may become less clear over time. Any Fair Processing Notices 
provided by either the Home Office or participating public bodies will become 
inadequate.  
 
Although the Register forms a substantial part of the Bill its existence is not 
acknowledged in the title of the Bill. The problems in the development and maintenance 
of such a database are well known with difficulties including the identification of the 
appropriate technology and the ongoing operation of such large-scale systems. The Data 
Protection Act requires any personal information held in a database to be accurate, up to 
date, relevant, adequate and not excessive for the stated purposes; standards which 
provide sufficient challenges to data controllers. However, should compulsion for the 
whole nation become fact, the scope of the Register, the amount of information to be 
                                                 
87 Memorandum submitted by the Editors of ‘Data Protection and Privacy Practice’ to the Select Committee on Home 
Affairs  
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held and the necessary complexity of the infrastructure will present additional problems 
in terms of compliance with the Data Protection Act. 
 
The Bill states that the Register is to be a convenient method for individuals to prove 
registrable facts about themselves to others and to allow those facts to be ascertained by 
others where it is in the public interest. Only one of those ‘registrable’ facts is a 
person’s identity.  Identity per se is listed in cl. 1(6) of the Bill as being a person’s full 
name, other names by which they have been known, place and date of birth and 
identifying physical characteristics.  The Bill lists another 15 classes of information that 
may be included on the Register. It is difficult to see how the requirement for all this 
information can satisfy the 3rd Data Protection Principle by being relevant, adequate and 
not excessive for the proposed purposes. A person will be required to provide their 
present main address, alternative addresses and previous addresses; a great deal of 
historical information will be collected that will not contribute to a person’s ‘identity’.   
 
The information held on the Register will be disclosable without the consent of the 
individual to the Security Services, Chief Police Officers, Inland Revenue and 
Customs& Excise, any prescribed government department and any other person 
specified by Order by the Secretary of State.  Again the potentially wide audience to 
whom this large and powerful amount of information might be disclosed will go the 
fairness and transparency features of the 1st Data Protection Principle and the specificity 
requirement of the 2nd principle.    
 
The issue of ID cards to those applying for the issue or renewal of certain documents 
such as driving licences and passports will not only contribute to the lack of clarity as to 
purposes but will also undermine the idea that the compulsion to hold an ID card will be 
the subject of scrutiny in Parliament before it is extended to the wider populace. When 
an individual is asked to present an ID card based on one of these documents it is very 
likely that not all information will be relevant on every occasion. The risk is that 
excessive information will be disclosed and possibly retained even where it is not 
necessary for the particular circumstances in which the card was presented and the 3rd 
Principle will again be breached. 
 
If the argument for a National Register is accepted, then the actual practical aspects of 
administration, maintenance and compliance with the information quality data 
protection principles (3rd, 4th, 5th) present very serious concerns.  
  
A more comprehensive assessment is set out in Appendix 4 of this report. 
Liability issues 
The Identity Cards Bill sets forth a number of civil and criminal offences relating to the 
use of identity cards and the information contained on the National Identity Register.  
Notably, it will be an offence under Section 12 to fail to notify within the prescribed 
period any change of circumstances, such as a change of address.  Under Section 11, the 
Secretary of State is empowered to require a third party to provide information about an 
individual for the purposes of verifying the information on the Register.  Section 11(5), 
in particular, offers a non-exhaustive list of the persons who may be covered by this 
requirement, including government departments and Ministers of the Crown.  However, 
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it is clearly intended that the order to provide information could be imposed on anyone, 
such as “local government or the private sector”.88   
 
Nothing in Section 11 appears to limit the scope of such an order of the Secretary of 
State; in particular, it is not clear whether such an order could override duties of 
confidentiality, legal professional privilege, doctor-patient privilege and related duties.  
The net effect of the above is to create a Register which contains information relating to 
persons, that may have been gathered in contravention of duties owed to that person in 
circumstances where the person was unaware that the information was being gathered, 
and that the person affected has no means of knowing what information is being 
gathered or whether it is accurate and correct.   
 
In addition, the Bill does not address whether the individual must consent to the 
provision of the information or whether the individual should be informed that an order 
issued by the Secretary of State has been made or complied with.  Schedule 1 specifies 
that information that may be recorded in the Register includes “particulars of every 
occasion on which information contained in the individual’s entry has been provided to 
a person”.  This implies that information can be entered on the Register without the 
individual’s knowledge or consent.  Yet, without such prophylactic measures, the 
likelihood of inaccurate or false information becoming entered onto the Register 
remains high.   
 
Significantly, it remains unclear to what extent, if any, private parties supplying 
information to the Register may be exposed to liability for providing information about 
individuals that is in fact inaccurate or incorrect.  Given that public bodies will be 
relying on the Register to make determinations that will have a significant impact on the 
lives of the persons concerned, such as decisions related to benefits and public services 
entitlements where the potential harm caused by inaccuracies appearing on the Register 
remains high, the issue of potential liability for private parties remains an important one.   
 
On a related note, Section 11(6)89 makes clear that any third party, including potentially 
non-public entities, submitting information to the Register may owe a duty to the person 
ordering the provision of the information, namely the Secretary of State.  It is unclear to 
what extent such a third party may be liable for incorrect information that it provides to 
the Register and where that inaccuracy leads to an adverse consequence, such as 
preventing or hindering the identification of a security risk.  This issue also requires 
additional clarification. 
 
                                                 
88 Explanatory Notes to the Identity Cards Bill, para. 77. 
89  Section 11(6) of the draft UK legislation states:   
 The power of the Secretary of State to make an order specifying a person as a person on whom a 
requirement may be imposed under this section includes power to provide: 
(a) that his duty to provide the information that he is required to provide is owed to the person imposing it; and 
(b) that the duty is enforceable in civil proceedings: 
 (i)  for an injunction; 
 (ii) for specific performance of a statutory duty under section 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988 (c.36); or 
 (iii)for any other appropriate remedy or relief. 
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Biometrics 
Prosecutions for dealing with or creating false ID cards and high-level identity 
documents have been pursued in many countries, including Britain,90 Hong Kong,91 
Pakistan,92 Ireland,93 Malaysia,94 Yemen,95 Czech Republic,96 Venezuela,97 India,98 
Italy,99 and Sri Lanka100 where the forgeries were supplied to suicide bombers. This 
year the Israeli government estimated that “hundreds of thousands” of fake ID cards are 
in the hands of its population.101 
 
In many cases the false identity was secured merely by bribing an official or by 
providing counterfeit documentation at the point of registration.  The government 
proposes to eliminate this risk by establishing a “clean” database of identities. Entry 
onto the database will require multiple biometric captures, biographical footprint 
checking and a range of primary documentation. The Home Office has explained that 
the database will contain no multiple identities because a “one to many” check will be 
used before a person is enrolled.  
 
A biometric is a measure of identity based on a body part or a behaviour of an 
individual. The most well known biometrics are fingerprints, iris scans, DNA and 
signatures. The position taken by the UK government is that some biometrics are 
extremely secure and reliable forms of ID, and it has promoted the use of fingerprints 
and iris scans to establish one's identity or, at least, one's uniqueness. The theory behind 
this approach is that a biometric is less likely to be spoofed or forged than might a 
simple photo identity card. 
 
In the UK identity proposals, biometrics would be taken upon application for a card and 
for entry on the National Identification Register, and would be used thereafter for major 
"events" such as obtaining a driving license, passport, bank account, benefits or 
employment. The eye and fingers of the applicant would be scanned, and then compared 
both with the biometric on the identity card (which contains the biometrics in electronic 
form), and against a national database (which also contains the biometrics). 
 
                                                 
90 ‘Passport scam uncovered’, BBC News Online, December 3, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/548559.stm. 
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http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail_frame.cfm?articleid=52102&intcatid=42 
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http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2003-daily/29-10-2003/main/main13.htm. 
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95 ‘Yemen confirms Cole suspects' trial’, BBC News Online, December 6, 2000, 
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However, any claim of infallibility is incorrect. All biometrics have successfully been 
spoofed or attacked by researchers. Substantial work has been undertaken to establish 
the technique of forging or counterfeiting fingerprints102 while researchers in Germany 
have established103 that iris recognition is vulnerable to simple forgery.104 
 
A 2002 report of the United States General Accounting Office “Using biometrics for 
border security” states: 
Biometric technologies are maturing but are still not widespread or 
pervasive because of performance issues, including accuracy, the lack 
of applications-dependent evaluations, their potential susceptibility to 
deception, the lack of standards, and questions of users’ acceptance.105 
It also warns against making assumptions about the ability of the technology to perform 
across large populations: 
“The performance of facial, fingerprint, and iris recognition is 
unknown for systems as large as a biometric visa system…”  
There are two distinct problems that can result from failure to adequately register with a 
biometric device. The first is described as the Failure to Enrol Rate (FTER). This 
occurs when a person’s biometric is either unrecognisable, or when it is not of a 
sufficiently high standard for the machine to make a judgment.  The second crucial 
indicator is the False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) that occurs when a subsequent reading 
does not properly match the properly enrolled biometric relating to that individual. 
 
The first problem would result in a person not being enrolled in an identity system. The 
second can result in denial of access to services. While iris recognition appears to 
perform better than other biometrics in both these figures, there are still substantial 
problems, and these are likely to disproportionately affect, for example, visually 
disabled people.  
Usability, accessibility, and acceptance of biometrics 
Usability, accessibility and acceptance of the technology by the citizen are key concerns 
with the implementation of biometrics. 
 
Usability: currently available equipment is difficult to operate, particularly by people 
who are not used to interacting with high-tech equipment, and by those who are not 
using the technology frequently. Some of the problems could be overcome through a 
program of usability testing and re-design to provide better user instructions and 
feedback. Some problems, however, cannot be addressed through re-design and are 
likely to persist. Correct positioning of the body, and presenting the eye in focus to an 
                                                 
102 Tsutomu Matsumoto, Hiroyuki Matsumoto, Koji Yamada, Satoshi Hoshino, Impact of Artificial "Gummy" 
Fingers on Fingerprint Systems, May 15, 2002, http://www.cryptome.org/gummy.htm  
103 ‘Body Check’, Lisa Thalheim, Jan Krissler, Peter-Michael Ziegler, CT Magazine, November 2002, 
http://www.heise.de/ct/english/02/11/114/. 
104 Liveness Detection in Biometric Systems,  http://www.biometricsinfo.org/whitepaper1.htm.  
105 U.S. General Accounting Office, Using Biometrics for Border Security, Washington D.C., November 2002 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf.  
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iris scanner, is difficult for many users.  This will present problems to people with 
certain eye conditions, and to many people who are not using the systems regularly.  
With regular use, usage time can be around 12 seconds per user per identification, but 
for infrequent users, usage times increase substantially, and each failure to verify will 
slow the process down further, and/or demand additional resources for checking identity 
by other means. 
 
Accessibility: A small percentage of people (which would nevertheless amount to tens 
of thousands for an ID card) are unable to enrol fingerprints or iris images.  The quality 
of both characteristics is known to decline with age (fingerprints wear down, some eye 
conditions increasing with age cloud the iris), and operation of equipment becomes 
difficult with some conditions related to ageing (e.g. arthritis and tremor can impair 
ability to place fingerprints, positioning and focussing of the eye with deteriorating 
eyesight, and drooping of eyelids can cover so much of the iris that an image cannot be 
computed). There has been no scientific study to determine the stability of biometric 
characteristics over time.  Apart from ageing, fingerprints may become unrecognisable 
because of cuts or burns, extreme weight gain or loss. Pregnancy and medication can 
affect the recognition of irises.   
 
The vast majority of biometric trials have been in the "frequent traveller" context, using 
volunteers who are predominantly white male professionals in the age group between 
20-55 years old.  The recent UK Passport Service trial funded by the Home Office had a 
representative sub-sample of the whole population, but the results from this trial have 
not been published to date. 
 
Face recognition has a lower failure-to-enrol rate (if removal of veils for enrolment and 
verification is compulsory), but has in past trials shown false rejection rates of around 
10% (i.e. every 10th user with a proper ID card would not be recognised and would be 
subjected to a further test).  For the Smartgate face recognition system in Sydney airport 
(the security check for Quantas crew), an average processing time of 14 seconds, and a 
false rejection rate of 2% is reported.  It is to be noted, however, that this performance is 
achieved with regular (daily) users, who were given special training, and building 
measures to control lighting, and live updating of the templates (i.e. the image taken to 
verify is used to keep the reference image up to date).  These measures are not only 
expensive, but updating of images cannot be contemplated for the ID card, since the 
security risks of doing this in a distributed system (i.e. biometric equipment at various 
border control points a citizen might pass through) are unacceptable. 
 
Acceptance: Many people have concerns about interacting with the technology. Contact 
sensors (e.g. those used for fingerprint recognition) raise hygiene concerns.  Iris 
recognition raises concerns about potential damage to the eye in longer term use, and 
whether the iris image could be used for health diagnostics.  Whilst from a scientific 
point of view, these concerns are without basis (touching a FP sensor is no different 
from touching a door handle, taking photographs of the eye should neither irritate nor 
damage it), the existence of those concerns need to be addressed.  Other concerns (often 
based on scenes from Hollywood movies such as James Bond or Minority Report) are 
expressed about physical safety (criminals might cut off fingers or rip out eyeballs to 
overcome biometric scanners).  The other key category of concern is related to hidden 
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identification and tracking of individuals.  For the biometrics proposed for the ID card, 
this applies particularly to face recognition. 
Fingerprinting 
There are two key points concerning fingerprinting that are likely to compromise the 
government’s objectives. The first is that the proposed system is not “universal”. A 
significant number of people will not be able to use it. The GAO report concluded that 
the fingerprints of about 2 to 5 percent of people cannot be captured “because the 
fingerprints are dirty or have become dry or worn from age, extensive manual labor, or 
exposure to corrosive chemicals”.  
 
These findings are supported by the biometrics industry. BarclayCard has conceded that 
trials with fingerprint biometrics proved them too unreliable as a means of verifying 
identity. People who had recently used hand cream created serious problems for the 
fingerprint readers, as did people with particularly hard or calloused skin, such as chefs, 
gardeners and labourers.  
 
The GAO report raises other concerns that challenge the universality proposition for 
biometrics. It advises that comparative biometric testing has shown that “certain ethnic 
and demographic groups (elderly populations, manual laborers, and some Asian 
populations) have fingerprints that are more difficult to capture than others.” 
 
Error rates in fingerprinting are both significant, and poorly understood. According to a 
recent review106 of available systems, only a handful of products achieved an equal error 
rate of under 3%, and the performance of most was much worse. Furthermore, it would 
be hazardous and risky for governments to lock their core infrastructure into a single 
proprietary product while both attack and defence are evolving rapidly.  
 
According to one expert, our understanding of fingerprints “is dangerously flawed and 
risks causing miscarriages of justice”.107 Amongst the numerous cases of mistaken 
identification through fingerprinting, that of Brandon Mayfield is indicative of the many 
problems in assessment and interpretation of fingerprint data.  
 
Following the Madrid Bombings of March 11, 2004, Spanish National Police managed 
to lift a fingerprint from an unexploded bomb. Three highly skilled FBI fingerprint 
experts declared that Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield's fingerprint was a match to the 
crime scene sample. U.S. officials described the match as “absolutely incontrovertible” 
and a “bingo match”. As a former U.S. soldier, Mayfield’s fingerprint was on the 
national fingerprint system. Mayfield was imprisoned for two weeks. The fingerprint, 
however, was not his. According to one law professor,  
“The Mayfield misidentification also reveals the danger that 
extraneous knowledge might influence experts' evaluations. If any of 
those FBI fingerprint examiners who confidently declared the match 
already knew that Mayfield was himself a convert to Islam who had 
                                                 
106 Fingerprint Verification Competition 2004, Open Category Results: Average results over all databases, 
Preliminary results, http://bias.csr.unibo.it/fvc2004/results.asp. 
107 ‘The Achilles' Heel of Fingerprints’, J.L. Mnookin, Washington Post, May 29, 2004. 
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once represented a convicted Taliban sympathizer in a child custody 
dispute, this knowledge may have subconsciously primed them to 
"see" the match. ... No matter how accurate fingerprint identification 
turns out to be, it cannot be as perfect as they claim.”108  
When Mayfield’s personal information was combined with the crime scene evidence, 
the FBI was convinced of his culpability. Yet according to a recent panel of experts, 
they were wrong.109 As the collection of biometric information increases, and as it 
moves from law enforcement to civilian applications, the error rate may significantly 
increase.  
Iris recognition and blind and visually impaired people 
Iris recognition is a relatively new identification technique. In the decade since the iris 
identification algorithms were patented, nearly all technical reports and trials have been 
conducted at a general level. It appears that no trials have been undertaken with specific 
reference to blind or visually impaired users. When such people are unable to use a 
system for whatever reason, they are referred to within the biometrics industry as the 
“outlier” population (the members of which are colloquially known by the industry as 
“goats”).110 They are frequently excluded from research trials. The reported levels of 
accuracy and acceptability of iris recognition therefore tend to be based on analysis of 
those who are physically able to use the technology rather than representing a cross-
section of the community. 
 
A distinction should be made between the “outlier” population – those who physically 
cannot use the technology – as opposed to the population who would find the 
technology difficult to use or who would produce inconsistent data. The latter group 
may be larger than the outlier population. Not all blind and visually impaired people 
will be unable to use iris recognition technology. Indeed it is quite possible that most 
people will interface with iris recognition, though perhaps with varying degrees of 
difficulty. Such situations will be covered later in this report. 
 
Research findings and medical literature indicate significant potential problems for 
blind and visually impaired people when using iris recognition systems. 
 
A 2002 technology assessment report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 
highlighted a number of problems with the accuracy of iris recognition.111 While 
acknowledging that the mathematics of the technique appeared sound, the enrolment 
and verification elements of iris recognition were far from perfect. The Failure To Enrol 
Rate was around half a percent, while the False Non Match Rate ranged from 1.9 to 6 
percent. This means that around 1:200 of the research population could not enrol, while 
a further 1:18 to 1:50 could not match their enrolled iris.  
 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
109 ‘FBI Faulted in Arrest of Ore. Lawyer’, B. Harden, Washington Post, November 16, 2004. 
110 See references to this term, for example, in http://www.speechtechmag.com/issues/3_3/cover/442-1.html  
111 U.S. General Accounting Office, Using Biometrics for Border Security, Washington DC, 2002, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03174.pdf. 
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It is unclear how much of this failure was due to the inability of visually impaired 
people to interface with the technology, however the report does acknowledge that iris 
technology can be hindered by poor eyesight. It also states that people without glasses 
have a lower FNMR than people wearing glasses. Importantly, the report – one of the 
most substantial yet published – warns: 
People with glaucoma or cataracts may not be reliably identified by 
iris recognition systems.112 
Biometrics researchers – and the industry itself - generally acknowledge the limitations 
of iris technology for blind and visually impaired people. A report published in the FBI 
Law Enforcement Journal observed: 
Although the theory requires additional research, some evidence 
suggests that patterns in the eye may change over time because of 
illness or injury. Therefore, eye identification systems may not work 
for blind people or individuals with eye damage.113 
This view is reflected in various studies and reports. One industry report states: 
Subjects who are blind or who have cataracts can also pose a 
challenge to iris recognition as there is difficulty in reading the iris.114  
A report for the European Commission observes: 
The iris recognition systems had public acceptability problems in the 
past because of the use of an infrared beam. The recent systems 
register the iris image at a distance from the user but users are still 
sceptical of this technology. Blind people or people with severely 
damaged eyes (diabetics) will not be able to use this biometric 
method.115  
A study by the UK National Physical Laboratory reported that: 
(iris recognition) tests revealed difficulty in enrolling a blind person’s 
iris because the system required both eyes to be enrolled.116 
While the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) acknowledges: 
Iris recognition may fail in the case of a blind eye.117 
                                                 
112 ibid p.73.  
113 Stephen Coleman, Biometrics: solving cases of mistaken identity and more. Source: FBI Law Enforcement 
Bulletin v.69 no.6 (June 2000), p. 9-16, ISSN: 0014-5688 Number: BSSI00019069, 
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The biometrics industry appears reluctant to publicly discuss the prevalence of the 
outlier problem. However, in an industry presentation, Iridian Technologies has stated 
that the outlier population for iris recognition is “less than two per cent”.118 This may 
represent up to a million people in the UK.  
 
This is a substantially larger outlier population that has been previously acknowledged. 
In its public statements, industry often cites the incidence of Aniridia, in which a person 
has no iris. Studies have shown Anaridia to occur in about 1:60,000 births. This 
prevalence would translate to almost 1,000 UK residents.119 
 
This however is only one of many populations that may be unable to register with an iris 
recognition system. One medical report examining iris changes following cataract 
surgery concluded: 
Cataract procedures are able to change iris texture in such a way that 
iris pattern recognition is no longer feasible or the probability of false 
rejected subjects is increased. Patients who are subjected to intraocular 
procedures may be advised to re-enrol in biometric iris systems which 
use this particular algorithm so as to have a new template in the 
database.120 
More than 200,000 cataract operations are performed each year in the UK. The 
objective of the NHS “Action on Cataracts programme”, initiated in 1998, is to increase 
the number of cataract procedures carried out in the UK to 250,000 per year.121 
 
The Nystagmus population is also likely to be at a disadvantage when using iris 
recognition technology. The inventor of the iris algorithms, Dr John Daugman, has 
acknowledged: 
Persons with pronounced nystagmus (tremor of the eyes) may have 
difficulty in presenting a stable image; however, some iris cameras 
now use stroboscopic (flashed infrared) illumination with very fast 
camera integration times, on the order of milliseconds, so tremor 
becomes unimportant for image capture.122  
Whether the estimated 60,000 or so people with Nystagmus in the UK will be able to 
use iris biometric systems will depend entirely on whether the government is prepared 
to ensure that appropriate iris camera equipment is made generally available, both in the 
enrolment phase and for all points of verification of the iris. 
 
Daugman has also identified a larger problem facing blind and visually impaired people:  
                                                                                                                                               
117 ETSI EG 202 116 V1.2.1 (2002-09) Design for All, Human Factors (HF) - Guidelines for ICT products and 
services, http://docbox.etsi.org/EC_Files/EC_Files/eg_202116v010201p.pdf. 
118 Industry presentation by Iris Australia & Iridium, http://www.sensory7.com/presentations/DSD.ppt.   
119 emedicine.com, http://www.emedicine.com/OPH/topic43.htm 
120 Roberto Roizenblatt et al., Iris recognition as a biometric method after cataract surgery, BioMedical Engineering 
OnLine 2004, 3:2. 
121 Cited in EuroTimes, published by the European Association of Cataract and refractive surgeons, 
http://www.escrs.org/eurotimes/archive/nov_dec2000/ukopthamologists.asp. 
122 John Daugman, Iris Recognition, available at http://www.icdri.org/biometrics/iris_biometrics.htm.   
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Blind persons may have difficulty in getting themselves aligned with 
the iris camera at arm's length, because some such systems rely on 
visual feedback via a mirror or LCD display to guide the user into 
alignment with the camera.123  
Daugman describes the existence of sophisticated iris cameras that “are mounted on 
automatic pan and tilt platforms that actively home in on an eye, including autozoom 
and autofocus”. Again, the need for such technology at a universal level must be 
recognised from the outset by government if integrity of iris readings is to be maximised 
throughout the population. 
 
Industry selectively acknowledges such difficulties. One Australian iris technology 
company reports: 
There is a very small outlier population that cannot use Iris 
Recognition. These are mainly people who have had cataracts or have 
experienced extreme trauma and scarring to both eyes.124 
The company does not mention problems relating to visual prosthesis, nystagmus or 
total blindness. 
 
There are however many circumstances where enrolment with an iris system is possible, 
but difficult. The iris division of the U.S. based LG Electronics optimistically observes: 
While blind people can be difficult to enrol, there are instances where 
blind people have used iris recognition successfully.125 
There appear to be substantial practical difficulties facing people who have even minor 
eye conditions or visual aids. The UK trials of iris recognition have been suspended 
because of such problems.126 One IT industry publication reported: 
(O)n Thursday (6 May), MPs testing the iris-recognition technology 
were told that up to 7% of scans could still fail, due to anomalies such 
as watery eyes, long eyelashes or hard contact lenses.127  
Multiple biometrics 
The Home Office has stated that it intends dealing with iris recognition failures by 
instituting a second or third biometric – fingerprints or facial recognition.  The GAO 
report makes the point that the False Non Match Rate for fingerprinting can be 
extremely high – up to 36 percent. The failure of facial recognition can be even greater. 
                                                 
123 Ibid. 
124 Argus technology website http://www.argus-solutions.com/about_overview.htm  
125 Website information http://www.lgiris.com/iris/index.html  
126 Hard contact lenses cause the recognition system to fail because their diameter is less than the diameter of the iris. 
Light reflection off the surface of glasses or contacts can cause an unacceptable FTER or FNMR. The iris code is, in 
effect, trinary: Each bit could be either 0, 1 or read as “couldn't measure this bit with sufficient confidence”. With 
partial occlusion (long eyelashes etc) the number of uncertain bits exceeds a threshold and the measurement must be 
attempted again.. With eye damage, depending on the system threshold used, measurement may be impossible and 
must be stopped. If the threshold is set too low there will be too many false matches. 
127 ‘Technical glitches do not bode well for ID cards, experts warn’, Computer Weekly, May 7, 2004. 
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If we assume that this overall failure rate is representative in the population of blind and 
visually impaired people, there will still be a large number of people who are 
consistently rejected by the system after considerable effort. Such a situation, at both a 
legal and a societal level, would be unacceptable. 
 
We believe that the above data clearly establishes that there is a strong likelihood that 
iris recognition will create substantial difficulties and potential denial of services to 
blind and visually impaired people. With this background in mind, the specific elements 
of the draft legislation will now be addressed. 
 
This data presents challenges to the implementation of a national identity system that 
employs iris recognition. At a level of principle and practicality any legislation should 
ensure: 
 
- That visually impaired people will not be denied access to services because they 
are physically unable to register for an Identity Card; 
 
- That visually impaired people will not encounter discrimination in the use of 
identity systems;  
 
- That visually impaired people will not encounter hardship or difficulty when 
registering for a card. 
 
- That the legal requirements imposed on individuals set out in the Bill do not 
place blind and visually impaired people at greater risk of prosecution than 
would be the case for fully sighted people. 
 
The research cited above raises concerns that aspects of the Identity Cards Bill may 
bring about a violation of standards, right and safeguards set out in instruments such as 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 & the Code of Practice of Rights of Access to 
Goods, Facilities, Services and Premises. These and other provisions seek to ensure that 
organisations provide that their procedures and infrastructure do not create disadvantage 
to people with a disability.  
 
The possible use of iris scanning is one of the principal concerns with the Identity Cards 
Bill. There exists a threat that this technique may inherently discriminate against people 
with visual impairment. 
 
The available literature indicates that blind and partially sighted people may be unable 
to use such systems, may generate unstable or unusable biometric data, or may suffer 
disproportionate disadvantage in using such systems. The research indicates that 
because of a deteriorating or unstable sight condition many blind or partially sighted 
people will either not be able to provide Iris Recognition data on enrolment or will 
subsequently provide an altered reading during routine checks or renewal. The Bill 
provides for the imposition of a variety of penalties and offences that may unfairly 
apply to blind and visually impaired people who in good faith use iris systems, but are 
unable to provide data that is accurate or consistent. 
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The environment of public trust 
The creation of public trust in a national identity system depends on a sensitive, 
cautious and cooperative approach involving all key stakeholder groups. Public trust 
thrives in an environment of transparency and within a framework of legal rights. 
Importantly, trust is also achieved when an identity system is reliable and stable, and 
operates in conditions that provide genuine value and benefit to the individual. We are 
not confident that these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the 
Identity Cards Bill. 
 
Public opinion should be separated from public trust. Opinion polls consistently 
demonstrate public support for the concept of an identity card, and yet the detail of 
those polls indicates that people have little trust in the core elements of the proposed 
scheme. Nor, according to the polls, is the overwhelming majority of the population 
convinced of the benefit of the identity card. Few are prepared to pay the sum proposed 
by the government. 
 
A review of polling data suggests that the headline support figure for an identity card 
translates more accurately into support for the goals of an identity card – counter-
terrorism, fraud reduction, illegal working and law enforcement objectives. While this 
level of response is not unusual in polling on public interest policies, it is especially 
relevant to the success of the identity card. Long-term public cooperation is essential to 
the success of a policy of this complexity and importance. 
Public opinion  
Currently, support in principle for a national identity card is substantial. Opinion polls 
commissioned both by organisations supporting the proposals (e.g. Detica) and by 
groups opposing them (e.g. Privacy International) have uniformly highlighted a headline 
support figure of around eighty percent of the population. Polling results in most 
categories are remarkably consistent. 
 
An April 2004 Detica/MORI poll128 provides some insight into public expectations of 
the government’s proposals. A third of the population surveyed tended to support a card 
because they believe it will prevent illegal immigration. This was by far the most 
popular motivation, followed by 21% who perceived it as an aid to law enforcement, 
and 16% who felt it would be an aid in the fight against terrorism.  
 
Proposals to charge people directly for a card appear to be the key trigger for public 
concern. A recent poll (from Reform/ICM)129 indicated that 81% of UK adults support 
government ID plans. However, this headline support was reduced to 67% once the 
costs of the scheme were mentioned (with 31% of those surveyed not wanting to pay 
anything towards a card, and another 30% only willing to pay up to £10 – much less 
than the government is planning to charge).  
 
                                                 
128 Detica/MORI poll, http://www.mori.com/polls/2004/detica.shtml.  
129 Reform/ICM poll, http://www.reform.co.uk/filestore/pdf/041203%20id%20cards%20tables.pdf.  
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Public support appears more complex when other polling figures are examined closely. 
The April 2004 Detica/MORI poll found that two-thirds of those surveyed knew “little 
or nothing” about the ID scheme. There is some evidence that other countries that have 
introduced proposals for ID cards have found that public opinion has turned sharply 
against card schemes once their full details and implications become clear. In Australia, 
initial support of 90% for an “Australia card” turned within months to opposition of 
70% as details of the legislation were analysed by media commentators.  
 
As the UK proposals move through Parliament and towards actual implementation, they 
are likely to receive far more specific attention from the media and the public. Even at 
this stage, the Reform/ICM poll found that a smaller majority (58%) was happy with the 
scheme’s key feature of a centralised database of fingerprints and iris scans. This is 
roughly consistent with an earlier Privacy International/YouGov poll130 that found a 
support of 61% for the database. The ICM survey found opposition of 54% to £1,000 
fines for failing to notify the government of a change of address, and an even split over 
whether increasing the number of police officers would be a better use of public funds. 
A similar level of opposition to address requirements was also found by the Privacy 
International/YouGov poll in May, with 47% opposed (24% strongly) to notification 
requirements. 
 
Public trust in the ability of government may also be a contentious issue. The MORI 
poll found almost 60% of those surveyed had little or no confidence in the 
Government’s ability to introduce a national ID system smoothly.  
Public expectations and perceptions 
The LSE’s research indicates that three components of the identity proposals are likely 
to become prominent in public attitudes. These are (a) the biometrics element of the 
scheme, (b) the privacy and security of personal information, and (c) the balance 
between the financial cost of the system as its value to the individual.  
 
The expectations and presumptions that drive public opinion are clearly more 
significant than the headline support figures themselves. These underlying attitudes 
have been assessed through research into focus group outcomes. Annex Two provides 
details of a study into the views of people with regard to biometrics. The results indicate 
that science fiction movies are a key driver of opinion and perception, that security is a 
keyword for those who support the technology, while surveillance and control are key 
negatives for those who are concerned about the technology. 
 
These results indicate that much has yet to be done to provide a solid foundation of 
knowledge and awareness of these advanced technologies. Until then, public support is 
likely to be fickle. 
 
 
                                                 
130 Privacy International/YouGov poll, 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/uk/idpollanalysis.pdf  
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Design principles and options 
Much of the controversy, challenges, and threats arising from the Government’s identity 
proposals are due to the technological design itself.  While it is true that many of the 
technological details remain undetermined and are to be established at a later date in 
secondary legislation, some of the larger decisions regarding the architecture of the 
scheme are already decided, and are encoded within the bill. 
 
There are many ways to design even the simplest technologies.  The course of history 
has been dramatically shaped by small decisions regarding a technology.  Whether it 
was the intention of the designer, early applications and market opportunities, the social 
norms at the time, or a myriad of other factors, small decisions have transformed the 
way our society works. This is the transformative potential of technology as both an 
enabler and as part of the infrastructure of society. 
 
With Government projects as important as a national identity system, technological 
choices are crucial.  Relatively simple choices, such as which department or ministry is 
responsible for the design of a government infrastructure, may shape future policy 
decisions radically, and may even determine entire courses of action.  For example, in 
the U.S. the choice of which arm of the military would be responsible for the nuclear 
infrastructure dictated much of the Cold War policy because of the use of Air Force 
missile silos rather than Army installations that were mobile.  Similarly, when a 
ministry of energy is responsible for research into nuclear power, the power generators 
that result differ significantly from those designed by a defence ministry. 
 
When the Home Office is the proponent and selector of an infrastructure as vast as an 
identity system, the choices made in the basic design of the system will reflect the 
interests and expertise of the Home Office.  This is particularly important in the design 
of an ID card, particularly as its design goals include not only combating crime, but also 
enabling e-government, enhancing trust in commerce, and providing the ‘gold standard’ 
for identity in Britain.  The Home Office’s design choices are in stark contrast to the 
system being developed in France, emerging from the Ministry for the Civil Service, 
State Reform and Spatial Planning.  The ID Card Bill for the UK proposes a massive 
complex centralised system with an audit trail that focuses on identification, while the 
French system proposes a simpler decentralised and user-oriented system that focuses 
on confidence-building. 
 
In other sections in the report we addressed issues on international environment and 
public opinion.  This section identifies the core differences between the scheme 
proposed here compared to other countries.  We also look to public opinion as a guiding 
principle in the design of the system, trying to build an infrastructure that would work 
from existing trust relations and local identity requirements.  The audit trail is the 
greatest challenge to the proposed UK system, complicating the architecture 
unnecessarily, placing the bill and the ID system on legally problematic grounds, and 
ignoring the existing identification structures in British society. 
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The Challenges Arising from the Government’s Model 
Despite claims of harmonisation and creating a system that is consistent with 
international obligations and practice, the Government contradicts these claims by 
designing a system of unprecedented complexity.  As the Home Secretary stated in his 
first speech on the introduction of the Identity Card Bill, (it) is a mistake in believing 
that what we are putting forward is a replica of anything else that actually exists across 
Europe and the world”.131  Technological and legal challenges emerge from these 
important differences. 
 
Three salient features distinguish the Home Office scheme from other identity card 
systems planned or deployed elsewhere in the world. 
 
- the accumulation of a lifetime “audit trail” of the occasions when a person’s 
identity has been verified and information from the database disclosed; 
- the construction of a central database containing biometrics for an entire 
population, to be used for broad purposes, with the intention of eliminating the 
possibility that each individual could be enrolled more than once;  
- the insistence on a single standard identity in order to generate trust, replacing or 
reframing British social and economic relationships. 
 
These novel aspects raise important questions of compliance with Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which allows for state infringements of privacy 
only to an extent which is necessary in a democratic society and proportionate to 
permitted justifications which include a “pressing social need” and national security. 
 
Along these lines, the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights recently 
published a report that seriously questions the compatibility of the ID Cards Bill with 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Committee states that  
“For interferences with Article 8 rights to be legitimate … it must be 
shown that they interfere with privacy rights to the minimum degree 
necessary, and that their aim could not be achieved by less intrusive 
means …”  
From our research and interviews with computer security experts, the currently 
envisioned national ID card does not meet this test.  
 
If there are reasonable technological alternatives to the Home Office’s scheme which 
can accomplish the objectives permitted by ECHR Article 8 in a way which causes less 
infringement to the privacy rights of the individual, then compliance with ECHR 
requires these technological alternatives to be adopted. 
                                                 
131 Home Secretary Speech to the IPPR, November 17 2004, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/identitycards_041118speech.htm.  
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Audit trails and the arising legal questions 
The Identity Cards Bill defines a category of data to be held in the Register database 
that has come to be known as the “audit trail”.132  It consists of a record detailing 
occasions when an individual’s identity is checked, and consequent disclosures of 
information. It is the last definition in the text of the legislation, but it is of the first 
importance in evaluating the design of the system and the impact on civil liberties . 
 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights report on the Bill states that the 
ECHR infringement caused by the audit trail is particularly significant since it  
...will include a record of the occasions on which his or her entry on 
the Register has been accessed by others (clause 1(5)(h)), for example, 
in the use of public services, or by prospective employers, or as part of 
criminal investigations (regardless of whether these result in 
prosecutions or convictions). Thus the information held on the 
Register may amount to a detailed account of their private life.133 
On the face of the Bill, access to the audit trail is limited to Agencies concerned with 
serious crime and national security, however the JCHR notes that: 
it is a particular concern that the order-making power in clause 22 
would allow the Secretary of State to make further provision for 
disclosure of this material, without the need for additional primary 
legislation.134 
Moreover, the Regulatory Impact Assessment published by the Home Office states that: 
The verification service will be available not just to the authorities 
responsible for maintaining immigration controls but to providers of 
public services and private sector organisations. 
 
Key ID card checks would be performed online to minimise the 
usefulness of high quality forged cards and to provide an audit trail. 
Following consultation with key user groups, there is a clear 
requirement for most verification checks to be made on-line. Ongoing 
specification work is taking account of the need for the verification 
service to have the necessary capacity to support this.135 
The Home Office envisions a “single, standard verification service, operating online to 
achieve full security, (with a) full audit trail of card use”.136 Consequently, the audit trail 
could contain an entry for each instance of online verification to the central database, 
                                                 
132 Sch.1(9)….(a) particulars of every occasion on which information contained in the individual’s entry has been 
provided to a person; (b) particulars of every person to whom such information has been provided on such an 
occasion; (c) other particulars, in relation to each such occasion, of the provision of the information. 
133 JCHR, 5th Report, January 26, 2005, para.13 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200405/jtselect/jtrights/35/35.pdf.  
134 Ibid para.42.  
135 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/ria_251104.pdf  
136 Home Office presentation to Intellect, December 16, 2004, Slide 20, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/Intellect_HO_FINAL.pdf.  
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building up an increasingly dense set of transaction events, across the public and private 
sectors, so that the trail could become a general means of tracking and profiling the 
behaviour and activities of individuals in society, showing where/when/why any checks 
took place. 
 
The privacy implications were briefly explored in Commons Standing Committee:137 
Mr. Richard Allan: ...Another point that it might be helpful to have 
clarified is the scope of the audit trail… Will they form a whole-life 
record? That is the key question. Are we saying that from the moment 
somebody gets an identity card, which is going to be fairly swiftly if 
the Government have their way, the audit trail will be kept for whole 
of life? If at no point will it be deleted as historic data, the data that 
can be disclosed under clause 20(4) will be potentially intrusive and 
comprehensive. The public ought to be aware of the extent to which 
those data will be kept and the circumstances under which they may 
be disclosed. 
 
Mr. Humphrey Malins: …for how long the audit trail will continue. 
Will it continue to my death, perhaps 50 years later? By then, what 
information about me will have been built up on the Register? 
Virtually all my business and domestic activities, and my travel, will 
be on there for people to access. Is there a cut-off point, after a certain 
number of years, when this information will be deleted?...  
 
Mr. Des Browne138: ... in relation to an individual's civil liberties, I 
would much rather that such information was preserved. I can see 
arguments why deletion of that information would give a false 
impression of the way in which an individual's information had been 
accessed. Once it was deleted and lost, the fact that information had 
been abortively accessed on a number of occasions would be lost, and 
that might be just the sort of thing that a commissioner would want to 
comment on. For clear and understandable reasons, I am not prepared 
to set out now the parameters for when that information should be 
stored or deleted. That will develop over time, and it will be a matter 
for the commissioner. 
The Identity Cards Bill (clause 26) provides for the Intelligence Services Commissioner 
to keep under review the Agencies’ acquisition, storage and use of information from the 
Register, and for any associated complaints to be dealt with by the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal, but neither appears to be explicitly empowered to access any portion of audit 
trails relating to Agencies’ usage (i.e. a clause analogous to Cause 24(4)). In fact, the 
Bill does not require a comprehensive audit trail of access by intelligence and serious 
crime agencies, or by any other parties. Clause 3 and Sch.1(9) only provides that an 
audit trail may be recorded. The analysis below presumes these provisions are 
                                                 
137 Identity Cards Bill Standing Committee, Hansard, January 27, 2005, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmstand/b/st050127/am/50127s02.htm.  
138http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmstand/b/st050127/am/50127s04.htm.  
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unintended omissions from the Bill as drafted, which will be rectified in later legislative 
stages. 
The audit trail and the Data Protection Act 1998 
Under the Data Protection Act 1998, individuals have a general right of access to 
personal data held about them. The Information Commissioner has commented in 
relation to apparent restrictions on this right of “subject access” in the Draft Bill, that in 
the current Bill, 
“there is no longer any attempt to restrict an individual’s right of 
access under the Data Protection Act 1998 to certain ‘audit’ or ‘data 
trail’ information.”139 
The Home Office has even attributed their decision to create such extensive data trails 
to “representations from the information commissioner”.140 If true, this amounts to an 
own-goal for the national regulator of information privacy, because the consequence of 
creating a dense and perhaps ubiquitous audit trail are a much worse outcome for 
privacy than the potential abuses against which it is purported to act as a safeguard. 
 
Access of any part of an individual’s entry in the Register (including access to the audit 
trail) should itself generate a corresponding new entry in the audit trail. Therefore the 
entries in the audit trail will logically comprise two types of event: 
 
- consented or aware : a person presenting their card for online verification, to 
authorise use of some public or private service, and concomitant disclosure of 
information from the Register. This includes occasions when an individual 
exercises their right of subject access to information held in the Register, and 
disclosure of that information to the data subject. 
- non-consented or unaware : access to the Register without the individual’s 
awareness and/or specific consent, for example to ascertain identity by means of 
matching with a live biometric obtained after arrest by the police, or checks by a 
public or private organisation empowered to do so without notifying the 
individual. 
 
It is critically important to note that audit trail events of the first kind reveal information 
about the individual’s activities, behaviour and movements, whereas the preponderance 
of audit trail events of the second kind record the activities and behaviour of 
organisations conducting checks on the Register.  
Disclosure under a Subject Access Request 
Under DPA 1998, disclosure of information to an individual asserting their subject 
access right is exempted to the extent it would be: 
 
                                                 
139The Identity Cards Bill - the Information Commissioner’s Perspective, 
http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/The%20Identity%20Cards%20Bill%20Dec%2
004.pdf  
140 Stephen Harrison’s speech to the Law Society, reported in the Guardian 23rd March 2004, ‘Government will Track 
ID card use’, http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,,1175638,00.html.  
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- s.28 – required for the purpose of safeguarding national security 
- s.29 – likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime, the apprehension 
or prosecution of offenders, or the assessment or collection of any tax or duty or 
of any imposition of a similar nature. 
Exemption for national security 
The validity of an exemption claimed under s.28 is adjudicated by the Information 
Tribunal (National Security Appeals), and was tested in a 2001 case involving Norman 
Baker MP.141 The Security Service claimed that under the Neither-Confirm-Nor-Deny 
(NCND) doctrine, a blanket ban on any disclosure of their records was justified. The 
Tribunal rejected the validity of the certificate imposing a blanket ban, because it held 
that there were conceivable circumstances under which disclosure might not breach the 
NCND doctrine. 
 
Whether the exemption is claimed under a blanket or a case-by-case Ministerial 
certificate, under DPA 1998 it is certain that information disclosed to individuals about 
their audit trail will be redacted of any and all events pertaining to access by the 
intelligence and security Agencies. A fortiori, in relation to national security purposes, 
the right of subject access is irrelevant to providing redress against abuses harming the 
individual. 
Exemption for prevention and detection of crime 
If the trail contained records of access to the Register for reasons which would engage 
the exemption allowed by DPA s.29, then the audit trail disclosed to the individual 
could be redacted of access events pertaining to such reasons. Thus the disclosed trail 
would not indicate Register access by serious crime agencies, or other users empowered 
under clause 22, to the extent that exempted “prejudice” would likely be caused. A 
fortiori, in relation to the exempted purposes of DPA s.29, the right of subject access is 
irrelevant to providing redress against abuses harming the individual. 
Differentiating between two types of audit trail events 
As shown in the analysis above, the right of Data Protection subject access to the audit 
trail would not reveal information about access to the Register by security, intelligence 
and in many cases law enforcement agencies (assuming that the audit trail will contain 
information about access by any of these agencies – which as noted previously is not 
explicitly required by the Bill as drafted). 
 
The rationale for the existence of the audit trail is ostensibly to provide the individual 
with a means to seek redress in cases of abuse (so far as permitted by subject access 
exemptions), and the Commissioners and Tribunals with evidence to detect, investigate 
and substantiate instance of abuse and complaints, in the interests of the individual. The 
trail might also serve a secondary function as a means of surveillance, to ascertain the 
whereabouts and activities of an individual, perhaps over an entire lifetime. 
 
                                                 
141 Norman Baker MP v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Decision by the Information Tribunal, 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/foi/bakerfin.pdf.  
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From the point of view of protection of the individual, the audit trail of Register access 
events, of which they are not aware or for which their consent is not required, should be 
maintained for a sufficient period to allow redress of abuse, but there is no such 
compelling reason in the interest of the individual to retain a trail of consented/aware 
access events indefinitely. 
 
The design implications of fixing this problem are relatively simple.  There is no 
technological reason why an individual should not exercise their right of subject access 
to their audit trail by periodically “downloading” a copy to a personal computer from an 
online portal to the Register provided for this purpose. The evidential integrity of this 
audit trail data could be guaranteed by certifying it with a digital signature affixed by 
the Register, (in accordance with the Electronic Communications Act 2000). There is 
then no necessity to require the Register to maintain an original copy of the data, and it 
could be deleted if the individual wishes. Of course the Register would create a new 
audit trail from that time going forward, until again downloaded and deleted. Any 
subsequent claim and investigation of abuse could rely on audit data in the individual's 
custody (and if necessary cross-checked with decentralised secondary records held by 
public or private organisations empowered to make use of the Register). 
 
It may be argued that it would be useful for the Register to keep a copy of the trail in 
case the behaviour/whereabouts/activities of the individual subsequently needed to be 
investigated for some official purpose. But such retention would need to be justifiable 
under the provisions of the Data Protection Act and ECHR Article 8 tests of necessity 
and proportionality. 
 
It may also be argued that the idea of downloading and then erasing trails of the 
consented/aware events will only be of interest to an technophile elite, but the design 
and operation principles established through primary legislation should be durable, and 
it is only in the past decade that most people have had access to personal computers and 
the Internet. 
 
There is therefore overall a strong case for differentiating between audit trails events 
pertaining to Register access and identity verification of which the user is aware or to 
which they have consented, and other types of event. It is not in the interests of the 
individual for a comprehensive trail to be retained indefinitely - the cumulative threat to 
privacy will at some point outweigh the risk of ancient abuse claims incapable of 
pursuit. Furthermore the Investigatory Powers Tribunal imposes a one year time-limit 
on their acceptance of complaints, which would apply equally in relation to complaints 
about the conduct of Agencies in relation to the ID scheme. 
 
At any rate, the residue of trails left after deletion of consented/aware events (at the 
individual’s discretion) would logically be those occasions when the Register was 
checked without the knowledge or permission of the individual. The former category 
constitutes a dossier of life events and behaviour about the individual and is therefore 
highly privacy-invasive, but the latter are predominantly information about the 
behaviour of organisations using and accessing the Register. There is thus a compelling 
rationale to distinguish and clearly separate requirements and policies for the recording 
of these two types of events in any audit trail. 
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There are strong technical and legal analogies with the debate over the mandatory 
retention of telecommunications traffic data (cf. Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 
2001 Part.11), but with these differences: 
 
- audit trails are strictly superfluous to the function of the Register, rather than 
arising through ordinary business processes; 
- the data are created and retained centrally by a government-operated online 
authentication service, rather than scattered in different private-sector (ISP and 
telephone company) records systems. (ECHR Article 8 therefore fully applies); 
- the debate in Standing Committee strongly suggests government currently 
intends no finite limit on retention, and deletion will be the exception not the 
rule; 
- the trails are very strongly authenticated to the individual, and thus more privacy 
invasive than other forms of retained data (e.g. traffic data). 
 
The way to cut the Gordian knot that abuse cannot be redressed unless an audit trail 
exists, is that there should be a retention period fixed by statute (perhaps one year – in 
line with the remit of the IPT) after which all audit trails should be deleted. A long or 
indefinite retention period will over time become the main privacy threat to the 
individual, one that outweighs the risk of a potential inability to pursue redress, but this 
does not seem to have been widely appreciated so far in public debate. 
Design Considerations and Legislative Implications of Audit Trails 
- In order to deal with privacy issues arising from access to the central register, 
the audit trail should record all occasions when access or verification takes place 
without the consent or awareness of the individual; 
- The Investigatory Powers Tribunal and Intelligence Services Commissioner 
would benefit from direct access to the complete audit trail, including those 
portions recording access events within their purview authorised under clause 
23(5); 
- We may distinguish the trail of access and verification events of which the user 
is aware or to which they have consented from other types of event, and require 
deletion after a period fixed by statute, or sooner at the individual's request; 
- It is technologically feasible to require the provision of online Data Protection 
subject access to trails, at the discretion of the individual and certified as valid 
with an official digital signature from the Register. The ID card itself can be 
used as the means to authenticate subject access online; 
- To enable such a system to operate within the confines of British law, through 
the design of the system we can ensure that Commissioners and Tribunals can 
accept trails in user possession, certified by an official digital signature, as valid 
evidence in any complaint or investigation of abuse, and we can ensure that 
unauthorised parties cannot accumulate and retain copies of audit trails through 
periodic and incremental lawful access to the Register, beyond the fixed 
statutory period allowed for retention in the Register. 
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The central biometric database with broad purposes 
Another challenge to the proposed ID card and Register scheme remains that, in order to 
have a biometric system that is proof against duplicate enrolment of individuals, it 
would appear to be necessary to be able to check each enrolment against a central 
database of biometrics already enrolled. This would involve a central database with over 
60 million records containing personal information such as fingerprints, iris-scans and 
other biometrics.   
 
A centralised database solution necessarily gives rise to enormous additional privacy 
challenges.  An alternative scheme would involve the storing of biometrics on a 
‘smartcard’, a card containing a digital processing chip with storage capacity.  It is 
likely that the card envisioned by the Home Office is already going to be a smartcard, 
and if the ID Card is designed in accordance with the passport standards from the 
ICAO, then the biometrics will already be on the chip.  The difference, however, is that 
the biometrics in the UK Identity Card scheme will include a database holding copies of 
the biometrics.  There is an enormous difference in the implications for the human right 
to privacy between this type of system, and one where a biometric is only stored locally 
in a smartcard, as recognised in opinions of the EU Article 29 Working Party on Data 
Protection.142 
 
The Home Office has maintained that a crucial advantage of the proposed scheme is the 
provision of a unique and inescapable identity for each individual and avoidance of the 
possibility of multiple enrolments (which might be used for unlawful purposes).  
 
But a system based on smartcard-stored biometrics would undoubtedly be much less 
costly in design and operation, because identity would be verified by a biometric reader 
matching against the template stored on the card, rather than online against a central 
database of biometrics. If attributes and facts securely stored and periodically refreshed 
on the smartcard were for some reason insufficient, there could still be a central 
Register of facts, but they need not contain biometrics. Offline biometric-reader 
terminals would be far less expensive because no online communication capability 
would be necessary, and no communication costs would be incurred each time the card 
was read. 
 
Nor is it the case that online verification to a central database would be any more secure 
than offline verification against a biometric stored in the card. The authenticity of the 
biometric stored in the card could be checked by a cryptographic digital signature, 
which only government would hold the key to create, preventing fraudulent cards being 
created with a valid biometric.  
 
It may be suggested that checking against a central database is more secure because data 
held centrally would be “fresher” than data held in a smartcard, or 
errors/omissions/malfeasance might occur resulting in differences between data held on 
the cards and a central database. However the database could and should rely on 
                                                 
142 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion No 7/2004 on the inclusion of biometric elements in residence permits and 
visas taking account of the establishment of the European information system on visas (VIS), the European 
Commission, August 11, 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp96_en.pdf 
and Article 29 Working Party, Working document on biometrics, August 1, 2003, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp80_en.pdf. 
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cryptographic techniques143 to ensure that any loss of integrity would be instantly 
detectable. Similarly, cryptography will be used to protect the communications data 
path between a biometric reader and the database in an online checking scenario. The 
cryptography and its implementation will have to be trusted for communication with 
and protection of a central biometric database. If one trusts the cryptography for online, 
why not for offline? 
 
Would online checking help against very sophisticated insider attacks involving 
tampering with the database cryptography? The answer is no – these threats imply 
complete compromise to the integrity of the system. Any putative additional security 
value for online verification is illusory.  
 
Also, offline verification provides a far more resilient system overall. A single, 
centralised online authentication service carries an inherent risk of systemic loss of 
service. A system based on biometric readers that match against templates stored on the 
card do not carry this additional and catastrophic risk of a single point of failure, and 
would permit most transactions to continue. 
 
In summary a central biometric database system with online verification is much more 
costly, much riskier in operation, and for example is extremely vulnerable to distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on its authentication servers. Its sole advantage seems 
to be the possibility of preventing individuals enrolling with multiple identities. 
 
The government has stated in support of the proposed scheme that one-third of terrorist 
incidents involve multiple or false identities. But it would be logically fallacious to infer 
that a system with unique non-duplicated identities could necessarily reduce the 
incidence of terrorism. Terrorists could continue to employ those modalities where they 
have operated under their real identities. 
 
Little benefit fraud involves false or multiple identities, ranging from 1% to 3% . The 
vast majority involves misrepresentation of circumstances (undeclared income, housing 
benefit ineligibility etc.). To bear down on benefit fraud, cross-departmental data-
matching could be used to detect false statements of circumstances, and this would be 
effective because inter-related claims must be connected through related identities. 
What has prevented this to date is a profusion of incompatible legacy systems that are 
unable to co-operate in data-matching cost effectively and reliably. Identification and 
identity management systems are only a small part of solving this problem. 
 
More generally, the position in common law has traditionally been that use of an alias or 
pseudonym is lawfully provided if there is no fraudulent intent. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to ask if there is a risk that introducing an identity system in which multiple 
enrolment and a plurality of official identities was theoretically possible, could lead to 
an explosion in exploiting such a “loophole” for illegal purposes. 
 
However, such concerns can be obviated by adopting some simple principles of 
cryptographic technical design, which are now being developed by IT vendors as 
                                                 
143 Including, but not limited to, such as chained hash functions. 
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“Federated Identity”144 systems, at least one of which has been endorsed by the French 
government145 for precisely such purposes. 
Design Considerations and Legislative Implications of Central Database 
- In order to deal with the privacy and complexity issues arising from the central 
database model, we may prohibit biometric information from being stored in the 
Register; 
- If there is an insistence upon the storing of biometrics on a central database, then 
for security purposes these may be recorded only if they employ privacy 
protection mechanisms which prevent identification unless for purposes specific 
to the function of that database; 
- To ensure consistency, personal data can be redefined to include information 
derived from the scheme which is reasonably likely to be identifiable by any 
combination of parties; 
- It is technologically feasible that identity claims may be made by means of 
cryptographic security tokens derived from the Registrable Facts, which contain 
the minimum personal data necessary to fulfil the intended purpose; 
- To ensure consistency across government departments, we can require each 
public or private-sector service wishing to issue cryptographic security tokens 
derived from personal data in the scheme to provide a Privacy Impact 
Assessment to the Identity Scheme Commissioner and Information 
Commissioner, demonstrating how the design minimises infringement to 
privacy, in compliance with DPA 1998 and the Human Rights Act, for 
certification by both Commissioners.   
Centralised Single Identity and British Social and Economic 
practice 
When asked why they are in favour of ID cards, many of our focus group participants 
responded that they already carry around many forms of ID.  There are two assumptions 
from their responses: 
 
1. We have many forms of identification. 
2. An ID Card would reduce the number of cards that we carry. 
 
Here we look at these two assumptions in some detail.  First, we confirm that indeed 
there are many ways of identifying yourself to the various public sector and private 
sector entities.  Second, we note that the ID card as proposed by the Government could 
be used as a unique identifier to all of these entities.  But we conclude that the ID card 
will transform all of these relationships that we held previously.  In particular, the 
Government’s proposed ID card is poorly designed for our daily lives.  Finally, the ID 
card can never replace all of these forms of identification. 
                                                 
144 For more information see: Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) Supports SAML Version 2.0, 
February 11, 2005, http://xml.coverpages.org/ni2005-02-11-b.html and Federation of Identities in a Web 
Services World, A joint whitepaper from IBM Corporation and Microsoft Corporation,  http://www-
128.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-fedworld/. 
145 The French E-Government Strategic Plan (PSAE) 2004-2007, pp.15 
http://www.adae.gouv.fr/IMG/rtf/Le_plan_strategique-GB.rtf.  
 The LSE Identity Project Interim Report:  March 2005 69 
 
  
 
Currently, individuals can gain access to government and private-sector services 
through the disclosure of personal information and through presenting some form of ID 
or authentication when required.  But generally these relationships currently take place 
without disclosing a universal ID number. The forms of identification that we present to 
these entities either show proof of entitlement, or they provide use of service-specific 
account details.  The advantage of the existing situation is not just that it is privacy-
protecting.  Rather, the greatest advantage of the existing systems is that each is purpose 
built and necessarily proportionate in their demands for personal information.  They are 
relationships that have formed over time. People have become accustomed to disclosing 
this level of information and the entities are accustomed to managing this information. 
 
Consider the situation of a student travelling on public transportation.  The student may 
have received a student-ID card issued by the transportation firm, which is not granted 
to all people under 25, but merely to those who are students.  The proposed ID-card 
could not be used in such a situation.  Moreover, a rail-season ticket purchased by this 
student is often bound to the personal identifier on the student’s travel-ID card.  This is 
not necessarily bound to the student’s school identification number, and it is certainly 
not bound to the student’s bank account, NHS information, or other identifiers.  It is an 
identifier issued by the transportation firm, independent of all of these other identifiers.  
The card expires in accordance with the policy of the transportation firm.  For the 
student, she is assured that the card, when stolen, can only be used for transportation 
purposes.  The student also knows that the transportation firm is only collecting the 
necessary amount of information on her to issue her the card and to provide 
transportation. 
 
To appreciate the unlinked nature of today’s identifiers, consider the following popular 
identification methods:  
 
Birth names User identifiers with service providers 
(account numbers) 
Credit and debit cards Calling cards 
Loyalty Tokens Employee Badges 
Sports club membership cards National insurance number 
NHS number Passport and passport number 
Driver license and number On-line usernames 
 
As these examples illustrate, individuals today are represented by an abundance of 
identifiers that are designed to be relied on only by one or a few service providers only 
in specific contexts.  An Internet Service Provider does not record our NHS number 
(and has no knowledge or concern whether we have been issued such an identifier, nor 
any means of linking to such a number).  Sport club membership cards are not linked 
with our employee information, and are identifiers issued in accordance with club 
membership policies and requirements.  As a matter of design, the identifiers held by 
the sports club are in essence useless to any other entity other than the sports club.  It is 
also fair to say that in a number of these relationships, records are not even in a 
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computerised form.  The personal data that is collected for the issuance of an identifier 
is not even verified, nor is it required to be.146 
 
Local identifiers enable service providers to identify individuals within their specific 
transaction contexts, to create accounts for them, and to effectively deal with fraudsters. 
At the same time, local identifiers have the important benefit of limiting the capabilities 
of service providers to create profiles of an individual’s activities with other parties. A 
pub owner does not need to know our name, birth date or birthplace but merely whether 
we are of the legal age to consume alcoholic beverages.  Previously a relationship of 
trust would be established between the publican and the clientele; or a form of identity 
would be verified to ensure that the individual’s birth year is prior to the threshold year.  
Our prior means of identification involved natural segmentation that ensures that 
identity thieves can only do damage with specific providers where they have gained 
information on users of those providers. 
The transformation and reduction of local relationships 
The envisioned national ID card would replace today’s local non-electronic identifiers 
by universal identifiers that are processed fully electronically. This migration would 
remove the natural segmentation of traditional activities. In the case of a pub, if 
additional information was disclosed, say through a national ID card, malicious staff 
could steal this information, or this information can be abused in other ways.  As a 
consequence, the damage that identity thieves can cause would no longer be confined to 
narrow domains, nor would identity thieves be impaired any longer by the inherent 
slowdowns of today’s non-electronic identification infrastructure. Furthermore, service 
providers and other parties would be able to electronically profile individuals across 
multiple activities on the basis of the universal electronic identifiers that would 
inescapably be disclosed when individuals interact with service providers. 
 
Ironically, the currently envisioned ID card architecture therefore has severe 
implications for the security and autonomy of service providers. When the same 
universal electronic identifiers are relied on by a number of autonomous service 
providers in different domains, the security and privacy threats for the service providers 
no longer come only from eavesdroppers and other traditional outsiders. A rogue system 
administrator, a hacker, a virus, or an identity thief with insider status would be able to 
cause massive damage to service providers, could electronically monitor the identities 
and visiting times of all clients of service providers, and could impersonate and falsely 
deny access to the clients of service providers. 
 
In sum, the national ID system as currently envisioned by government poses threats to 
the privacy of UK citizens as well as to the autonomy and security of service providers. 
While the card may well be acceptable for the internal needs of businesses that engage 
in employee-related identity management within their own branches, the privacy and 
security risks of adopting the card as a national ID card for citizens would be high. 
                                                 
146 As an example, although we register our next of kin for emergency purposes under many circumstances, it is not 
the responsibility of a sports club to verify that this person is in fact kin, nor to verify if the contact details that we 
have given are accurate, by checking against a national registry. 
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A constructive way forward 
Indeed, far less intrusive means exist for achieving the publicly stated objectives of the 
UK national ID card. Over the course of the past two decades, the cryptographic 
research community has developed an array of entirely practical privacy-preserving 
technologies that can readily be used to design a better national ID card.  The system 
would not need to be centralised, could build on existing societal relationships, to better 
ensure for security and privacy. 
 
Technologies such as digital credentials, privacy-friendly blacklist screening, minimal 
disclosure proofs, zero-knowledge proofs, secret sharing, and private information 
retrieval can be used as building blocks to design a national ID card that would 
simultaneously address the security needs of government and the legitimate privacy and 
security needs of individuals and service providers. The resulting ID card would 
minimise the scope for identity theft and insider attacks.  A Federated solution would 
also better model and suit existing relationships, whilst ensuring for proportionate data 
practices. 
 
These solutions are well known to the private sector, but are rarely sought out when 
Government endeavour to develop national identification systems.  The reasons for 
Government reluctance to consider these technologies are many.  One reason includes 
the poor design principles behind national ID cards, always perceived as large projects 
that enable only the full flow of information, rather than the proportionate flow of 
information.  Another significant reason may be because these alternative authentication 
systems empower individuals to control the amount of information that is disclosed. 
 
If the Government wishes to improve identification in general throughout British 
society, it needs to consider all the relationships involving the citizen.  Rather the 
Government is proposing a system that will supersede all other relationships and current 
identification techniques.  This is acceptable as long as the National ID is designed to 
allow proportionality and adaptability to local conditions.  The current policy does not 
do this, even though the technology does exist. 
 
Notably, proper use of privacy-preserving techniques would allow individuals to be 
represented in their interactions with service providers by local electronic identifiers 
that service providers can electronically link up to any legacy identity-related 
information they hold on individuals. These local electronic identifiers within 
themselves are untraceable and unlinkable, and so today’s segmentation of activity 
domains would be fully preserved. At the same time, certification authorities could 
securely embed into all of an individual’s local identifiers a unique “master identifier.” 
This embedded master identifier would remain unconditionally hidden when individual 
authenticate themselves in different activity domains, but its presence can be leveraged 
by service providers for security and data sharing purposes – without causing any 
privacy problems.  
 
Designing such systems is possible, but the proposed scheme aims only to increase the 
links to and from, and enable the full flow of information across, sectors and other 
boundaries. 
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In Federated Identity systems, there are pluralities of Credential Providers (public and 
private sector) who issue cryptographic security tokens for representing identity in some 
limited domain, or linked set of domains. The credentials can be designed to be permit 
records of transactions to be either linkable or unlinkable, or some spectrum of 
properties between with two. For example, it is possible for identifiers to: 
 
- be bi-directional or unidirectional, so that multiple identities can be traced from 
one domain to another, but not in the reverse direction; 
- for facts (“attribute values”) to be asserted and trusted without disclosing a 
specific identity; 
- for separate identities to be selectively united, either under the control of the 
individual or another party; 
- for infringement of rules to be penalised by disclosure of identity if and only if 
infringement occurs. 
-  
Also, embedded master identifiers could be blacklisted across multiple segmented 
activity domains to ensure that fraudsters in one domain can be denied access to 
services in other domains, while preserving the privacy of honest individuals.  
Similarly, service providers would be able to securely share identity assertions across 
unlinkable activity domains by directing these assertions in digitally protected form 
through the ID cards of their data subjects in a privacy-friendly manner.  
 
There is thus ample scope for designing identity systems for e-government with rules 
that can be specifically tailored to intentionally isolated domains of health entitlement 
and patient records, taxation and benefit claims, border-control and travel, and inter-
operation with private sector systems. The rules of each system would constitute the 
procedure for Data Protection compliance, and could allow good governance of data-
sharing for legitimate public policy reasons, whilst limiting infringements of privacy to 
the minimum necessarily required by ECHR Article 8. 
 
Such flexibility does not of itself answer difficult questions about how much data-
sharing and non-consented identification is justifiable in a democratic society 
conformant with human rights. However adopting such a fine-grained system allows the 
processes of democratic legislation and oversight many more options than a monolithic 
identity system predicated on a unique and ubiquitously traceable identity for each 
individual. Monolithic systems have much poorer resilience and scaling, and offer 
nugatory privacy, security, and reliability protection in comparison to Federated ID. 
 
The practice of illicitly loaning Federated ID credentials to other people is discouraged 
by the fact that those to whom a credential is loaned can damage the owner’s reputation, 
incur liabilities in that domain and learn personal information.  
 
Nevertheless, biometrics may be necessary for applications requiring a high degree of 
identification (such as travel and border-control). A local-biometric card scheme could 
be devised which checked for duplicate IDs in a compartmentalised way.  
 
Simplifying the cryptographic details, the card could present a biometric template 
encrypted with a different key specific to the NHS, Asylum/Immigration etc., in such a 
way that duplicate (encrypted) biometric identities could be detected and traced within a 
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limited domain (e.g. an international border-control system), but ad-hoc data-matching 
across domains could not occur unless designed and authorised. 
 
Therefore, the oft made observation that the jurisprudence of ECHR plainly allows 
national identity cards, must be reconsidered when contemplating a system based on a 
general purpose central biometric database and a monolithic unique identity facilitating 
arbitrary infringement of Article 8. The impact of all previous identity card systems has 
been miniscule in comparison to the potential deleterious impact on privacy of the 
scheme proposed. 
 
Is there a "pressing social need" for a general purpose central biometric database, if the 
interests of national security, the prevention or detection of crime, the enforcement of 
immigration controls, prohibitions on unauthorised working or employment, and 
efficient and effective provision of public services can all be accomplished with 
Federated Identity systems, and biometrics compartmentalised to specific domains, 
physically stored only in tamper-resistant devices, and matched with offline biometric 
readers? 
 
It is illegal, not "sensible", to create a single electronic internal passport just because 
there is an international imperative to introduce biometrics into border-control systems. 
It is technologically unremarkable to design an international travel and immigration 
biometric system, which links to other sector-specific identity systems only to an extent 
which is foreseeable, explicitly legislated, enforceable, and compliant with European 
Convention rights. 
The French E-Government Strategic Plan 
The French Minister for State Reform is overseeing the implementation of a strategic 
plan to provide services to citizens, the private sector, and the public sector supported 
by e-government initiatives.147  The plans emphasises the need for user-friendly and 
accessible solutions that create a climate of trust. 
 
In their plan to enhance e-government, the French national plan aims for a user-oriented 
system, allowing for multiple forms of identification.  The emphasis is on simplicity and 
proportionality.  The amount of information collected will be minimised to increase the 
confidence of users.  The French Government acknowledges that e-government gives 
rise to two contradictory requirements:   
 
- simplifying registration and personal data management for the users would entail 
breaking down the barriers between government departments, making exchanges 
flow more smoothly without the user being systematically asked repeatedly for 
documents, for example, which he has already supplied; 
- upholding the protection of personal data, which may in fact restrict the 
interconnections between government departments. 
 
The French Government is clear on how to resolve this conflict. 
                                                 
147 The French E-Government Strategic Plan (PSAE) 2004-2007, 
http://www.adae.gouv.fr/IMG/rtf/Le_plan_strategique-GB.rtf.  
74 The LSE Identity Project Interim Report:  March 2005 
 
 
Government guidelines are clear: do not authorise uncontrolled 
generalised exchanges between departments. However, the 
development of e-government must grant citizens more transparency 
in the monitoring of their administrative papers and better control of 
their personal details (confidentiality, right to access and correct data 
regarding them).148 
To enable this, the Government intends to provide tools and services “which will enable 
[citizens and professionals] to exercise their rights more simply and completely.”  These 
tools and services include the: 
Decentralised Storage of data 
The French Government is aware that there are several options available, including 
centralising all the data of every user, but notes that, “This solution is not implemented 
in any country, for obvious reasons of individual freedoms and near technical 
impossibility.”  The French Government proposes instead that all data will remain 
decentralised within each department. 
Distributed Identifiers 
The French strategy acknowledges that the easiest solution would be to call for a unique 
universal identifier for all citizens, but the French designers have foremost in mind that 
privacy law was created to prevent a situation such as this.  They further note that the 
Germans consider such an approach to be an unconstitutional practice.  The French 
Government position states, 
It should be remembered that, with regard to e-government, the State 
must take a stance as guarantor (of individual freedoms, the 
authenticity and enforceability of dematerialised procedures and 
actions, the security of actions carried out by public servants, etc.) and 
the Government wishes to confirm this position clearly both in the 
formulation of the decisions taken and in their methods of application. 
As a result, French authorities do not see the need for anything more than sectoral 
identifiers to preserve rights.  They also admit that a solution such as the national 
registry in the UK that would include a listing of all relevant identifiers “would 
probably not go down too well in our country”149.  Instead the French Government calls 
for the creation of an ‘identity federator’:   
the most successful solution consists of creating an identity federator, 
enabling the user to use the single identifier to access each of the 
services of his or her choice without either the government databases 
or the identity federator itself being able to make the link between the 
different identifiers. 
Further proposals include an on-line environment where the user can verify all the usage 
of her personal information, and give consent if information needs to be shared between 
                                                 
148 Ibid, page 13. 
149 Ibid, page 15. 
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departments.  At the same time, the French Government wishes to preserve the ability of 
users to not identify themselves to government departments. 
 
The French Government has chosen to follow a proportionate path to identification and 
data management.  Their systems will, at a technological level, be less complicated, and 
will be more resilient to attack and failures.  The Government sees the benefits of e-
government, but understands and resists the temptation to coalesce or link all personal 
information held by government departments. In order to ensure user trust and 
adaptability of current and future systems there will therefore be no central registry, no 
single identifier, nor a centralised list of identifiers. 
Conclusion 
In the context of a national ID card infrastructure, security and privacy are not opposites 
but, assuming that proper privacy-preserving technologies are deployed, are mutually 
reinforcing. In order to move forward constructively with a national ID card, it is 
important for government to investigate technological alternatives that hold the promise 
of multi-party security while preserving privacy.  
 
Not only will this approach preserve privacy, but it will also protect the existing 
relationships in society.  It will ensure that the rail company knows what it needs to 
know for granting special prices to students; that sports clubs know the required 
information for membership purposes; and the NHS has sufficient information to 
authenticate patients; without unnecessarily binding these relationships with additional 
needless information. This approach will also diminish the potential for the amassing 
and sharing of information that is unnecessary and disproportionate.  
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Appendix One: Comparison with the HAC findings 
 
We have found it useful to assess our findings by comparing each to the conclusions in 
the report of the Home Affairs Committee. While the HAC report dealt primarily with 
the draft legislation, nearly all circumstances are identical to those created by the final 
legislation introduced in November 2004. 
 
Of the 91 conclusions drawn by the HAC, 52 were supported by this report, 27 were 
conditionally supported and 6 were considered to have no basis that could be 
determined through research. 6 were not relevant to the study. 
 
 
H.A.C. report L.S.E. report 
 
The international context 
1.  While we can understand why the Government 
has proposed a combined passport and identity card, 
we regret that no analysis has been published of the 
costs and benefits of a free-standing identity card. 
(Paragraph 20) 
Supported by research. There are strong grounds 
on the basis of law, practicality and technology to 
argue the case for keeping the two documents 
distinct and separate. 
2.  We consider in detail later in this report the 
concerns raised in the United Kingdom over the 
Government's proposals. The international 
experience clearly indicates that identity cards and 
population registers operate with public support and 
without significant problems in many liberal, 
democratic countries. In a number of these, the 
holding and even carrying of the card is compulsory 
and appears to be widely accepted. However, each 
country has its own social, political and legal 
culture and history: the nature of each identity 
scheme and population register reflects those unique 
elements. We cannot assume that any particular 
approach can be applied successfully in the UK. 
Nor can we yet draw on any significant international 
experience of the use of biometrics on the scale that 
is proposed in the UK. (Paragraph 38) 
Conditionally supported. While there is little 
public resistance to identity systems in most 
countries nothing approximating the scale and 
complexity of the UK scheme has been 
undertaken elsewhere. There are numerous 
examples of hostile public responses following 
proposals to use this scale of personal 
information in a range of identity and database 
applications. 
Concerns of principle 
3.  An identity card scheme of the sort and on the 
scale proposed by the Government would 
undoubtedly represent a significant change in the 
relationship between the state and the individual in 
this country. International experience does not 
suggest that objections of principle are 
overwhelming, although the development of a 
biometric-based scheme does introduce new 
elements that have not been tested elsewhere. We 
do not, however, believe that an identity card 
scheme should be rejected on constitutional grounds 
alone. (Paragraph 59)  
Conditionally supported. There is general 
agreement among key stakeholder groups that the 
proposals represent a fundamental change in the 
relationship between the individual and the state. 
Unless appropriate and necessary safeguards and 
guarantees can be built into the system it is 
entirely reasonable to consider rejecting the 
scheme solely on constitutional grounds. 
4.  The test should be whether the measures needed 
to install and operate an effective identity card 
Conditionally supported. While proportionality is 
a key consideration in the development of the 
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system are proportionate to the benefits such a 
system would bring and to the problems to be 
tackled and whether such a scheme is the most 
effective means of doing so. (Paragraph 60) 
scheme, such arguments should not override 
legal rights and guarantees. 
Practical concerns 
5.  The proposed system is unprecedentedly large 
and complex. It will contain sensitive personal 
information on tens of millions of individuals. Any 
failure will significantly affect the functioning of 
public and private services and personal and 
national security. Measures to ensure the integrity of 
the design, implementation and operation of the 
system must be built in to every aspect of its 
development. As we will remark at a number of 
points throughout this report, the Government's lack 
of clarity about the scope and practical operation of 
the scheme, and the nature of the procurement 
process, does not give us confidence that this will be 
achieved. (Paragraph 64) 
Supported by research. The study agrees with 
this conclusion in its entirety. 
Benefits and weaknesses of the Government's scheme 
6.  It is reasonable for the Government to have 
refined the aims of its scheme after a consultation 
exercise and development of proposals for its 
implementation. It has now set out its reasons for 
introducing identity cards, in its most recent 
document, Legislation on Identity Cards: A 
Consultation, which accompanied the publication of 
the draft Bill. (Paragraph 70)  
Conditionally supported. The aims of the scheme 
are broad and non-specific (see section 7 & 8 
below). The consultation exercise undertaken by 
the government was perceived widely to be 
largely ineffective in facilitating national debate. 
7.  However, many elements of the design of an 
identity card scheme, from the national register, to 
the design of the card and to its operational use, 
depend greatly on the precise purpose for which it is 
designed. Although some core functions are 
consistent and clear, the changing aims of the 
scheme do not give total confidence that the 
Government has arrived at a complete set of clear 
and settled aims for the card. The Government has 
not yet clarified how it intends to deal with some 
elements of the original proposals for entitlement 
cards, such as which services should be linked to the 
card and whether there should be unique personal 
numbers across public services. We consider these 
issues further below, but it is clear that they are 
central to the functioning of the scheme. (Paragraph 
71)  
Supported by research. 
8.  The draft Bill might have been expected to 
clarify the Government's aims but we do not believe 
it has done so. It is essential that the Government 
explain its intentions on issues raised in this report 
before the Bill is published. (Paragraph 72) 
Supported by research. 
Illegal working and immigration abuse 
9.  Identity cards could make it easier for those 
seeking work to demonstrate their right to do so, 
and, by the same token, make it easier for the police 
to show that a company employing illegal labour 
had done so knowingly. (Paragraph 79)  
Not supported by research.  Many individuals, 
because of a variety of personal or technical 
circumstances, may be denied the right to work. 
10.  We believe that identity cards can make a 
significant contribution to tackling illegal working. 
However this will need to be as part of wider 
Conditionally supported. While a successful 
outcome will depend on a package of measures, 
risk assessment has not been undertaken to assess 
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enforcement measures, including action against 
culpable employers. We repeat our 
recommendations that the Government should target 
employers who deliberately break the law and that 
the Proceeds of Crime Act should also be used to 
seize profits made from the employment of illegal 
labour. We welcome the steps the Government has 
taken so far, but to be fully effective there must be 
properly resourced enforcement of existing 
regulations. (Paragraph 80)  
whether illegal working could become 
entrenched, more invisible or more extensive. 
11.  The Government must clarify what action will 
be expected from the employer, including whether 
presentation of the card by a job applicant is enough 
or whether an employer would have to check the 
biometrics or the authenticity of the card. If so, the 
Government needs to be clear how often this will be 
required and what access to biometric readers or the 
National Identity Register will be available to 
employers or other agencies. (Paragraph 81)  
Supported by research. 
12.  We are concerned that the three-month period 
for EU nationals, or those claiming to be such, 
might constitute a significant loophole: it is difficult 
to see what would stop someone moving from job to 
job on false papers. The Government must bring 
forward proposals to deal with this loophole, as well 
as making a substantial commitment to robust 
enforcement of laws against illegal working. 
(Paragraph 82)  
Supported by research. At its most extreme point 
this situation has the potential to substantially 
undermine key benefits that could flow from the 
scheme and has an even greater potential to 
undermine public trust in the system. 
13.  It is also clear that the integrity of the UK 
system will be dependent on the integrity of the 
passport, asylum and visa regimes in other EU 
countries. In our visit to Germany we were told of a 
pilot scheme involving biometrics to prevent 
fraudulent asylum and visa applications. The 
Minister of State has set out the UK's involvement 
in similar schemes. As part of the development of 
the identity card scheme, the Government should 
report regularly to Parliament on progress being 
made across the EU to tackle any weaknesses in 
other EU countries, and, in particular, those 
countries currently judged to be the least secure. 
(Paragraph 83)  
Supported by research. 
14.  We conclude that identity cards, by reducing 
the "pull factor" from work, and public services, 
could make a contribution to preventing illegal 
immigration, but only if the scheme is properly 
enforced and complemented by action on access to 
public services. (Paragraph 84) 
Conditionally supported. A comprehensive risk 
assessment is required. 
Organised crime and terrorism 
15.  We understand that the contribution to fighting 
terrorism would be the ability to disrupt the use of 
multiple identity, identity fraud and related 
activities like money-laundering, and illegal 
migration by terrorists and their networks. While, of 
course, not all terrorists make use of activities based 
on false identities, and some will have legitimate 
national or international identity documents, we 
believe that effective action on identity would be a 
real and important contribution to restricting the 
Not supported by research. This reasoning 
appears to have little foundation in evidence. 
Research should be undertaken before reaching 
conclusions on these questions. 
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ease with which terrorists can operate. (Paragraph 
94)  
16.  We note, however, the real benefits of an 
identity card in fighting serious crime and terrorism 
are only likely to be achieved with a compulsory 
scheme covering all citizens and residents. It will 
also be dependent on the effective use of the scheme 
to check identities, an issue we discuss in the next 
sections. (Paragraph 95) 
Not supported by research. This conclusion is, 
again, assumed without much factual basis. More 
detailed research is required. 
Identity fraud 
17.  We believe there is a danger that in many day-
to-day situations the presentation alone of an 
identity card will be assumed to prove the identity 
of the holder without the card itself or the 
biometrics being checked, thus making possession 
of a stolen or forged identity card an easier way to 
carry out identity fraud than is currently the case. 
The availability of readers of cards and biometrics, 
including to the private sector, is therefore a crucial 
factor. (Paragraph 99)  
Conditionally supported. The outcome would 
depend largely on the extent of biometric 
spoofing techniques. The widespread availability 
of biometric readers in an environment of 
widespread spoofing would magnify the extent of 
identity theft. 
18.  We think it would be likely that identity cards 
would help combat identity fraud, but only as part 
of a wider package of measures. The Government 
should be clearer both about how and when it 
expects the card and biometrics to be checked and 
about what levels of security are appropriate in 
different circumstances. (Paragraph 100) 
Conditionally supported. See 17 above. 
Entitlement to public services 
19.  Identity cards would make it easier to establish 
entitlement to public services. However the 
Government should take action now to ensure that 
measures to check identity are developed across 
public services prior to the introduction of the new 
card. (Paragraph 107)  
Supported by research. 
20.  The Government should also review 
entitlements to public services across the board with 
the aim of rationalising and standardising them, 
since there does not appear to be a consistent set of 
principles underlining access to government 
services. (Paragraph 108)  
Conditionally supported. Standardisation of 
access to public services should not preclude 
organisations from evolving unique 
authentication measures suited to their individual 
circumstances. 
21.  The existence within the United Kingdom of up 
to four different systems for checking entitlement to 
public services will be a possible cause of 
confusion, particularly where cross-border services 
are provided. The UK Government should liaise 
closely with the devolved administrations on these 
issues, both to avoid confusion and to learn from the 
experiences of the devolved administrations' own 
entitlement cards. (Paragraph 112) 
Conditionally supported. See 20 above. 
Easier access to public services 
22.  The Government's current proposals would 
improve access to public services to the extent to 
which this depends on identification. It is important 
to ensure that the convenience to the state of having 
a comprehensive system of identifying individuals 
and accessing data about them is accompanied by an 
increase in convenience to the individual. The 
benefit must not be entirely, or even predominantly, 
to the state. (Paragraph 118)  
Supported by research. 
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23.  The Government has not developed coherent 
proposals for using the identity card in other ways 
to improve access to a wider range of services and 
information or to promote greater coherence across 
public services. As a result, citizens are still likely 
to be required to carry a wide range of cards and 
documents to use many local and national, public 
and private services. We believe that this is a missed 
opportunity. (Paragraph 119) 
Supported by research. 
Key issues 
24.  We note that at the moment there is very little 
clarity about the level and nature of checks that will 
be required and carried out, even though this is 
fundamental to the whole scheme. We recommend 
that the Government should provide estimates of the 
proportion of checks that would be biometric and 
therefore highest security. (Paragraph 125)  
Supported by research. 
25.  It is not clear that Government departments 
have identified how the operation of their services, 
or entitlement to them, need to be changed to make 
best use of an identity card system. (Paragraph 126)  
Supported by research. 
26.  In most cases, identity cards will only be fully 
effective if complementary enforcement action can 
be taken. (Paragraph 127)  
Supported by research. 
27.  Finally, more could be done to check identities 
today and there is a danger that action will be 
delayed pending the introduction of an identity card. 
(Paragraph 128) 
Conditionally supported. A full risk and 
opportunity assessment is required. 
Public support 
28.  It may be that citizens will choose to use 
identity cards voluntarily on an extensive basis. 
However, until identity cards are compulsory there 
should be realistic alternatives to their use in every 
case. There should also be effective restrictions on 
inappropriate demands for them. (Paragraph 133) 
Supported by research. 
The 'voluntary' stage 
29.  Given the Government's decision to base 
identity cards on passports and driving licences, we 
believe the incremental approach to introduction is 
justified. We set out our concerns about the 
implications of this choice in paragraphs 19-20 
above. (Paragraph 138) 
Conditionally supported. See 1 above. 
Vulnerable groups 
30.  The effect of the identity card scheme on 
minorities, such as the elderly, the socially excluded 
and ethnic groups, is of the utmost importance. The 
Government should ensure that the scheme imposes 
no new disadvantages on these groups, and do so 
before it is implemented. (Paragraph 141) 
Supported by research. 
The National Identity Register 
31.  We do not ourselves have the expertise to make 
judgements on the technical issues involved in 
setting up a national identity card system, but we 
have been struck by witnesses' insistence on the 
importance of the Government getting the structure 
right from the beginning and sticking to its 
decisions. We are concerned that the Government's 
approach has not taken into account the need to 
ensure adequate technical debate and public scrutiny 
Supported by research. 
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of the design of the system. (Paragraph 144) 
Architecture of the database 
32.  The structure of the database, and how to set it 
up and manage it, are among the most important 
choices the Government has to make. We are 
greatly concerned that the Government's 
procurement process appears to be taking these key 
decisions without any external reference or 
technical assessment, or broader public debate. We 
recommend the Government publishes details of 
consultations with any external bodies and also any 
technical assessments that have been undertaken. 
(Paragraph 147) 
Supported by research. 
Access to the database 
33.  A balance needs to be struck between, on the 
one hand, protecting individuals from unnecessary 
access by public and private bodies to information 
held on them and, on the other, ensuring that users 
of the database have the information they need for 
the scheme to fulfil its purposes. Above all, it is 
important that the public should know who may be 
able to see information about them, and what that 
information is. (Paragraph 151) 
Supported by research. 
'Function creep' 
34.  Whatever the merits or otherwise of such 
developments [eg. the establishment of a national 
fingerprint register], their potential should be 
recognised. It is essential that they do not develop 
incrementally or by executive action but are subject 
to full Parliamentary scrutiny. These issues are at 
least as significant as the decision to make cards 
compulsory. (Paragraph 158)  
Supported by research. 
35.  In a similar way, identity cards are not planned 
to be a single card for all public services, but it 
clearly is possible, and perhaps desirable, for a 
successful identity card scheme to develop in this 
direction. But this should be a decision of 
Parliament, not of the executive. (Paragraph 159) 
Supported by research. 
Information on the database 
36.  The functions of the Register entail establishing 
an individual's identity in a number of different 
circumstances. For some of these, such as 
interaction with local authorities, addresses may be 
necessary. There is therefore a case for including 
them in the National Identity Register. But to do so 
would have significant administrative and 
operational consequences, since the Register would 
need to be updated frequently; the extra work could 
lead to mistakes which would be disastrous if not 
properly handled. The Government should be more 
explicit about the case for including addresses and 
demonstrate that the advantages of doing so 
outweigh the problems that would be created. The 
Government should also clarify whether addresses 
would be only on the Register or whether they 
would be legible on the surface of the card itself. 
(Paragraph 163)  
Conditionally supported. While there may be a 
justification for the requirement to provide or 
store addresses, the case for inclusion of this data 
on the national register has not been clearly 
established. Using the national identity 
registration number to link to other databases 
may be a more secure and cost effective option. 
37.  In many parts of Europe, including Sweden and 
Germany, where there is a requirement to register 
Not supported by research. This requirement 
would create a range of additional security and 
82 The LSE Identity Project Interim Report:  March 2005 
 
 
addresses, it is a legal requirement for landlords to 
register their tenants. We recommend that this be 
adopted if the Government decides to include 
addresses, since it would help alleviate the problem 
of frequent changes of address. (Paragraph 164)  
administrative issues. Tenants would be required 
to disclose their identity card to landlords, and in 
the event of loss or failure of the card, may be 
denied housing. 
38.  The nature of the individual number and its 
relationship to other identifying numbers used by 
the state are more decisions that are crucial for the 
design and development of the system. The 
Government must be clear and open about the issues 
involved and enable informed parliamentary and 
public scrutiny of any decisions (Paragraph 167) 
Supported by research. 
Biometrics 
39.  The security and reliability of biometrics are at 
the heart of the Government's case for their 
proposals. We note that no comparable system of 
this size has been introduced anywhere in the world. 
The system proposed would therefore be breaking 
new ground. It is essential that, before the system is 
given final approval, there should be exhaustive 
testing of the reliability and security of the 
biometrics chosen, and that the results of those tests 
should be made available to expert independent 
scrutiny, perhaps led by the Government's Chief 
Scientific Adviser. (Paragraph 175) 
Supported by research. 
Medical information 
40.  We agree with the BMA: it would not be either 
useful or appropriate to keep medical details on the 
Register. But it would be sensible for the identity 
card to be the mechanism that enables individuals to 
access their NHS records. (Paragraph 176) 
Conditionally supported. Risk assessment 
required. 
The Citizen Information Project and other Government databases 
41.  We doubt that the Citizen Information Project 
will provide "a strong and trusted legal basis for 
holding personal contact information" if the 
information on it has to be confirmed by another, 
separate identity card Register. There is a very large 
degree of overlap between the Citizen Information 
Project and the National Identity Register. The 
Registrar General mentioned the options of 
"comprehensive legislation to oversee information 
matching which in itself was conducted by 
individual agencies but which improves the quality 
of individual registers without actually going to the 
next step of creating a register" and of "common 
standards for register management in the British 
government": each of these would be more 
worthwhile than the Citizen Information Project as 
it is currently planned. (Paragraph 185)  
Not applicable to this study. 
42.  We are concerned by the proliferation of large-
scale databases and card systems, since we have 
seen little to suggest that they are being approached 
in a co-ordinated way. While we have not taken 
detailed evidence on current proposals, other than 
the Citizen Information Project, we have the 
impression that each government department is 
continuing with its own project in the hope that it is 
not going to be significantly affected by other 
projects. The format of registration on different 
Conditionally supported. While this concept may 
have merit at a fiscal level, it also goes a 
considerable way to violating the principle of 
Functional Separation, which provides privacy 
protections for individuals as well as creating 
safeguards to prevent full centralisation and 
control of personal information. 
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databases should be coherent and consistent. 
(Paragraph 186)  
43.  We believe that the Government must tackle 
this proliferation of databases, examining in each 
case whether the number, identifier or database is 
needed, what its relationship is to other existing or 
planned databases, how data will be shared or 
verified and other relevant issues. For this action to 
be effective, it must be co-ordinated at the highest 
levels of the Civil Service. (Paragraph 187)  
Conditionally supported. See 42 above. 
44.  We do not think that there should be a central 
database with all information available to the 
Government on it. But an identity card should 
enable access to all Government databases, so that 
there would be no need for more than one 
government-issued card. (Paragraph 188) 
Conditionally supported. See 42 above. 
Registration and enrolment 
45.  The integrity of the enrolment and registration 
processes are central to both the smooth running of 
the system and to its security. Without data of 
investigative or evidential quality, few of the 
objectives of the scheme can be achieved. Issues the 
Government must consider include: the number of 
mobile units to enrol the housebound, the elderly 
and those in remote locations; how sensitive the 
equipment is to the environment; the training of 
personnel; and the need to minimise opportunities 
for corruption and fraud. More study of these 
aspects is needed. (Paragraph 193) 
Supported by research. 
Cards 
46.  The type of card to be used is a decision of the 
same order of importance as the architecture of the 
database, since it has consequences for issues such 
as how the card will be used and the number of 
readers and the infrastructure needed, both of which 
have significant implications for costs. Some 
choices, such as the nature of the chip, seem to 
follow a decision to use the passport as an identity 
card (and therefore follow ICAO) rather than any 
independent assessment of what would be most 
appropriate for an identity card. We are concerned 
that the Home Office appears to be taking these key 
decisions without any external reference, technical 
assessment or public debate. (Paragraph 197)  
Supported by research. 
47.  The Government's figures on how much cards 
would cost compare them to 10-year passports and 
driving licences. The Government has not, however, 
confirmed explicitly how long the validity of 
identity cards would be. It must do so before the 
Bill is published. (Paragraph 198) 
Conditionally supported. Because of the 
inclusion of biometric data, the validity period of 
the cards may vary according to individual 
circumstance. 
Readers and infrastructure 
48.  We are deeply concerned that the Government 
has published so little information about the 
number, type, distribution and cost of card readers 
and the infrastructure necessary to support this. This 
information is not only essential to proper costing of 
the scheme, but also to an assessment of how 
effective the scheme will be. (Paragraph 201)  
Supported by research. 
49.  We are also concerned that the Home Office Supported by research. 
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may be leaving it to other government departments, 
local government and the private sector to decide 
what level of investment to make in card readers 
and infrastructure. There is an obvious danger that 
each organisation will opt for a low level of 
security, relying on others to raise the level of 
security in the system as a whole. If this happens the 
value of the identity card system will be 
significantly undermined. We also expect the Home 
Office and other Departments to give at least broad 
estimates of the numbers of readers they expect to 
need of each type and what level of provision other 
organisations are expected to make. (Paragraph 202) 
Multiple cards 
50.  We support the issue of multiple identity cards 
to an individual in cases where there is a legitimate 
need, and welcome the Home Office's expression of 
flexibility on this issue. (Paragraph 203) 
Supported by research. 
Security 
51.  We believe that an identity card system could 
be created to a sufficient level of security. We 
stress, however, that the security of the system 
depends as much on using the proper procedures 
with the appropriate level of scrutiny to verify the 
card in use as it does on the integrity of the card 
issuing process or the identity register. (Paragraph 
207) 
Conditionally supported. This conclusion cannot 
be drawn until agreement has been reached on a 
specific architecture. 
Costings 
52.  The Home Office have provided us with details 
of the assumptions on which their costings have 
been based, on a confidential basis. We are not 
convinced that the level of confidentiality applied is 
justified. Cost information is an essential element in 
determining the value for money of any project. It is 
of prime importance where expenditure is funded 
from the public purse and of particular relevance 
with regard to public sector IT projects which have 
a history of poor performance and cost-overruns. 
We are also concerned that the least robust cost 
estimates appear to relate to the assumptions with 
the greatest cost-sensitivity, such as the length of 
enrolment time, the anticipated number of 
applications requiring further investigation, the cost 
of card production and the criteria for subsidised 
cards. Changes to any one of these factors could 
cause significant increases to the cost of the 
programme. (Paragraph 212)  
Supported by research. 
53.  The failure to attach a Regulatory Impact 
Assessment to the draft Bill, or to provide any 
detailed information on estimated costs and 
benefits, significantly weakens the basis for pre-
legislative scrutiny and the public consultation 
exercise. This secrecy is all the more regrettable 
since the case for an identity card system is founded 
on whether its benefits are proportionate to the 
problems it seeks to address: a proper cost-benefit 
analysis is an indispensable element of this. The 
excuse of commercial sensitivity should not be used 
to avoid publishing a full Regulatory Impact 
Supported by research. 
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Assessment with the Bill. (Paragraph 213) 
Procurement 
54.  We welcome the Home Office's efforts to 
overcome their record on IT procurement. We do 
not believe that it is impossible for them to deliver 
the project on time, to specification and to cost. 
(Paragraph 215)  
Not supported by research. This conclusion 
appears to be entirely speculative. 
55.  But we are concerned about the closed nature of 
the procurement process which allows little public 
or technical discussion of the design of the system 
or the costings involved. We do not believe that 
issues of commercial confidentiality justify this 
approach. Any potential gains from competing 
providers providing innovative design solutions are 
likely to be more than offset by the unanticipated 
problems that will arise from designs that have not 
been subject to technical and peer scrutiny. 
(Paragraph 216)  
Supported by research. 
56.  Nor do we believe that the Government's OGC 
Gateway process has yet demonstrated the robust 
track record on procurement projects that would 
allow it to be relied upon for a project of this scale. 
(Paragraph 217)  
Supported by research. 
57.  The Home Office must develop an open 
procurement policy, on the basis of system and card 
specifications that are publicly assessed and agreed. 
The Home Office should also seek to minimise risk, 
including, as appropriate, by breaking the 
procurement process down into manageable 
sections. We have already recommended that the 
Chief Scientific Officer be invited to oversee the 
development of the biometric elements of the 
scheme. We recommend that individuals or groups 
with similar expertise be invited to advise on the 
scrutiny of other aspects of the scheme. (Paragraph 
218) 
Supported by research. 
Conclusions 
58.  Identity cards should not be ruled out on 
grounds of principle alone: the question is whether 
they are proportionate to the aims they are intended 
to achieve. Identity cards could make a significant 
impact on a range of problems, and could benefit 
individuals through enabling easier use of a range of 
public services. This justifies, in principle, the 
introduction of the Government's scheme. But the 
Government's proposals are poorly thought out in 
key respects: in relation to the card itself, to 
procurement and to the relationship of the proposals 
to other aspects of government, including the 
provision of public services. These issues must be 
addressed if the proposals are to be taken forward. It 
is important that the Government clarifies the 
purposes of the scheme and makes them clear 
through legislation. (Paragraph 219) 
Conditionally supported. See 4 above. 
The draft Bill 
59.  The draft Bill gives the Government powers to 
require and register a wide range of information not 
obviously needed to establish identity. It gives a 
wide range of organisations access to that 
Supported by research. 
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information and to the audit record of when and by 
whom the National Identity Register has been 
accessed, so giving information on key actions of 
individuals. While the draft Bill undoubtedly 
enables these actions to be taken in the fight against 
serious crime or terrorism, it allows for far wider 
access to the database than this justifies. In 
particular, given the lack of clarity about the aims of 
the identity card, to leave so much to secondary 
legislation is unacceptable. (Paragraph 222)  
60.  It is unacceptable that basic questions about the 
degree of access to the National Identity Register 
should be left to secondary legislation. The 
Government must clarify what access will be given 
to public and private sector bodies, and under what 
circumstances. Once identity cards are compulsory, 
there is a significant danger that the concept of 
consent to disclosure of information will in practice 
be eroded, unless there are clear statutory 
safeguards against improper access to the Register. 
(Paragraph 224)  
Supported by research. 
61.  We note that whilst a range of data might be 
required to verify an application, it is not necessary 
for all that data to be retained on the National 
Identity Register. They could either be returned or, 
if necessary for audit purposes, held on a separate 
database. The Bill should be amended to restrict 
data held on the register to that information required 
to establish identity once the card has been issued. 
(Paragraph 229)  
Supported by research. 
62.  The one exception would be information about 
immigration status. This is so central to the 
justification for the Bill that it would be useful and 
convenient to hold this on the central register. 
(Paragraph 230)  
Not applicable to this study. 
63.  The purposes of the draft Bill as set out in 
Clause 1 are very broad and the list of registrable 
facts is longer than those the Home Office has said 
are necessary to establish identity. Both the 
purposes of the Bill and the registrable facts should 
be strictly limited to establishing identity and 
immigration status, so as to ensure that the 
provisions of the Data Protection Act cover the 
operation of the scheme effectively. (Paragraph 
231)  
Supported by research. 
64.  It is not yet possible to be more precise about 
the list of registrable facts, because the aims of the 
scheme, and hence the requirements for information 
to be registered, are not sufficiently clear. As the 
Bill proceeds, the Government must set out its 
justification better. (Paragraph 232)  
Supported by research. 
65.  Clause 1 should set out the aims of the scheme. 
A possible formulation might be: "to enable an 
individual to identify himself in order to gain access 
to public and private services or when required to 
identify himself for the purposes of law 
enforcement". Wording of this sort would establish 
a test against which the data to be stored and used 
could be tested. It would also guard against the type 
Supported by research. 
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of function creep in which the state uses the register 
to identify individuals without amendment by 
Parliament. (Paragraph 233)  
66.  There should be explicit provision in the Bill 
that all access to the register must be recorded. 
(Paragraph 234)  
Conditionally supported. See Appendix detailing 
concerns about the audit trail. 
67.  We support the provisions in Clauses 2(4) and 
8(4) that enable registration of failed asylum seekers 
and other similar cases, but recommend that the 
Home Office clarify the purposes of these Clauses 
in the Bill. (Paragraph 235)  
Not applicable to this study. 
68.  Clause 3 provides an acceptable mechanism for 
amending the information required to be held on the 
Register, but only if the statutory purposes of the 
Bill are clarified as we recommend. (Paragraph 237) 
Conditionally supported. The desirability of 
having a national Register of data has not been 
comprehensively assessed. 
69.  It is practical to allow some flexibility over 
precisely which documents are required at 
registration and that these should be set out in 
secondary legislation. But the Bill should state that 
only those documents that are reasonably necessary 
to establish identity may be required. There should 
be a right of appeal to the National Identity Scheme 
Commissioner. (Paragraph 239)  
Supported by research. 
70.  The proposed penalties [for failing to register 
when required to do so and for failing to provide 
information] are reasonable given their purposes 
and existing penalties for similar offences. 
(Paragraph 244)  
Not supported by research. The conditions 
established through the development of a 
comprehensive identity card system cannot 
readily be compared with those of other 
mechanisms. 
71.  It is unlikely that if full Parliamentary 
procedures were followed the Government would, 
as it fears, be accused of "proceeding by stealth". 
The move to compulsion is a step of such 
importance that it should only be taken after the 
scrutiny afforded by primary legislation: the 
proposed "super-affirmative procedure" is not 
adequate. We would, however, support the inclusion 
in the Bill of powers to enable the Government both 
to set a target date for the introduction of 
compulsion and, if necessary, to require agencies 
and other bodies to prepare for that date.  
Supported by research. 
72.  The Government should consider statutory 
provisions to ensure the integrity of the registration 
and enrolment system, as well as specific penalties 
for breaches of these provisions. (Paragraph 250)  
Supported by research. 
73.  It is reasonable to require individuals to report 
relevant changes in their circumstances, provided 
that the range of information they are required to 
update is not excessive and that they are able to 
check that the information held on them is accurate. 
We do not believe that there should be charges for 
updating information on the Register, since this 
would be likely to affect adversely the accuracy of 
the information held. (Paragraph 253)  
Conditionally supported. This matter also 
involves the question of necessity. Further 
consultation is required to assess whether, for 
example, only resident and immigration status 
changes are required to be notified. 
74.  We find it anomalous that failure to update a 
driving licence should be a criminal offence, 
especially when failure to update the National 
Identity Register will not, and we note that the 
Home Office does not know how many 
prosecutions there have been for failing to update a 
Supported by research. 
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driving licence. This offence should be reviewed in 
the light of the proposed legislation on identity 
cards. (Paragraph 254)  
75.  Clause 11(1) could have significant 
implications for past and current employers, 
neighbours, landlords, family members and past 
spouses, all of whom might be required to assist in 
the identification of an individual. The Government 
should clarify the scope and limits of this clause on 
the face of the Bill. (Paragraph 255)  
Supported by research. 
76.  The practical application of Clauses 11 and 12 
to socially excluded groups must be clarified as 
soon as possible. This should be done in such a way 
as to ensure that such groups are no further 
disadvantaged by the operation of the scheme. The 
Bill should contain legal duties on the Home 
Secretary to take into account special needs, such as 
health, in applying these clauses; and to establish a 
clear legal status in the primary legislation for those 
of no fixed abode.  
Supported by research. 
77.  We agree with the CRE that the Bill should be 
accompanied by a full Race Impact Assessment and 
that there should be a further Assessment at the time 
of the move to compulsion. (Paragraph 257)  
Supported by research. 
78.  A reasonableness defence to the offences that 
might follow from Clause 13(1) should be included 
on the face of the Bill, rather than left to regulations. 
(Paragraph 258)  
Supported by research. 
79.  The Bill should contain an explicit 
reaffirmation of the right of individuals to see both 
the data held on them and the audit trail of who has 
accessed those data and on what occasions, subject 
only to the national security and crime exemptions 
of the Data Protection Act. (Paragraph 259)  
Supported by research. 
80.  It is reasonable that there should be the 
possibility of restricting releasable information in 
certain cases. We welcome the Home Office's 
readiness to consult on the issue. (Paragraph 260)  
Conditionally supported. It might be considered 
that such a decision should be taken in each case 
by the Identity Cards Commissioner. 
81.  Earlier in this report, we referred to the 
different levels of security, from simple visual 
examination of the card to access to the National 
Identity Register, which the Home Office expects to 
be undertaken. Although it would not be possible to 
specify in detail all the circumstances in which 
different bodies might have access to the Register, 
we believe that the principle and tests of 
reasonableness should be placed on the face of the 
Bill. (Paragraph 261)  
Conditionally supported. While a test of 
reasonableness is a valid limiting function 
governing access, a full risk assessment should 
be undertaken to determine whether specific 
access circumstances and organisations should be 
set out on the face of the Bill. 
82.  The Bill might also allow individuals to limit 
access to certain data under certain circumstances. 
For example, a citizen might choose that addresses 
could not be released to all those who access the 
Register. (Paragraph 262)  
Supported by research. 
83.  We welcome the provisions of Clause 19 
prohibiting any requirement to produce an identity 
card before the move to compulsion. (Paragraph 
264)  
Supported by Research. 
84.  We are not opposed in principle to access to the 
database and to the audit trail without the consent of 
Conditionally supported. See Appendix on audit 
trails. 
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the individual concerned. But we are extremely 
concerned by the breadth of the provisions of 
Clauses 20 and 23 and particularly by Clause 20(2) 
which would allow nearly unfettered access to the 
security and intelligence agencies. At a minimum, 
disclosures without consent should be limited to 
cases of national security or the prevention or 
detection of serious crime. (Paragraph 269)  
85.  It is not acceptable to have as broad a Clause as 
20(5) simply because the Government is unclear 
about its objectives. (Paragraph 272)  
Supported by research. 
86.  The Bill should have explicit data-sharing 
provisions to make clear the relationship between 
the National Identity Register and other official 
databases. Some of the proposed databases have no 
statutory basis—this is unacceptable and needs to be 
addressed in further legislation. (Paragraph 273)  
Supported by research. 
87.  It is reasonable for the scheme to be operated 
by an Executive Agency similar to the DVLA or 
UK Passport Service. But we reject the argument 
that since their operations are not overseen by a 
Commissioner, neither should those of an identity 
card agency. We believe that because the identity 
card scheme would directly affect the daily lives of 
millions of people, and routinely involve sensitive 
and often highly personal information, oversight of 
its operation is utterly different to that of the DVLA 
or UK Passport Service. The National Identity 
Scheme Commissioner should report directly to 
Parliament. He or she should have powers of 
oversight covering the operation of the entire 
scheme, including access by law enforcement 
agencies and the security and intelligence services. 
(Paragraph 276)  
Supported by research. 
88.  There are no provisions in Clause 27 to cover 
aiding and abetting the offences created, or 
conspiracy to commit them. It is possible that these 
can be dealt with through existing legislation, but 
we believe that it would be more sensible to cover 
them explicitly in the Bill. (Paragraph 277)  
Not applicable to this study. 
89.  We welcome the Home Office's commitment to 
enabling complaints to be made about the operation 
of the scheme. The provisions to enable this must be 
effective, unbureaucratic and practical. (Paragraph 
278) 
Supported by research. 
Overall conclusions 
90.  We believe that an identity card scheme could 
make a significant contribution to achieving the 
aims set out for it by the Government, particularly 
tackling crime and terrorism. In principle, an 
identity card scheme could also play a useful role in 
improving the co-ordination of and the citizen's 
access to public services, although the Government 
has not yet put forward clear proposals to do so. We 
believe that the Government has made a convincing 
case for proceeding with the introduction of identity 
cards. (Paragraph 279)  
Conditionally supported. The impact of an 
identity card on levels of crime and terrorism is 
largely unknown and conclusions in this area are 
speculative. 
91.  However, the introduction of identity cards 
carries clear risks, both for individuals and for the 
Supported by research. 
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successful implementation of the scheme. We are 
concerned by the lack of clarity and definition on 
key elements of the scheme and its future operation 
and by the lack of openness in the procurement 
process. The lack of clarity and openness increases 
the risks of the project substantially. This is not 
justified and must be addressed if the scheme is to 
enjoy public confidence and to work and achieve its 
aims in practice. (Paragraph 280) 
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Appendix Two: Biometrics, Public Opinion & the Public 
Trust 
 
Based on the findings of “Biometrics and Privacy: A Study of Behaviours and 
Attitudes”.150 
Background 
There indeed exists a dichotomy between individuals’ stated attitudes towards privacy 
and their actual behaviours. Even while claiming to be concerned with protecting their 
privacy, individuals consistently sacrifice their privacy for seemingly minimal amounts 
of benefit. The inverse is also true, as those who say that they do not need privacy, also 
protect their personal information without thought.  For those agents, such as businesses 
and government agencies, which demand and require information from individuals, 
understanding this disconnect between attitudes and behaviours is essential. The 
difficulty is differentiating between stated preferences and the way in which preferences 
for privacy are determined. This difference will affect individuals’ actual demand for 
privacy. 
 
The introduction of strong forms of authentication, such as biometric identifiers, 
highlights this problem. Individual perceptions of biometric technologies will be the 
result of the complex interplay between prior associations and the internal valuations of 
the costs and benefits. Those in the private and public sectors who hope to use 
biometrics to identify consumers and citizens need to understand this process in order to 
influence the demand for privacy. 
 
In this section we analyse how biometrics affects the determinants of the demand for 
privacy and the implications of these effects for private and public sector 
implementation. Successful implementation of a biometric identity system is predicated 
on building trust relationships.  
 
Our results point to two basic types of demand for privacy, privacy-rational demand 
and privacy-myopic demand. 
 
Privacy-Rational Demand: The baseline demand for privacy by a longsighted 
individual. A rational or longsighted individual calculates costs and benefits of privacy 
over the long-term and takes advantage of and is aware of the full range of complex 
privacy-enhancing technologies. Longsighted demand is relatively inelastic. 
 
Privacy-Myopic Demand: The demand for privacy by a myopic individual. A myopic 
individual is short-sighted and neither appropriately protects privacy nor understands 
the full costs and benefits of maintaining/sacrificing privacy. Myopic demand is 
relatively elastic. 
                                                 
150 Conducted by the LSE in association with EDS. The authors of the report are Jeegar Kakkad, Ariosto Matus and 
Derek Wong. 
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Identifying the demand for privacy requires identifying the price-quantity trade-offs 
associated with maintaining privacy and the factors that change price. Much of the 
discussion surrounding information privacy and biometrics focuses on the convenience 
or benefits gained through sacrificing information privacy.  
The Costs of Strong Authentication 
Individual behaviour suggests that a small reward is worth the sacrifice of non-intrusive 
pieces of personal information, the provision of which amounts to a loss in anonymity. 
If this relationship exists because demand for anonymity is elastic then it should hold as 
well for biometrics and stronger forms of authentication. An elastic demand for 
anonymity would suggest that any benefits gained would be valued relatively more than 
any anonymity lost. If behaviour represents revealed preferences, then consumers are 
neither worried about being identified nor concerned with the eventual costs of 
identification. 
 
However, if the low demand for anonymity is due to privacy-myopia then consumers 
may care about anonymity and privacy, but realise providing information entails a loss 
of autonomy. Rationally, the connection between being identified with biometric 
information is easier to establish than with weaker authentication. Thus, greater 
benefits/conveniences are required to provide smaller amounts of personal information, 
for example biometric data. 
 
If revealed preferences hold, the effect of biometrics on the demand for privacy is fairly 
neutral: biometric requirements represent a shift along the demand curve, lowering the 
quantity of privacy demanded, but not affecting the demand for privacy. However, the 
latter case implies a lower cost to maintaining privacy as the expected cost of 
identification with biometrics rises relative to the expected cost with weaker forms of 
authentication. 
 
Advancing technology poses both risks and benefits for consumers. Ever stronger forms 
of authentication, for example biometric passports, not only strengthen ownership 
concerns, but also increase the costs of identification due to linking personal 
information. This latter effect can be seen as reducing the cost in the secondary market 
of creating usable information sets used, for example, for targeted-marketing purposes. 
Technology can also increase benefits by increasing the technology available to protect 
privacy. However, insofar as revealed preferences hold, consumers’ limited willingness 
to use advanced anonymising technologies may not overcome the costs of stronger 
forms of authentication. Given myopia, increased technology should raise the demand 
for privacy. 
 
Stronger forms of authentication, like biometric identifiers, increase the demand for 
privacy by altering individuals’ internal valuations of the cost of maintaining privacy. 
The strength-of-signal and loss of autonomy inherent to biometrics increase the costs of 
identification. An increase in the stated demand for privacy implies greater amounts of 
benefits are required to entice a consumer to sacrifice given amounts of privacy or 
autonomy.  
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Biometrics reduces the myopia due to bounded rationality and asymmetric information 
about secondary information markets. Moreover, the gap between privacy-rational 
demand and privacy-myopic demand explains the observed gap between stated 
preferences and actual behaviour. 
Understanding the Responses  
What is the lay public’s perception of biometrics? What values are associated with it? 
What ideas come to mind when someone engages in a discussion about biometrics, 
privacy, security and identification? What patterns of behaviour can we predict from 
such social representations? We come up with an explanation of the different attitudes, 
perceptions, judgments and prejudices that the general public has expressed regarding 
biometrics. 
 
For this we collected information from three focus groups, each comprised of citizens of 
the UK, the U.S. or other countries. All participants were between the ages of 22 and 
31, and were either university students or young professionals. We recognise that there 
are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn from such a specific demographic 
group. However, as we will show, our focus groups may serve as a limiting case. 
 
The main purpose of focus group research is to draw upon respondents’ attitudes, 
feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way that would not be feasible using 
other methods, for example observation, one-to-one interviewing, or questionnaire 
surveys. There are many definitions of a focus group in the literature, stressing different 
features like organised discussion, collective activity, and interaction. These groups 
comprise six to eight previously unacquainted people meeting for between one and two 
hours with one or more moderators. 
 
An analysis of their discussions allows us to study the similarities and differences 
between each group in relation to the social representations of biometrics. We found 
that nationality played a significant role in the formation of the social representation of 
biometrics. In the U.S., the events surrounding 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act, and the 
subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security have shaped the way 
Americans view biometrics. In the UK, media coverage of the debate over the National 
Identity Cards has dominated public discussion and understanding of biometrics. More 
generally, movies, documentaries and editorial commentaries have been strongly 
influential. Nevertheless, when the groups expressed their ideas about biometrics, along 
with its applications and implications, they shared a number of similar concerns and 
arguments. 
 
When we asked our participants, What comes to your mind when thinking about 
biometrics? The British group immediately related the topic to the National Identity 
Cards. “I don’t know anything about biometrics except from the ID cards.” “The press, 
ID cards” “I hadn’t heard about it until last summer [during the ID debate].” Likewise 
the British group and in particular the American group based their knowledge of 
biometric applications on what they had seen in action and science fiction films. 
References such as “I think of Top Secret Agent films,” “Scanning eyes like in Mission 
Impossible,” “It is used for marketing like in Minority Report,” “I first heard about 
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biometrics in Charlie’s Angels,” or “Identification through physical characteristics like 
in the movie Gattaca” were reiterative and generalised. 
 
In addition we found that the struggle for understanding biometrics has taken place 
though personal conversations, newspaper readership, and other forms of mass media. It 
should be noted that respondents in the more heterogeneous international group did not 
share any tendency or reference in common towards biometrics. In fact, for some 
members there was an absence of meaning or points of reference; additionally, some 
commented that it was the first time that they had reflected on the topic. Consequently, 
it can be argued that the conceptualization of biometrics is still in an embryonic stage of 
development or for some, it is simply not there. 
 
In the three focus groups we found that biometrics was predominantly linked to the 
following descriptions: 
 
- Security 
- Criminal investigation 
- Surveillance 
- Most people associate it with police 
- Identification and security 
- In the movies it is always in the context of circumvention; people abusing the 
power 
- I think it will be an invasion of my privacy 
 
We divided these concerns into security and privacy. 
Security 
A motivating hypothesis for our research was that the concept of security would be an 
anchor for biometrics. Specifically, we believed that the terrorist attacks of 11 
September, 2001 would function as a focusing event, making security a salient topic in 
the public sphere.  
 
In our first investigations into biometric representations through written questions and 
later on in our focus groups discussion we came across a relevant number of opinions 
that confirmed the hypothesis that the concept of security was an anchor for biometrics. 
Our groups frequently related security to biometrics across a series of questions about 
their general knowledge of biometrics and subsequently about their knowledge of 
applications of biometrics. 
 
British Responses: 
- For security reasons. 
- They will use it for immigration, security. 
- Biometrics is used for government surveillance. 
- For tracking people. 
American Responses: 
- It is a tool for criminal investigation. 
- For police identification. 
- Criminal investigations and terrorism. 
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- To enhance security. 
- For identification and security. 
International Responses: 
- The application of biometrics is security. 
- For identification. 
- To tackle crime and terrorism. 
 
In the latter parts of the focus group, we returned to the issue of security and biometrics 
to understand more about the associations between the two concepts. We asked our 
participants two questions: How important of an issue is security for you? (follow-up 
references we provided to the participants were: national security, identity theft, 
personal safety) and Would you feel more secure or less secure if people were identified 
using biometrics? We obtained the following surprising and unexpected answers: 
 
British Responses: 
- I don’t feel insecure. 
- In my opinion biometrics can not make much difference in security. 
- I don’t feel insecure in airports. 
American Responses: 
- I don’t feel insecure at airports. 
- I don’t feel insecure in general. 
- I don’t think biometrics will make a difference preventing an attack. 
International Responses: 
- I am sick about it (security), warnings all the time, we hear about it all the time, 
for me is a bit too much, I am bored with this problem. 
- It’s not healthy to worry too much about security all the time. 
- You can not think that a bomb is going to explode. 
- It doesn’t make much of a difference to me. 
- You can not get completely paranoid and stop doing everything and stay at 
home. 
 
Even though security is an important anchor through which the participants judge, 
comment and categorise biometrics, they neither identified security as a pressing issue 
nor perceived any advantage of this technology in their everyday lives in terms of 
security benefits. Across all three groups, participants felt that they lived in a secure 
environment and did not see the relevance of implementing biometrics for security 
purposes. Quite simply, associations of security with biometrics did not translate into 
perceptions of benefits: any demand for biometrics is not driven by a demand for 
security. 
Privacy 
Privacy was the most controversial issue discussed in the three focus groups and the 
main issues raised reflected most of the principal concerns of biometrics’ critics. From 
the overall discourse it is possible to establish two conclusions. Firstly, participants had 
large concerns about data collection and management. Second, these concerns implied 
that the individuals’ demand for privacy was reduced when they dealt with an agent 
they trusted. 
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Across the three groups, our participants displayed a feeling of uncertainty and mistrust 
in the public and private sector about the collection and management of information. 
These feelings matched perceptions in the public at large.  In the Detical/MORI poll, 
when asked, “how confident are you that the Government can be trusted to hold identity 
cards information securely?”, 88% of the answer range between ‘Fairly confident’ to 
‘Not at all confident’. 
 
In general this fear is based on the possibility that information might be filtered, sold or 
extracted without the citizen’s knowledge and/or consent. The biometrics case is 
particularly worrisome for people given that it operates with characteristics that can not 
be replaced, for example iris, fingerprint or voice data. Once information is stolen there 
is no way to change it, as is easily done with a password or a credit card number. The 
responses highlighted fears about ownership and the life-cycle of information: 
 
British Responses: 
- Someone can know where you shop. 
- It’s scary that anyone might have the information. 
- Consumers may not be aware that their information is given. 
- I see negative implications… information should always be the minimum 
- demanded…It should not be shared. 
American Responses: 
- All kinds of implications!! Who voluntarily gives the information? 
- Most implications on privacy are negative, you see them in the movies. 
- Gattaca is the perfect example, you can manipulate and change information. 
- Someone can scan your genetic information and use it against you if they 
somehow duplicate your fingerprints. They can pretend they are you. 
- People can know if someone has HIV. 
International Responses: 
- There’s a medical impact, it will be very easy for people to know your medical 
background. 
- It could lead to discrimination; they may not want to employ you. 
- For me the question is, how can they impact my privacy? how can it be 
misused? 
 
Secondly, attitudes towards privacy change when participants identify a person or 
organisation, public or private, which they do or do not trust. In a general sense, trust is 
the degree of confidence when someone thinks about a relationship. One aspect of trust 
is predictability, which refers to our ability to predict someone else’s specific behaviour. 
A predictable person or organisation is someone whose behaviour is consistently good 
or bad. But consistency is not enough for confidence to grow. A sense of trust must be 
based on the knowledge that someone else acts in consistently positive ways. For all its 
value in conducting day-to-day exchanges, predictability is at best a starting point for 
the development of trust. After all, we predict particular actions, but we trust people or 
organisations. We do not trust an institution to protect our information just because the 
institution says that they will not abuse that trust, but rather we trust the institution only 
because we know of its disposition, their available options, the consequences and their 
ability and so we expect they are trustworthy. 
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For our participants, trust in data collection and management was an issue of ownership 
and the individual’s relationship with whomever information was being shared. 
Uncertainty in ownership lowered predictability, and thus trust, in a given information-
sharing relationship. All three groups shared concerns about ownership, suggesting that 
their demand for privacy would decrease the more trust in the information-sharing 
relationship increased: 
 
British Responses: 
- What happens if the government changes? What happens if regulation changes? 
That’s what worries me the most, if they have my information. 
- You should give your consent when your information is shared. For me the 
important issue is who holds the information. 
American Responses: 
- As an organic consumer I would be totally happy to give information, fill a 
survey, to one of those macrobiotic shops. 
- I would give information to my doctor. 
- The answer is going to change depending on who the government is. Could be 
your citizens council vs. Washington DC. Depends on what part of the 
government you are talking about. 
- Depends on the definition of security and who is in charge of providing it. I feel 
better without the current administration. 
- They seem to violate my trust in their provision of security. If it were another 
administration… I wouldn’t be so suspicious. 
- Privacy issue, yes that bothers me. Security issue, no, well… depends who will 
use the information at the airport. 
International Responses: 
- I don’t care about how much information I am giving; the most important thing 
is who is going to see my information and how is going to be used. 
- If it is for my own safety it does not matter, just depends on who is in charge of 
the data. 
- You must be very careful with this kind of information. There could be 
dangerous applications under a regime like the Nazis, where they used the 
information against the Jews – it depends on the kind of government. 
 
These responses suggest that the level of trust towards the generic term “government” 
may change depending on the perceptions and relations that the individual has 
established with the different tiers of government (local, regional or federal) and on the 
public officials in charge of them. 
 
Similar attitudes are observed with the level of trust in the private sector. Our 
participants consistently identified the profit motive of the private sector as a reason to 
doubt the information sharing relationship. It is easy to mistrust big supermarkets when 
they conduct market studies, but when considering a local corner store with which one 
is familiar and trusts, one is much more likely to provide substantial amounts of 
personal information. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of these responses and the possible behavioural 
patterns that they may explain, we asked our participants to discuss and develop their 
arguments about the possible impacts on them by the governments’ use of biometrics 
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and, specifically, Who should control the collection and dissemination of personal 
data? 
 
British Responses: 
- National agency accountable [to the public]. 
- Private body accountable to government, but not the government itself 
- Independent bodies who will protect privacy. 
- People themselves should have ultimate control and must be involved in the 
decisions that concern them. 
- Not certain that government won’t use the information inappropriately. 
American Responses 
- Government under strict regulation. 
- Whoever can protect it from use outside what has already been authorised. 
- Government but without disseminating it. Corporations never unless consent. 
- Government should regulate the dissemination of personal data. 
- Government with consent. Private companies also but with permission. 
- If anyone, government. 
International Responses: 
- The government has to be accountable, we assume a government with 
constitutional set up. 
- Government if it has an interest in public safety. 
- If it is for security purposes, who has the discretion to use it? 
- Who is monitoring the data? That is very important. 
- The compromise should be to protect the data. 
- I think that information could be shared but there should be an agreement 
between the government and the public… for what are they going to use this 
information…so we can trust. 
 
Overall we found a strong demand for governments’ regulation of the collection, 
storage and distribution of biometric information. Because there is a strong mistrust of 
the public and (more so) the private sector, the feeling of uncertainty about complete 
contracting raises the demand for privacy. 
 
When confronted with hypothetical tradeoffs between security and privacy in biometric 
applications, the participants opted for privacy. And when asked, What makes giving 
information to businesses different from giving information to governments? 
participants raised several concerns about business: 
 
British Responses 
- I have more trust in giving biometric information to the government than giving 
it to businesses. Businesses will use your information for advertising. 
- In theory the government is to protect people. Businesses care only about profit 
- There is no guarantee on what they (businesses) will do with it (information). 
American Responses 
- The business sector can sell the information to somebody else. 
- The Business sector wants to know everything about your consumption habits. 
- The Business sector always wants to sell you something. Although 
governments’ objectives can change. 
- They (private sector) can sell the information to the highest bidder. 
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- The government is not going to call me in middle of a dinner. 
- If business sector can be defined as my doctor… I trust my doctor more. 
International Responses 
- Businesses can use it for profit purposes. 
- Businesses can sell the information to other companies. 
- I would give my information more easily to my government than to business. 
 
We recognise the limits of possible conclusions that can be drawn from a study with an 
unrepresentative population. However, we argue that their responses may serve as a 
limiting case. Our participants are highly informed and highly educated compared to the 
average person. As part of their regular activities they actively engage in discussions 
about global politics, economics and relevant social issues. Therefore, we consider that 
their social representations, as gathered through the focus groups, could be a limiting 
case for our research in biometrics. This group of young, well-informed, and well-
educated citizens conceptualise biometrics in terms of science-fiction movies, yet they 
are to a certain extent also able to separate fact from fiction. While recognising potential 
benefits from biometric authentication, they expressed doubt and uncertainty as to how 
personal data would be used. It is fair to assume that the rest of the population may draw 
even less rational inferences from the same images seen in films. The general public is 
more likely to be confused about the use of biometrics, and thus, the average person’s 
perceptions may be relatively more influenced by fantasy than reality. 
Conclusion 
The results of our focus groups suggest that the social representation of biometrics is 
objectified primarily in science fiction movies and, predominantly for the British group, 
in the ID cards debate. In the U.S. and British groups there was a stronger influence 
from science fiction films and in the international group we did not find any tendency or 
reference in common towards biometrics. Nevertheless, when the groups expressed their 
ideas about biometrics, along with its applications and implications, they shared a 
number of similar concerns and arguments anchoring biometrics in terms of security 
and privacy. Even though security is an important reference through which participants 
discussed biometrics, they did not perceive any security benefits resulting from the use 
of biometrics. 
 
Participants believed that they live in a secure environment and do not see the relevance 
of implementing biometrics for security purposes. In terms of privacy all groups showed 
a great concern that the government and the private sector could misuse biometric 
information. These concerns were much more accentuated toward the private sector. In 
any case, these attitudes are susceptible to change when participants identify a person or 
organisation, public or private, that they trust. Overall there is strong demand for 
governments’ regulation of the collection, storage and distribution of biometric 
information. These attitudes underscore the importance of information ownership and 
trust relationships between citizens and relevant service providers. 
 
 
 
100 The LSE Identity Project Interim Report:  March 2005 
 
 
Appendix Three:  Memorandum of Laws on EU 
Freedom of Movement 
Introduction 
This memorandum151 describes certain of the issues associated with the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) proposed Identity Cards Bill, introduced and published by the UK 
Government on 29 November 2004.  A report issued by the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights on 2 February 2005 already has examined the Bill for compliance with human 
rights legislation and principles, including notably the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  This memorandum thus does not address that particular subject, but notes that 
the Bill does give rise to a number of potential issues as a matter of UK and European 
human rights law.   
 
This memorandum instead focuses on certain other legal issues raised by the proposed 
legislation.  In particular, we consider the extent to which the Bill -- as currently 
envisioned by the UK Government -- could conflict with existing European Community 
principles governing the free movement of persons within the European Union (EU).  
We also tentatively outline other issues that the Bill raises, such as issues relating to 
third party liability and possible indirect discrimination arising from phased 
implementation of the identity card scheme.  We do not discuss here the details of the 
proposed legislation, and assume some familiarity with its requirements.  
EU Freedom of Movement Principle 
Summary 
The Government’s Identity Card Bill would appear to require the mandatory registration 
on the National Identity Register of all EU citizens resident in the UK for more than 
three months.152  This requirement arguably conflicts with EU freedom of movement 
principles and, in particular, with the recently enacted EU Directive on the Free 
Movement of Persons, Directive 2004/38/EC (the Directive).  The Directive’s 
provisions suggest that EU citizens should not and cannot be compelled to register with 
the National Identity Register and obtain an identity card, at least not on the conditions 
set forth in the proposed Bill. 
 
EU Free Movement Principles and Directive 2004/38/EC 
The free movement of persons within the EU remains one of the four pillars of the EU’s 
Internal Market.  Under the free movement principle, EU citizens retain a fundamental 
                                                 
151 This Memorandum of Laws was prepared for the London School of Economics and Political Science by 
Covington and Burling. 
152 “Registration certificates and residence permits for foreign nationals would be issued, taking account of EU 
standards, but to the same level of security as the UK identity cards and as part of a single overall system of recording 
and verifying the identity of all legal residents”. Cm 6359, Identity Cards:  The Government Reply to the Fourth 
Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session 2003-04 HC 130, p 4. 
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right to freedom of movement and residence within the EU, as conferred directly by 
Article 39 of the EC Treaty, subordinate legislation and related case law.  The precise 
rights of entry and residence now are governed by a complex body of EU legislation.  
 
Under legislation that preceded the new Directive, EU citizens could enter another 
Member State “on production of a valid identity card or passport” and stay in that 
Member State for up to three months without the need to comply with any formalities, 
such as obtaining a residence card.  Workers, self-employed persons and their families 
were entitled to a five-year residence permit that could be renewed automatically. 
 
Then, in 2001, the European Commission issued proposals that ultimately resulted in 
the enactment of Directive 2004/38/EC.  The Directive’s principal aim is “to simplify 
and strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens” by 
codifying existing directives into a single legislative act.  The Directive creates a new 
right of permanent residence and sets forth the limits that can be placed on these rights 
by Member States on public policy, public security or public health grounds. 
 
The UK Government has until 30 April 2006 to implement the Directive and, prior to 
implementing the Directive, is precluded from enacting conflicting legislation.  As 
noted by the European Court of Justice in Case C-129/96 Inter-Environment Wallonie 
ASBL v Région Wallonie, “it is during the transposition period that the Member States 
must take the measures necessary to ensure that the result prescribed by [a] directive is 
achieved at the end of that period” and to refrain “from adopting measures liable 
seriously to compromise the results prescribed”.  
The Proposed Scheme is Arguably Incompatible with Directive 2004/28/EC 
The Directive requires Member States to allow EU citizens “to enter their territory with 
a valid identity card or passport” (Article 5) and to reside there for up to three months 
“without any conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid 
identity card or passport” (Article 6).  EU citizens, therefore, have the express right to 
stay in the UK for up to three months without any conditions or formalities.  Requiring 
them to acquire a UK identity card during that period of time would qualify as a 
condition or formality.  The Government appears to have accepted this and has stated 
that for “legal reasons, it is not feasible to require EU nationals to register until they 
have been in the UK for three months and intend to stay longer.”153 
 
Article 7, in turn, confers on all EU citizens the right to reside in another EU Member 
State for more than three months, if the citizen falls into one of the following categories 
of persons:  workers and self-employed persons, students and those with sufficient 
resources to support themselves without becoming a burden on the relevant Member 
State’s social welfare system.154  Article 8 describes the administrative formalities that a 
Member State may apply to such EU citizens -- namely, the host Member State may 
require the EU citizen to “register with the relevant authorities” (Article 8(1)).  Article 
8(2) goes on to clarify that a “registration certificate shall be issued immediately [by the 
                                                 
153 Cm 6359, Identity Cards:  The Government Reply to the Fourth Report from the Home Affairs Committee 
Session 2003-04 HC 130, p 10. 
154 Family members (whether or not EU citizens) have a corresponding right of residence if they are accompanying 
or joining the EU citizen. 
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Member State], stating the name and address of the person registering and the date of 
registration.”  The “registration certificate” is, however, all that the Directive requires. 
 
The Directive is unclear as to whether the “registration certificate” itself may or should 
contain any additional information beyond the individual’s name, address and date of 
registration.  The indications are that it should not.  When originally proposing the 
Directive, the European Commission commented: 
The residence certificate states the name and address of the person 
concerned; it does not have a period of validity and simply states the 
date of registration.  The purpose of the certificate is merely to record 
that an administrative formality has been carried out.155 (emphasis 
added) 
In other words, and consistent with the notion that residency in another EU Member 
State should not entail onerous registration requirements, the residence permit should 
only require the bare minimum amount of information specified in Article 8.  There 
certainly is nothing to suggest that additional personal information about an EU citizen, 
such as the individual’s date and place of birth, previous addresses, photograph, 
fingerprints or biometric data should be included.  Indeed, just the opposite result would 
appear to be called for given the underlying aims of the Directive.   
 
Moreover, for the registration certificate to be issued, Member States “may only 
require” under Article 8 that the EU citizen present a valid identity card or passport and, 
where they qualify as a worker, confirmation that they are entitled to work from an 
employer in that Member State or a certificate of employment.  If the EU citizen falls 
into one of the other categories of person entitled to residence over three months, the 
Member State can require “appropriate proof” (Article 8(3)).  Recital 14 of the 
Directive, however, clarifies that the documents specified in Article 8 serve as an 
exhaustive list of the supporting evidence that a Member State may require before 
issuing a registration certificate.156 
 
Significantly, the Government appears to equate registering, as that term is understood 
under the Directive, with registering for purposes of the National Identity Register.157  
However, the process of registration under the Directive is limited and carefully 
prescribed, as noted above.  Indeed, the UK proposal would call for further evidence or 
information that would appear to be contrary to the spirit of the Directive, which is “to 
simplify and strengthen the right of free movement and residence of all Union citizens” 
and generally to reduce and harmonise the administrative formalities that may be 
applied to this right.  At a minimum, this suggests that the UK Government should not 
                                                 
155 Com(2001) 257 final, p 12. 
156 Recital 14 provides, in particular, that:  “The supporting documents required by competent authorities for the 
issuing of a registration certificate or of a residence card should be comprehensively specified in order to avoid 
divergent administrative practices or interpretations constituting an undue obstacle to the exercise of the right of 
residence by Union citizens and their family members”.  
157 The UK Government has stated that:  “For legal reasons, it is not feasible to require EU nationals to register until 
they have been in the UK for three months and intend to stay longer.  EU Free Movement legislation provides that all 
Member States may require nationals of other EU states resident in their territory to register with the authorities ‘not 
less than three months from the date of arrival’”. Cm 6359, Identity Cards:  The Government Reply to the Fourth 
Report from the Home Affairs Committee Session 2003-04 HC 130, p 10. 
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require that EU citizens residing in the UK apply for and obtain an identity card that 
contains unique biometric identifiers and would compel the citizen to submit, or have 
third parties submit on his or her behalf, extensive documentation and other supporting 
evidence.158 
The Directive’s Derogations Do Not Appear to Permit Blanket Restrictions 
The Directive permits limited restrictions on the freedom of movement and residence of 
EU citizens “on grounds of public policy, public security or public health” (Article 
27(1)).  The Directive carefully limits the scope of these public policy and public 
security derogations, stating that measures taken must “comply with the principle of 
proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual 
concerned” (Article 27(2)). This is consistent with European case law, which has 
interpreted these derogations narrowly and introduced the notion of “proportionality”.  
Significantly, Article 27(2) provides: 
The personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the 
fundamental interests of society.  Justifications that are isolated from 
the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of general 
prevention shall not be accepted.  (Article 27(2)) [emphasis added] 
Therefore, the Article 27 derogations can only be used on a case-by-case basis and not 
against an entire class of individuals, as these “shall not be accepted”.  Thus, it would 
not appear possible for the Government to rely on general claims of “public security”, 
for instance, to resolve any conflict between the Identity Cards Bill and the provisions 
of the Directive.  As a consequence, any blanket rule that would require all EU citizens 
residing in the UK to become registered on the National Identity Register would appear 
to fall outside the scope of any applicable derogation permitted under Article 27 of the 
Directive.  
                                                 
158 The Directive creates a new right of permanent residence.  EU citizens who have resided legally in another 
Member State for five years may, but are not obliged to, apply for a “document certifying permanent residence” 
(Articles 16 and 19).  The Directive does not specify the form of the application or the document, so it is possible that 
the document could be similar to the identity card as proposed.  What is clear, however, is that the document must be 
valid indefinitely, not renewable after a prescribed period as in the case of a UK identity card. 
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Appendix Four:  Data protection analysis 
 
“I want to make it very clear to the public that this draft Bill is not just 
about an ID card, but an extensive national identity register and the 
creation of a national identity registration number. Each of these raise 
substantial data protection and personal privacy concerns in their own 
right. The introduction of a national identity register will lead to the 
creation of the most detailed population register in the UK.” - Richard 
Thomas, Information Commissioner, Press Release July 2004. 
This appendix will seek to identify some of the data protection and privacy concerns 
referred to by the Information Commissioner. 
 
The National Identity Register 
Although the Register forms a substantial part of the Bill its existence is not 
acknowledged in the title of the Bill. The problems in the development and maintenance 
of such a database are well known with difficulties including the identification of the 
appropriate technology and running systems. The DPA requires any personal 
information held in a database to be accurate, up to date, relevant, adequate and not 
excessive for the stated purposes; standards which provide sufficient challenges to data 
controllers. However, should compulsion for the whole nation become fact, the scope of 
the Register, the amount of information to be held and the necessary complexity of the 
infrastructure will present additional problems in terms of compliance with the DPA. 
 
The Bill states that the Register is to be a convenient method for individuals to prove 
registrable facts about themselves to others and to allow those facts to be ascertained by 
others where it is in the public interest; only one of those ‘registrable’ facts is a person’s 
identity.  Identity per se is listed in cl 1(6) of the Bill as being a person’s full name, 
other names by which they have been known, place and date of birth and identifying 
physical characteristics.   
 
The Bill lists another 15 classes of information that may to be included on the Register. 
It is difficult to see how the requirement for all of this information can satisfy the 3rd 
Data Protection Principle by being relevant, adequate and not excessive for the 
proposed purposes. A person will be required to provide their present main address, 
alternative addresses and previous addresses; a great deal of historical information will 
be collected that will not contribute to a person’s ‘identity’.   
 
The Register will also include a great deal of transactional data such as dates of 
applications, modifications and disclosures of information on the Register; the purposes 
of the Register are insufficiently precise to understand how such data retention will not 
be in breach of the 3rd , 4th and 5th Data Protection Principles. 
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The information held on the Register will be disclosable without the consent of the 
individual to the Security Services, Chief Police Officers, Inland Revenue and Customs 
& Excise, any prescribed government department and any other person specified by 
Order by the Secretary of State.  Again the potentially wide audience to whom this large 
and powerful amount of information might be disclosed to will go the fairness and 
transparency features of the 1st Data Protection Principle and the specificity 
requirement of the 2nd.    
 
Section 29 of the Data Protection Act does make provision for disclosures to bodies 
such as the police and Inland Revenue, however, the body making the disclosures is 
required, in the absence of warrant, court order or other legal compulsion, to assess on a 
case by case basis whether the information should be passed on.  Cl. 19 of the Bill does 
not require such an assessment, but is merely qualified by Cl. 23 which states it is not 
reasonably practicable to expect the requestor to obtain the information by other means.  
There is no exposition of this test and with a growing centralized database of 
information about the UK populace one can imagine both security and law enforcement 
forces arguing that obtaining information from other sources will not be ‘reasonably 
practicable’, particularly if they believe their request is likely to fail the s.29 test. 
 
If the argument for a National Register is accepted then the actual practical aspects of 
administration, maintenance and compliance with the information quality principles 
(3rd, 4th, 5th) present very serious concerns.   
 
One particular concern is the requirement upon individuals to notify the Secretary of 
State of any changes to the registrable facts on the Register in Cl. 12 of the Bill.  Under 
the provisions of the 4th principle, it is the responsibility of the data controller to take 
all reasonable steps to ensure the information they hold is accurate and up to data.  Not 
only does Cl. 12 shift this responsibility onto the individual but imposes a penalty of up 
to £1,000 for failing to do so even though later on at Cl. 37 an individual may 
eventually have to pay a fee in order to alter their records.  One can anticipate the 
difficulties that are likely ensuring that it is up to date bearing in mind the range of 
information that is going to be held on the Register. There may well be issues about 
policing of such requirements. 
 
Finally, there are already several other initiatives underway to collate information about 
citizens in the UK: the Citizen’s Information Project initiated by the National Census 
Office and the database of all children under the Children’s Bill.  There is clearly further 
potential for the amount of information to be linked or transferred to the National 
Identity Register if the Secretary of State chooses to make this happen by Order. It is 
unclear at present how these initiatives are to work together in practice. Other policies 
such as the retention of communications data by communications service providers and 
the tracking of vehicles for taxation of road usage also have the potential to be 
combined to provide the government with a comprehensive and all pervasive database 
on the lives of its citizens. 
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The Identity Card 
The purposes of the National Identity Card still remain to be clarified: referring back as 
it does to the entries in the Register – the 1st Data Protection Principle therefore remains 
to be satisfied within the legislation itself.  There is also general concern that even if 
such purposes were to be listed in sufficient clarity within the legislation, the production 
of an ID card would be required in order to access a wide number of as yet 
unanticipated services both in the public and private sector – the ‘function creep’ 
referred to by so many commentators on the legislation.159 The notion of function creep 
is nothing new; the same process happened with the ID card issued during World War II 
when there were originally three purposes for the card (national service, security and 
rationing); eleven years later thirty nine government agencies made use of the records 
for a variety of services.160 
 
It is also unclear from the Bill precisely what information will be held on the face of the 
card and which parts will be encrypted on the card chip, and even where some parts are 
encrypted, who will have access to the full information on the card.  The 1st and 7th Data 
Protection Principles may be breached if there is insufficient security surrounding the 
information on the card. Without clear limits on who may access information on the 
card and then go on to retain the information they have obtained there is a danger of the 
3rd and 5th Principles being breached. 
 
The issue of ID cards to those applying for the issue or renewal of certain documents 
such as driving licences and passports will not only contribute to the lack of clarity as to 
purposes but will also undermine the idea that the compulsion to hold an ID card will be 
the subject of scrutiny in Parliament before it is extended to the wider populace. When 
an individual is asked to present an ID card based on one of these documents it is very 
likely that not all information will be relevant on every occasion. The risk is that 
excessive information will be disclosed and possibly retained even where it is not 
necessary for the particular circumstances in which the card was presented and the 3rd 
Principle will again be breached. 
 
If the aim of the ID card was to merely confirm identity it would be possible to achieve 
this purpose through a far simpler process and much less personal information would 
have to be gathered and retained than that which is being proposed by the Bill.  This 
would present far fewer difficulties with compliance with the Data Protection Act and 
Human Rights Act. 
National Identity Registration Number 
The introduction of a unique identifier which will be linked to information stored in the 
National Identity Register and linked to other nationally used numbers such as National 
Insurance and Driving Licence numbers raises further concerns particularly in terms of 
security. The value of the National Identity Registration Number will mean that steps 
will have to be taken to ensure the number does not gain common currency and is 
                                                 
159 Information Commissioner’s evidence to Select Committee on Home Affairs, 3rd February 2004. 
160 Information Commissioner, Response to the Government’s Consultation on Legislation on Identity Cards, 2004, 
http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/cms/DocumentUploads/the%20information%20commissioners%20resp
onse%20to%20the%20draft%20bill.pdf.  
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protected from cloning, duplication and other practices that might lead to identity fraud. 
The 1st and 7th Data Protection Principles will have to be adhered to closely if the 
Number is to be properly protected and used. 
General Issues 
There are some general data protection issues that run as a common thread throughout 
the Bill and the next section aims to highlight those particular areas of concern. 
Fair and lawful processing 
There are three main elements to the First Data Protection Principle: processing must be 
legitimate, fair and lawful. The very enactment of the enabling legislation will ensure 
that any processing will be legitimate.   
 
There may be questions however, surrounding the other two elements of fairness to 
individuals and lawfulness.  Although the Bill does list more clearly the purposes for 
which the ID card and Register will be used than in earlier proposals, the provisions 
within the Bill for wide ranging powers of the Secretary of State to make amendments 
to the legislation by Order without full consideration by Parliament or public debate 
mean that the existing purposes and consequent disclosures may become less clear over 
time and any Fair Processing Notices provided by either the Home Office or 
participating public bodies will become inadequate.  
 
The overall test of fairness may, in the view of some, not be satisfied either: charging 
individuals for the issue of the cards themselves and for keeping that information up to 
date may not be fair if it disadvantages certain groups of people.  Cl. 2(4) states that an 
entry may be made in the Register for a person whether or not the individual has applied 
to be, or is entitled to be in it. 
 
Furthermore, once the decision to make the ID card compulsory for all is taken, some of 
the safeguards in the Bill such as the Cl. 18 prohibition on making the production of an 
ID card a condition of providing a service will be undermined and remove the 
opportunity for a person to choose to rely on alternative means of identification. 
 
The third element of the 1st Data Protection Principle (that of lawfulness) brings into 
play the human rights considerations mentioned earlier. Both the European Convention 
on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act allow for intrusions on the right of privacy 
where they are necessary to safeguard national security, defence, public security…the 
rights and freedoms of others… and is necessary in a democratic society.   One of the 
questions which needs to be asked is whether the actions being taken are a proportionate 
response to the harm seeking to be avoided.   The Home Secretary has stated that he 
believes the provisions of the Bill are compatible with the Convention Rights but has 
yet to demonstrate why he feels able to make this statement. However, it has long been 
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights that the storing of information and the 
use of it amount to an interference with the right to respect for private life.161 
Compatibility therefore remains to be tested in the courts. 
                                                 
161 Leander v Sweden, March, 1987; Amann v Switzerland, February 2000,  Rotaru v Romania, 2000 
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Security 
The Bill proposes that the ID card and National Register will provide for an individual 
to establish his identity and obtain the services to which they are entitled.  It is quite 
clear therefore that the ID card and Register will become a target for identity fraudsters; 
protecting against unauthorized access, use and disclosure as required by the 7th Data 
Protection Principle will present huge technical and logistical challenges which are not 
addressed within the Bill apart from the expected criminalization of certain behaviours.   
Given the potential damage and risk to an individual whose information and identity is 
unlawfully obtained and used, the Bill is worryingly silent on how the infrastructure 
will be kept secure and how individuals whose identities are stolen will be dealt with.  
Recent failures of existing governmental computer systems such as those at the Child 
Support Agency, Department for Work and Pensions and even the police fingerprint 
database, illustrate the need for a robust, secure and foolproof technology.   
 
The Bill anticipates that various public bodies will be able to access the ‘registrable 
particulars’ of the individual in question. A comprehensive set of standards of 
processing and procedures are going to be necessary in order to protect the integrity of 
the National Register and the information held by those public bodies. 
 
The 7th Data Protection Principle also requires data controllers to ensure their suppliers 
take steps to keep the information they process on behalf of the data controller safe from 
loss and disclosure. If any of the functions of the ID card and Register are outsourced, 
the government will have to ensure the contractual arrangements are sufficiently 
rigorous to protect the data and provide for the independent auditing of those outsourced 
functions.  Clearly if any outsourcing were to be overseas the 8th Data Protection 
Principle would also be engaged. 
Data sharing 
One of the main results of the provisions of the National Identity Register will be that a 
great deal of information will be shared between public bodies.  The government 
undertook a large exercise several years ago via the Performance and Innovation Unit 
which considered the obstacles to data sharing between public bodies.  Some of those 
obstacles were overcome by legislation which established lawful gateways for data 
sharing but also required memoranda of understanding to ensure data was only shared 
where necessary and that all the information held by various public sector bodies did not 
end up being pooled.   This approach recognized that public bodies’ powers only 
extended to the extent of their enabling legislation and that there were also public 
concerns about their information being shared widely across the public sector.162     
 
The proposals in the present Bill will undermine those protections and at the same time 
make data sharing much less visible and transparent. Cl. 19(4)f gives the Secretary of 
State powers to specify when the information contained in the Register may be 
disclosed on top of those crime prevention, customs and tax purposes already 
enumerated in the clause. 
                                                 
162 Cabinet Office, Privacy and Data sharing – The way forward for Public Service, PIU, 2002. 
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Conclusion 
The Identity Cards Bill raises many questions concerning compatibility with existing 
Data Protection legislation.  The remaining lack of clarity of purpose and the wide 
ranging scope for the Secretary of State to amend the various elements of the legislation 
by Order, mean that the elements of transparency and certainty sought by the First Data 
Protection Principle may not be provided.  The lack of clarity has a knock on effect for 
satisfying the remaining principles – if the purpose is not clear it is difficult to assess 
whether information stored is relevant or excessive.  The Bill also proposes turning the 
principle that it is the data controller’s duty to ensure the accuracy of their data on its 
head by laying this onus on the individual themselves.  Furthermore, though not clearly 
stated, it is implicit that the information fed into the Register will be kept indefinitely. 
The Bill in many ways seeks to obviate the requirements of the DPA by taking the 
whole ID card outside the data protection regime: “The Government’s commitment to 
make the scheme consistent with the data protection legislation can be summarized as 
outline proposals to exempt the scheme from five of the eight data protection principles 
through the use of statutory powers.”163 
 
Definitions 
Data subject means an individual who is the subject of personal data.  
Personal data means data, which relate to a living individual who can be identified – 
a) from those data, or 
b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to 
come into the possession of, the data controller. 
Sensitive personal data means personal data consisting of information as to- 
a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, 
b) their political opinions, 
c) their religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, 
d) whether they are a member of a trade union, 
e) their physical or mental health or condition, 
f) their sexual life, 
g) their criminal convictions or alleged convictions. 
Processing, in relation to information or data, means obtaining, recording or holding the 
information or data or carrying out any operation or set of operations on the information 
or data including- 
a) organisation, adaptation or alteration of the information or data, 
b) retrieval, consultation or use of the information or data: this will include simply 
looking at information on a computer screen and making a decision about the 
individual based on that information which is then recorded elsewhere. 
c) disclosure of the information or data by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, or 
d) alignment, combination, blocking, erasure or destruction of the information or data. 
Data controller means, a person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other 
persons) determines the purposes for which and manner in which any personal data are, 
or are to be, processed. 
                                                 
163 Memorandum submitted by the Editors of ‘Data Protection and Privacy Practice’ to the Select Committee on 
Home Affairs.  

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
